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Nuremberg Lives On: How Justice Jackson’s
International Experience Continues to Shape
Domestic Criminal Procedure
Brian R. Gallini*
The end of Germany’s participation in World War II came with its
formal surrender on May 8, 1945. After extensive debate over what
would come of top Nazi leaders, twenty-two Nazi defendants were tried
and ultimately convicted after 216 days of trials held in Nuremberg
spread across eleven months between November 1945 and 1946.
Associate Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson took a leave of
absence from the Court to lead the trial’s prosecutorial effort.
Decades of scholarship have considered and evaluated the
Nuremberg trials alongside Jackson’s role in them. But, no article has
evaluated how Justice Jackson’s experience as Nuremberg Chief
Prosecutor shaped his view of domestic criminal procedure issues when
he returned to the Court after the Nazi trials.
This Article makes two arguments. First, that Justice Jackson’s
experience as Nuremberg Chief Prosecutor transformed his thinking
about domestic criminal procedure.
Second, that Jackson’s
transformative Nuremberg experience remarkably continues to
impact—even today—the law on search and seizure, confessions, and
right to counsel. More than a handful of his post-Nuremberg opinions
remain consistently cited by lower courts and the Supreme Court alike.
Accordingly, this Article concludes, Nuremberg did more than affect
international criminal law. Given that so many of Jackson’s postNuremberg opinions continue to impact everyday citizens, the famous
war criminal trials that happened more than sixty years ago remain
modernly and domestically relevant.
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INTRODUCTION
On a pleasant evening in April 1945, Joseph Goebbels, the Nazis’
Propaganda Minister, read two horoscopes: one from January 30, 1933
(the day Hitler took office) and the other from November 9, 1918 (the
day of the Weimar Republic’s birth).1 The horoscopes, Goebbels
concluded, remarkably predicted the outbreak of war in 1939, German
victory in 1941, difficulty in the early months of 1945, and a temporary
success in the second half of April followed by Germany’s rise in
1948.2 Fortified by these predictions of the stars, Goebbels on April 6,
1945, sent the following to the remaining Nazi forces:
The Fuehrer has declared that even in this very year a change of
fortune shall come . . . . The true quality of genius is its consciousness
and its sure knowledge of coming change. The Fuehrer knows the
exact hour of its arrival. Destiny has sent us this man so that we, in
this time of great external and internal stress, shall testify to the
miracle . . . .3

President Roosevelt was dead nearly a week later—on April 12,
1945—and Goebbels was certain that Roosevelt’s death was the
“temporary success” the horoscopes predicted.4 He boldly brought out
the finest champagne, congratulated Hitler and other top officials, and
shared his certainty that Roosevelt’s death marked a turning point for

1. WILLIAM L. SHIRER, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE THIRD REICH: A HISTORY OF NAZI
GERMANY 1108–09 (Simon & Schuster 1960).
2. Id. at 1109.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 1110.
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Germany in the war.5
How wrong he was. As the Nazis toasted Roosevelt’s death, Russian
troops closed in on Berlin with alarming speed.6 The reality was not a
turning point that favored the Nazis; rather, by that point, victory in
World War II was a near certainty for the Allies.7 As if any
confirmation of that was necessary, Hitler’s celebration of Roosevelt’s
passing was fleeting; he exchanged congratulations with his top officials
on April 12 and was dead by his own hand before the month was over.8
The end of Germany’s participation in World War II came with its
formal surrender on May 8, 1945.9 With the Nazi threat removed and
wartime concluding, the international community debated what would
become of top Nazi leaders responsible for wartime atrocities.10 Many
Allied leaders, including for a time even Roosevelt himself, favored a
political resolution for remaining Nazi leaders; that is, summary
executions.11 But Robert H. Jackson thought differently.12 Alone in his
thinking, Jackson proposed a full and fair trial for top Nazi leaders.13
He believed doing so would set new precedent in transitional
international law.14 Despite understandable temptations to exact
retribution on Third Reich leaders, a trial would demonstrate fairness.15
His logic was persuasive and, in the first international criminal trial in
history, Jackson served as Chief Prosecutor for the United States while
on leave from his position as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court.16
5. Id.
6. TIME-LIFE BOOKS, THE ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF WORLD WAR II 413–15 (2001).
7. Id. at 415.
8. Id. at 420.
9. Id. at 424.
10. Mark Weisenmiller, Nazis on Trial, AMERICA IN WWII MAG., Oct. 2006,
http://www.americainwwii.com/articles/nazis-on-trial/.
11. WHITNEY R. HARRIS, TYRANNY ON TRIAL: THE TRIAL OF THE MAJOR GERMAN WAR
CRIMINALS AT THE END OF WORLD WAR II AT NUREMBERG, GERMANY, 1945–1946, at 7–8
(1954) (discussing the support by Roosevelt’s Treasury Secretary, Hans Morgenthau, in favor of
summary executions for Nazi leaders and his work to persuade Roosevelt to back up the summary
execution concept); JOSEPH E. PERSICO, NUREMBERG: INFAMY ON TRIAL 7–8 (1994) (stating
Winston Churchill initially proposed summary execution of Nazi leaders).
12. LOUIS FISHER, NAZI SABOTEURS ON TRIAL: A MILITARY TRIBUNAL AND AMERICAN
LAW 116 (2003); Henry T. King, Jr., Lecture at Chautauqua Institution: Robert Jackson’s Place in
History: Nuremberg Revisited (June 13, 2003), available at http://www.roberthjackson.org/theman/speeches-articles/speeches/speeches-related-to-robert-h-jackson/robert-jacksons-place-inhistory-nuremberg-revisited/.
13. Judge Norbert Ehrenfreund, Address at the Robert H. Jackson Center: Reflections on
Nuremberg Trial (June 13, 2005), available at http://www.roberthjackson.org/the-man/speechesarticles/speeches/speeches-related-to-robert-h-jackson/reflections-on-nuremberg-trial/.
14. FISHER, supra note 12, at 116; Ehrenfreund, supra note 13.
15. Ehrenfreund, supra note 13.
16. Henry T. King, Jr., Robert Jackson’s Vision for Justice and Other Reflections of a

GALLINI PRINT - FINAL 2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

4

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

10/4/2014 2:20 PM

[Vol. 46

He was the first and only Supreme Court Justice to serve as an
international prosecutor.17
Twenty-two Nazi defendants were tried and nineteen were ultimately
convicted after 216 days of trials held in Nuremberg that spread across
eleven months between November 194518 and 1946.19 Decades of
scholarship have considered the incredible effect of the Nuremberg
trials on human rights litigation,20 international criminal courts,21 and
the evolution of international humanitarian law22—among many other
topics.23 But no article has evaluated how Justice Jackson’s experience
Nuremberg Prosecutor, 88 GEO. L.J. 2421, 2423 (2000).
17. Other justices have, however, engaged in extrajudicial service. As the Supreme Court has
explained, “[i]n 1877, five Justices served on the Election Commission that resolved the hotly
contested Presidential election of 1876.” Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 400 (1989).
Other justices have “served on various arbitral commissions,” and “Justice [Owen] Roberts was a
member of the commission organized to investigate the attack on Pearl Harbor.” Id. By way of
final example, “Chief Justice Warren presided over the commission investigating the
assassination of President Kennedy.” Id.
18. Telford Taylor, The Nuremberg Trials, 55 COLUM. L. REV. 488, 503 (1955); Doug Linder,
The Nuremberg Trials, UNIV. MO. KAN. CITY SCH. LAW (2000), http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/
projects/ftrials/nuremberg/nurembergACCOUNT.html.
19. Taylor, supra note 18, at 510.
20. See, e.g., NORBERT EHRENFREUND, THE NUREMBERG LEGACY: HOW THE NAZI WAR
CRIMES TRIAL CHANGED THE COURSE OF HISTORY 121–29 (2007) (suggesting the greatest
influence of the Nuremberg Trials was the extension of international law into the area of human
rights through the invention of “crimes against humanity”); John Shattuck, The Legacy of
Nuremberg: Confronting Genocide and Terrorism Through the Rule of Law, 10 GONZ. J. INT’L L.
6, 7 (2007) (stating “[t]he modern concept of human rights accountability can be traced back to
the Nuremberg trials”); Gwynne Skinner, Nuremberg’s Legacy Continues: The Nuremberg
Trials’ Influence on Human Rights Litigation in U.S. Courts Under the Alien Tort Statute, 71
ALB. L. REV. 321, 326 (2008) (studying the link between the Nuremberg Trials and various
aspects of human rights litigation, including subject-matter jurisdiction, violations of customary
international law, complicit liability by corporations, and individual liability for violation of
human rights).
21. Beth Fain, The International Criminal Court: An Eminent Impact on a Hesitant United
States, 35 TEX. TECH L. REV. 163, 175 (2004) (discussing the precedent set by Nuremberg for
international criminal prosecution and the creation of the International Criminal Court); Henry T.
King, Jr., Universal Jurisdiction: Myths, Realities, Prospects, War Crimes and Crimes Against
Humanity: The Nuremberg Precedent, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 281, 283 (2001) (recognizing the
universal jurisdiction approach adopted at Nuremberg); David Tolbert, The International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: Unforeseen Successes and Foreseeable
Shortcomings, 26 FLETCHER FORUM OF WORLD AFFAIRS, Summer/Fall 2002, at 7, 11 (stating
that ad hoc tribunals, beginning with Nuremberg, “laid the foundation for the establishment of a
practical and permanent system of international criminal justice”).
22. Winston P. Nagan, International Criminal Law and the Ad Hoc Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, 6 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 127, 150–52 (1995) (relating the Nuremberg Trials to
the principle that individuals can be subject to international legal rights and obligations); Ruti
Teitel, Transitional Justice: Postwar Legacies, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1615, 1627–30 (2006)
(exploring how the substantive charges at Nuremberg have helped to define the concepts of
injustice and persecution in global politics and continue to shape the rule of law).
23. See, e.g., Christoph Burchard, The Nuremberg Trial and its Impact on Germany, 4 J. INT’L
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as Nuremberg Chief Prosecutor shaped his view of domestic criminal
procedure issues when he returned to the Court after the Nazi trials.24
This Article makes two arguments: first, that Justice Jackson’s
experience as Chief Prosecutor at Nuremberg transformed his thinking
about domestic criminal procedure—specifically his approach to (1)
search and seizure, (2) confessions, and (3) right to counsel. This
Article contends that, prior to Nuremberg, Jackson had not fully
developed his thinking about criminal procedure issues.
After Nuremberg, however, Jackson developed what this Article calls
a body of “dispassionate criminal procedure.”
Jackson’s postNuremberg opinions are replete with illustrations of what became his
crystalized and consistent approach to key criminal procedure issues—
particularly those related to search and seizure, confessions, and right to
counsel. This approach was generally rooted in judicial restraint, but,
specifically in the context of criminal procedure, he became more vocal
on the overarching importance of defendants receiving a neutral and fair
procedural prosecutorial trial experience overall.
Second, this Article asserts that Jackson’s transformative Nuremberg
experience remarkably continues to impact—even today—the law on
search and seizure, confessions, and right to counsel. More than a
handful of his post-Nuremberg opinions remain consistently cited by
lower courts and the Supreme Court alike. Accordingly, this Article
concludes that Nuremberg did more than affect international criminal
law. Given that so many of Jackson’s post-Nuremberg opinions
continue to impact everyday citizens, the famous war criminals trial that
happened more than fifty years ago remains modernly—and
domestically—relevant.
Part I explores Jackson’s background to briefly highlight that in his
formative professional years he rarely had occasion to become
meaningfully involved in search and seizure, confession, and/or right to
counsel issues. Rather, his extraordinary pre-Nuremberg career was
filled primarily with tax-related issues, antitrust considerations, and
Supreme Court appellate advocacy. It is not surprising, as Part I notes,
that before his departure for Nuremberg, Jackson penned only one
criminal procedure opinion while serving as an Associate Justice to the
Supreme Court.
CRIM. JUST. 800 (2006); Jonathan A. Bush, The Prehistory of Corporations and Conspiracy in
International Criminal Law: What Nuremberg Really Said, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1094 (2009);
From the Library, Advice from Justice Jackson, 5 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 215 (2003); Jonathan
Turley, Transformative Justice and the Ethos of Nuremberg, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 655 (2000).
24. To be clear, this Article’s use of the terms “criminal procedure” will encapsulate only
search and seizure, confessions, and right to counsel.
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Part II evaluates Jackson’s transformation as Nuremberg Chief
Prosecutor by looking, in part, into his personal papers—including the
diary he kept during the Nazi trials.
This assessment makes
unmistakably clear how difficult it was for him to navigate procedural
issues in what was, and remains, the biggest international criminal trial
the world has ever seen.
That experience, Part III argues, changed his thinking about criminal
procedure after his return to the Court from Nuremberg. That change is
best reflected not only by his productivity—he wrote thirteen opinions
on criminal procedure-related issues25—but also by the thoughtfulness
and analytical clarity manifested in a handful of illustrative opinions,
like United States v. Di Re (majority),26 McDonald v. United States
(concurrence),27 and Brinegar v. United States (dissent).28 Courts
nationwide have cited those opinions in excess of 3500 times since their
respective publications.29 This Article concludes that those opinions’

25. See infra note 417 and accompanying citations.
26. United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581 (1948). In 2012 alone, courts nationwide cited Di Re
eighteen times: Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2509 (2012); United States v. Jones,
132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring); Booker v. Ray, No. 3:11-cv-00268, 2012
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 169806, at *41 (M.D. Tenn. Nov. 26, 2012); Miller v. City of Plymouth, No.
2:09-CV-205-JVB, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152599, at *5 (N.D. Ind. Oct. 24, 2012); United States
v. Hall, No. 2:11-cr-122, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110633, at *17 (D. Vt. Aug. 7, 2012); United
States v. Laughlin, No. 1:10-CR-113-TWT/AJB, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104921, at *90 (N.D.
Ga. July 6, 2012); United States v. Moustrouphis, No. 2:11-cr-141-GZS, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
113490, at *14 (D. Me. May 30, 2012); United States v. Mazzetti, No. 6:11-mj-00090-MJS-1,
2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69922, at *46 (E.D. Cal. May 17, 2012); United States v. Warrick, No.
10-CR-0352A(Sr), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 162985, at *32 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 13, 2012); United
States v. McDuffie, No. CR-08-0102-RHW, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51003, at *13 (E.D. Wash.
Apr. 11, 2012); United States v. Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d 384, 403 (D. Md. 2012); State v.
Washington, 104 So. 3d 401, 405 (La. 2012); Ray v. State, 47 A.3d 1113, 1127 (Md. App. 2012);
State v. Smith, 729 S.E.2d 120, 124 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012); State v. Freeman, 290 P.3d 908, 909
(Or. Ct. App. 2012); State v. Patino, No. P1-10-1155A, 2012 R.I. Super. LEXIS 139, at *144
(Sept. 4, 2012); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 84 Va. Cir. 518, 523 (Va. 2012); Commonwealth v.
Turner, 84 Va. Cir. 406, 411 (Va. 2012); People of the V.I. v. George, No. ST-10-CR-680, 2012
V.I. LEXIS 13, at *14 (V.I. Super. Ct. Apr. 23, 2012).
27. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring).
28. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
29. Since 1948, courts have cited to Jackson’s concurring opinion in McDonald 337 times.
Jackson’s majority opinion in Di Re has been cited 1168 times since 1948 and, finally, courts
have cited his dissent in Brinegar more than 2000 times. Lower courts cited to Jackson’s
Brinegar dissent twenty times just in 2012. See generally United States v. Sowards, 690 F.3d
583, 588 (4th Cir. 2012); Bernini v. City of St. Paul, 665 F.3d 997, 1003 (8th Cir. 2012);
Wommack v. Brown, No. 4:11CV1487SNLJ, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168663, at *23 (E.D. Mo.
Nov. 28, 2012); Church of Universal Love & Music v. Fayette Cnty., 892 F. Supp. 2d 736, 744
(W.D. Pa. 2012); Dunn v. Harrell, No. 7:11-cv-2440-HMH-JDA, 2012 U.S. Dist. WL 3965043,
at *6 (D.S.C. Aug. 20, 2012); S.L. v. St. Louis Metro. Police Dep’t Bd. of Comm’rs, No. 4:10CV-2163, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116370, at *19 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 17, 2012); Gleason v. Presto,
No. 11-C-512, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112568, at *8 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 9, 2012); United States v.
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enduring impact is the direct legacy of Jackson’s Nuremberg
experience.
I. JACKSON’S EARLY YEARS
Robert H. Jackson worked throughout his life to establish “one of the
most spectacular legal careers of the twentieth century.”30 But despite
his diverse and varied legal career, Jackson, prior to his appointment to
the Supreme Court, rarely had occasion to confront issues related to
criminal procedure. Subpart A of this Part considers his incredible—
and exceptionally rapid—rise to the position of prominent government
attorney. Subpart B then evaluates his early experience as an Associate
Justice on the Supreme Court from 1941–1945. Collectively, Part I
demonstrates that despite Jackson’s extraordinary career and
tremendously influential judicial philosophy in other substantive areas,
he never defined a specific criminal procedure philosophy prior to his
experience at Nuremberg.
A. Life as a Prominent Government Attorney
Robert Houghwout Jackson (“Jackson”) was born on February 13,
1892, to William and Angelina Jackson, who lived at the time in
Northwestern Pennsylvania.31 Both William and Angelina worked
vigorously on the family farm until Robert was five, when William
moved the family to Frewsburg, New York, a village of approximately
500 people.32 In Frewsburg, William worked on a variety of projects,
from renovating a hotel (calling it Hotel Jackson), running a livery
stable, and investing in real estate.33 Jackson received a diploma from

Laughlin, No. 1:10-CR-113-TWT/AJB, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104921, at *88 (N.D. Ga. July 6,
2012); Lindsey v. Alabama, No. 12-0053-CG-M, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107400, at *14 (S.D.
Ala. July 5, 2012); United States v. Smith, No. S1-4:11CR288 RWS, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
53820, at *35 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 13, 2012); United States v. Almeida, No. 2:11-cr-127-DBH, 2012
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2415, at *25 (D. Me. Jan. 9, 2012); Watson v. United States, 43 A.3d 276, 282
(D.C. 2012); People v. Frier, No. 1-10-2437, 2012 Ill. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1930, at *10 (Aug.
13, 2012); People v. Timberlake, No. 1-10-3290, 2012 Ill. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1571, at *37
(June 28, 2012); People v. Mosley, No. 1-10-3642, 2012 Ill. App. LEXIS 1227, at *13 (2012);
State v. Otto, 726 S.E.2d 824, 828 (N.C. 2012); State v. Gardner, 984 N.E.2d 1025, 1030 (Ohio
2012); City of Mansfield v. Studer, No. 2011-CA-93, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 4242, at *40 (Ohio
Ct. App. Oct. 17, 2012); State v. Echols, 382 S.W.3d 266, 278 (Tenn. 2012); State v. Felix, 811
N.W.2d 775, 804 (Wis. 2012).
30. Kirk J. Stark, The Unfulfilled Tax Legacy of Justice Robert H. Jackson, 54 TAX L. REV.
171, 172 (2001).
31. GAIL JARROW, ROBERT H. JACKSON: NEW DEAL LAWYER, SUPREME COURT JUSTICE,
NUREMBERG PROSECUTOR 12 (2008).
32. Id. at 14.
33. Id.
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Frewsburg High School but then moved to Jamestown to complete an
additional year of high school coursework.34 Jamestown High School’s
principal, Milton Fletcher, persuaded Jackson to consider a career in
law although Jackson’s father was opposed and refused to pay for law
school.35
With no option to attend law school—and having never attended
college—Jackson accepted an apprenticeship with lawyer Frank Mott,
his mother’s cousin and a leader in the Democratic Party.36 Jackson
began work with Mott in September 1910 and after a year enrolled in
the Albany Law School.37 He obtained a certificate of graduation after
a year of coursework at Albany Law and, after another year of
apprenticeship, sat for the New York state bar exam.38
Following his time at Albany, Jackson returned to Mott’s office to
complete his final apprenticeship year.39 During that year, Mott
introduced Jackson to a first-term state senator from eastern New York
named Franklin Delano Roosevelt.40 The pair remained in contact,41
and Jackson became involved in the Democratic Party,42 but Jackson
himself declined to run for office.43 He preferred, instead, to practice
law.44 At the age of twenty-one, following his admission to the New
York State Bar on September 22, 1913, Jackson practiced throughout
western New York for ten years.45 Jackson practiced primarily in
Jamestown, New York,46 and argued seven cases before the New York
Court of Appeals—none of which involved criminal procedure.47

34. Id. at 23.
35. Id. at 25–27.
36. Id. at 27.
37. JARROW, supra note 31, at 28.
38. Id. at 28.
39. Id. at 30.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 31.
42. Early Life & Career, 1892-1934, ROBERT H. JACKSON CTR., http://www.roberthjackson.
org/the-man/timeline/early-life-and-career-1892-1934/ (last visited September 22, 2014)
[hereinafter Early Life & Career, ROBERT H. JACKSON].
43. JARROW, supra note 31, at 31.
44. Early Life & Career, ROBERT H. JACKSON, supra note 42.
45. Id.
46. John Q. Barrett, Robert H. Jackson’s Oral Arguments before the New York Court of
Appeals, 1 HIST. SOC’Y CTS. ST. N.Y. 3 (2005).
47. Helfrick v. Dahlstrom Metallic Door Co., 176 N.E. 141 (N.Y. 1931), aff’d, 284 U.S. 594
(1932) (per curiam) (resolving dispute under the New York Workmen’s Compensation Law);
Westfelt v. Atlas Furn. Co., 177 N.E. 147 (N.Y. 1931) (resolving a furniture company’s challenge
to a civil compensation award to a tort plaintiff); Minsker v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
173 N.E. 4 (N.Y. 1930) (involving insurance dispute); Caflisch v. Clymer St. Bank, 169 N.E. 286
(N.Y. 1929) (resolving a land ownership dispute); Allegheny Coll. v. Nat’l Chautauqua Cnty.
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Rather, Jackson’s practice focused on country and business law while
he worked in a variety of private firms until his departure for
Washington, D.C. in 1933.48
Roosevelt was elected President in 1932.49 In the Fall of 1933,
Jackson accepted a position in Washington, D.C. as General Counsel for
the U.S. Department of the Treasury.50 It was in this position—trying
cases against tax delinquents—that Jackson grew from a prominent
figure in Jamestown, New York, to a nationally known trial lawyer.51
As General Counsel, Jackson litigated a famous tax case against thenSecretary of the Treasury Andrew Mellon52 and investigated a case with
international reach against Ivar Kreuger.53 His capable handling of

Bank of Jamestown, 159 N.E. 173 (N.Y. 1927) (addressing what consideration is required to bind
a contract); Moller v. Pickard, 133 N.E. 887 (N.Y. 1922) (dealing with a forcible stock trade);
Bloomquist v. Farson, 118 N.E. 855 (N.Y. 1918) (arising from a bond trade). Jackson also
helped brief an additional case that reached the New York Court of Appeals, although he did not
personally argue it. In re Pa. Gas Co., 122 N.E. 260 (N.Y. 1919), aff’d, 252 U.S. 23 (1920).
48. See Early Life & Career, ROBERT H. JACKSON, supra note 42; accord JEFFREY D.
HOCKETT, NEW DEAL JUSTICE: THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF HUGO L. BLACK,
FELIX FRANKFURTER, AND ROBERT H. JACKSON 221 (1996) (noting that Jackson focused
variously on contract law, trusts and estates, promissory notes, and commercial litigation).
Jackson ultimately formed a partnership with Henry S. Manley and Gerald A. Herrick in 1923.
EUGENE C. GERHART, AMERICA’S ADVOCATE: ROBERT H. JACKSON 37 (1958). The firm’s
name changed in 1927 to Jackson, Herrick, Durkin & Leet, but Jackson’s substantive practice
focus did not. Id.
49. GERHART, supra note 48, at 62.
50. JARROW, supra note 31, at 38. He formally started on February 1, 1934. GERHART, supra
note 48, at 66.
51. See National Affairs, Judiciary: Round for Mellon, TIME MAG., May 24, 1937, at 11. By
the time Jackson left for Washington, D.C., he was earning a yearly salary of $30,000 (the
modern equivalent of $500,000) despite the stock market crash in 1929. JARROW, supra note 31,
at 36. Jackson had established a substantial client list that included small businesses, individuals,
and corporations. GERHART, supra note 48, at 63.
52. NOAH FELDMAN, SCORPIONS 93 (2010) (noting that “Mellon was no ordinary wealthy
businessman” and that he “embodied the financial system of the United States”).
53. In the 1920s, stocks and bonds in one of Ivar Kreuger’s conglomerates, Kreuger & Toll,
Inc., were the most widely held securities in America and abroad. Dale L. Flesher & Tonya K.
Flesher, Ivar Kreuger’s Contribution to U.S. Financial Reporting, 61 ACCT. REV. 421 (1986).
After Kreuger’s suicide in 1932, most of his businesses collapsed financially and declared
bankruptcy after it became apparent that the corporations’ accounting books were falsified.
ROBERT SHAPLEN, KREUGER: GENIUS AND SWINDLER 239 (1960). Banks and individual
investors suffered when the corporations crashed, with many middle-class investors losing all of
their savings in the financial wreckage. Id. at 246. In 1935, President Roosevelt assigned
Jackson to travel to Europe to investigate the financial circumstances of Kreuger and his
companies. John Q. Barrett, “One Good Man”: The Jacksonian Shape of Nuremberg, in THE
NUREMBERG TRIALS: INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW SINCE 1945, at 130 (Herbert R.
Reginbogin & Christoph J.M. Safferling, eds., 2006). Jackson travelled to Sweden, France, and
Germany as he led the U.S. government’s investigation into Kreuger’s financial fabrications. Id.
The bankruptcy and investigations resulted in numerous changes to financial reporting
requirements in the United States. Flesher & Flesher, supra, at 421.
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those cases earned Jackson a promotion in January 1936 to Assistant
Attorney General in the Tax Division of the U.S. Department of
Justice.54 For nearly a year in that position, Jackson litigated tax cases
in trial and appellate courts across the nation55—including six
arguments before the Supreme Court.56
Shortly after Roosevelt’s landslide reelection victory in 1936,57
Jackson was transferred to the Antitrust Division, where he led the
Division as Assistant Attorney General.58 He served for a year and a
half in that position—beginning on January 18, 193759—and argued
eight cases before the Supreme Court.60 His rise to prominence

54. Stephen R. Alton, Loyal Lieutenant, Able Advocate: The Role of Robert H. Jackson in
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Battle with the Supreme Court, 5 WM & MARY BILL RTS J. 527, 528
(1997).
55. GERHART, supra note 48, at 85.
56. United States v. Hudson, 299 U.S. 498 (1937) (tax issue related to silver futures, argued
Nov. 17 & 18, 1936); Helvering v. Fried, 299 U.S. 175 (1936) (tax, argued Nov. 17, 1936);
Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248 (1936) (Public Utility Holding Company Act, argued Nov. 9,
1936); Schafer v. Helvering, 299 U.S. 171 (1936) (tax, argued Nov. 17, 1936); Koshland v.
Helvering, 298 U.S. 441 (1936) (tax, argued May 1, 1936); McCaughn v. Real Estate Land Title
& Tr. Co., 297 U.S. 606 (1936, tax, argued Mar. 13, 1936).
57. Arthur Krock, History’s Largest Poll: 46 States Won by President, Maine and Vermont by
Landon, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1936, at A1.
58. GERHART, supra note 48, at 88.
59. Id.
60. Elec. Bond & Share Co. v. S.E.C., 303 U.S. 419 (1938) (Public Utility Holding Company
Act, argued Feb. 7, 8 & 9, 1938); Helvering v. Gowran, 302 U.S. 238 (1937) (tax, argued Oct. 22,
1937); Aluminum Co. of Am. v. United States, 302 U.S. 230 (1937) (antitrust. argued Nov. 8 &
9, 1937); Helvering v. Pfeiffer, 302 U.S. 247 (1937) (tax, argued Oct. 22, 1937); F.T.C. v.
Standard Educ. Soc’y, 302 U.S. 112 (1937) (addressing order of the Federal Trade Commission,
argued Oct. 18, 1937); Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937) (constitutionality of the Social
Security Act, argued May 5, 1937); Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937)
(constitutionality of the Social Security Act, argued Apr. 8 & 9, 1937); Cincinnati Soap Co. v.
United States, 301 U.S. 308 (1937) (addressing tax issue, argued Apr. 1 & 2, 1937). One
commentator suggests that Jackson argued ten cases before the Supreme Court during his time as
Assistant Attorney General in the Antitrust Division. Warner W. Gardner, Government Attorney,
55 COLUM. L. REV. 438, 440 (1955) (“In his year and a half in the Antitrust Division, Assistant
Attorney General Jackson argued ten cases to the Supreme Court, only one of which related to the
responsibilities of the Antitrust Division.”). That author, however, does not list cases to support
that number. I could uncover only eight cases argued by Jackson during his time as Assistant
Attorney General in the Antitrust Division. The error seems harmless, though, because we both
agree that Jackson argued a total of thirty-one times while serving as Assistant Attorney General
in the Tax Division, Assistant Attorney General in the Antitrust Division, and as Solicitor
General. Compare text accompanying supra note 56 (collecting the six cases while Jackson
worked in the Tax Division), supra note 60 (collecting the eight cases while Jackson worked in
the Antirust Division), and infra notes 76–79 (collecting the seventeen cases Jackson argued
while serving as Solicitor General), with Gardner, supra, at 442 (tallying Jackson’s win/loss
record before the Supreme Court while he served in Tax, Antitrust, and as Solicitor General, and
concluding, “[a]gainst these four cases may be tallied some twenty-seven arguments which he
won.”).
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prompted Time Magazine in May 1937 to recognize Jackson as “one of
the nation’s ablest trial lawyers.”61
Throughout his impressive rise as a government lawyer, Jackson also
remained a prominent figure in Democratic Party politics and an ardent
supporter of Roosevelt’s New Deal legislation.62 For example, he
spoke in favor of Roosevelt’s New Deal at the 1936 Democratic
Convention,63 railed against big business during a 1937 address to
political scientists in Philadelphia,64 and even wrote a book decrying the
“judicial nullification of the New Deal.”65 He also spoke in favor of
Roosevelt’s so-called “Court Packing Plan,”66 that ultimately failed,67
but sought to expand the number of justices on the Court.68
When Jackson considered returning to his law practice in Jamestown
in the Fall of 1937,69 Roosevelt tried to persuade him to run for
Governor of New York.70 Roosevelt kept Jackson from returning to
Jamestown by prophetically nominating him to the position of Solicitor

61. Judiciary: Round for Mellon, supra note 51, at 11.
62. Robert Houghwout Jackson, CURRENT BIOGRAPHY 428 (H.W. Wilson Co. 1940)
(“Jackson has subscribed to the ideals and objectives of the New Deal since long before the New
Deal was heard of.”); Robert H. Jackson, FORTUNE MAG., Mar. 1938, at 132 [hereinafter
FORTUNE MAG.] (describing Jackson’s efforts to promote New Deal legislation). Beginning in
1933, the New Deal had as many as three separate periods within the Roosevelt Administration,
each of which “were designed to combat the Great Depression and extend social protections.”
Darren M. Springer, Reimagining the WTO: Applications of the New Deal as a Means of
Remedying Emerging Global Issues, 29 VT. L. REV. 1067, 1077 (2005).
63. Special to The New York Times, Robert H. Jackson’s Attack on Republicans for Fighting
New Deal Program, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1936, at 20.
64. Special to The New York Times, Text of the Address of Robert H. Jackson to Political
Scientists in Philadelphia, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 1937, at 6.
65. Henry Steele Commager, Robert H. Jackson on the Court “Purge” of 1937, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 2, 1941, at BR4 (reviewing Jackson’s book); see ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR
JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: A STUDY OF A CRISIS IN AMERICAN POWER POLITICS (1941) [hereinafter
JACKSON, STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY].
66. See ROBERT H. JACKSON, THAT MAN: AN INSIDER’S PORTRAIT OF FRANKLIN D.
ROOSEVELT 50 (John Q. Barrett ed., 2003) [hereinafter JACKSON, THAT MAN] (detailing a speech
that, according to Jackson, “[came] so close to the President’s message”); Gardner, supra note 60,
at 440 (noting that Jackson was “an articulate and fearless advocate of the ‘Court Packing Plan’”);
National Affairs, Judiciary: Quiet Crisis, TIME MAG., Mar. 22, 1937, at 16 (“[H]onest ‘Bob’
Jackson made out a case for the President’s plan which earned the praise of its bitterest foes,
delighted its friends as perhaps the most persuasive yet presented.”).
67. See William E. Leuchtenberg, FDR’s Court-Packing Plan: A Second Life, A Second
Death, 1985 DUKE L.J 673, 673 (1985) (noting that “Roosevelt’s Court-packing plan went down
to defeat . . . .”).
68. Id. Despite the legislation’s failure, Roosevelt was ultimately (and remarkably) able to
appoint eight justices during his twelve years in office. Id.
69. GERHART, supra note 48, at 122.
70. Id. at 123.
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General on January 27, 1938.71 Jackson received a sterling vote of
confidence from Fortune Magazine,72 and was easily confirmed by a
62–4 Senate vote on March 4, 1938.73 Jackson took his oath of office
the next day.74
While serving as Solicitor General, Jackson’s talents as an appellate
advocate rose to a crescendo before the Supreme Court.75 He argued
cases on a diverse array of topics including tobacco pricing,76 taxation
of milk producers,77 and bankruptcy,78 among many others.79 In
addition to successfully arguing many of those cases,80 his talents as an
71. GERHART, supra note 48, at 136.
72. FORTUNE MAG., supra note 62, at 136 (“However dispassionate his motives, honest,
normal Bob is on the right side of the fence in his championship of the little man.”).
73. GERHART, supra note 48, at 141.
74. E. Barrett Prettyman, Jr., Robert H. Jackson: “Solicitor General for Life”, 1992 J. SUP.
CT. HIST. 75, 76 (1992).
75. Victoria A. Graffeo, Robert H. Jackson: His Years as a Public Servant “Learned in the
Law”, 68 ALB. L. REV. 539, 542 (2005) (“As Solicitor General for the United States, Robert
Jackson cemented his reputation as one of the nation’s foremost appellate attorneys.”).
76. Mulford v. Smith, 307 U.S. 38, 48–51 (1939) (holding that the Agricultural Adjustment
Act of 1938 constitutionally applied to tobacco farms, argued March 8, 1939); Currin v. Wallace,
306 U.S. 1, 15–17 (1939) (affirming the validity of the Tobacco Inspection Act of 1935, argued
Jan. 4, 1939).
77. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 307 U.S. 588, 603 (1939) (holding that the
Agricultural Marketing Act applied to certain milk producers in Boston, argued Apr. 25 & 26,
1939); United States v. Rock Royal Coop., Inc., 307 U.S. 533, 581 (1939) (same, but as applied
to New York, argued Apr. 24 & 25, 1939).
78. United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27, 51 (1938) (upholding the constitutional validity of
Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act, argued Apr. 7, 1938).
79. See, e.g., Fly v. Heitmeyer, 309 U.S. 146 (1940) (addressing the Communications Act of
1934, argued Jan. 11, 1940); F.C.C. v. Pottsville Broad. Co., 309 U.S. 134, 136–37 (1940)
(construing “the regulation of radio broadcasting in the Communications Act of 1934,” argued
Jan. 11, 1940); Pittman v. Home Owners’ Loan Corp., 308 U.S. 21 (1939) (mandamus action
requiring petitioner to record a mortgage in favor of respondent, argued Oct. 12 & 13, 1939);
Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939) (proceeding in mandamus to address the Child Labor
Amendment, argued Oct. 10, 1938); Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325 (1939) (addressing a citizenship
issue, argued Feb. 3, 1939); O’Malley v. Woodrough, 307 U.S. 277 (1939) (resolving tax issue
that arose pursuant to the Revenue Act of 1932, argued Apr. 28, 1939); United States v. Morgan,
307 U.S. 183, 185 (1939) (determining “the proper disposition to be made of a fund paid into the
court below pending a suit instituted in that court to set aside an order of the Secretary of
Agriculture,” argued Oct. 20 & 21, 1938); Graves v. N.Y. ex rel. O’Keefe, 306 U.S. 466 (1939)
(resolving a tax issue arising pursuant to the Home Owners Loan Act of 1933, argued March 6,
1939); Utah Fuel Co. v. Nat’l Bituminous Coal Comm’n, 306 U.S. 56 (1939) (considering an
issue arising under Bituminous Coal Act of 1937, argued January 3, 1939); Shields v. Utah Idaho
Cent. R. Co., 305 U.S. 177 (1938) (construing definition of “interurban electric railway,” argued
Oct. 19, 1938); Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 304 U.S. 55 (1938) (addressing
requirement of findings in equity, argued Apr. 5, 1938); Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1
(1938) (resolving the validity of maximum rates fixed by the Secretary of Agriculture, argued
March 10 & 11, 1938).
80. Compare Gardner, supra note 60, at 442 (estimating that Jackson won “some twentyseven arguments” before the Court), with Graffeo, supra note 75, at 545 n.17 (“Scholars and
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advocate drew substantial praise and even endeared members of the
Court to him;81 Justice Brandeis went so far as to say that Jackson
should be Solicitor General for life.82
Like his prior legal work, Jackson’s work as Solicitor General did not
include criminal procedure issues.83 But unlike his prior attorney
positions with the government, there was an element of discretion that
Jackson could exercise as Solicitor General to select cases for possible
argument to the Supreme Court.84 By all accounts, Jackson took
advantage of this discretion to select cases that focused on the New
Deal.85 In 1938, as Solicitor General, Jackson argued six cases before
the Court, none of which included a criminal procedure issue.86
Similarly, in 1939, Jackson argued nine cases, seven of which he argued
in ten days,87 and none of which implicated criminal procedure.88 In
the first month of 1940, his final month as Solicitor General, Jackson
argued two more cases, and again, the range of issues omitted criminal
procedure.89 In total, Jackson argued seventeen cases to the Supreme

Jackson’s Assistant Solicitors General disagree on the number of cases that Robert Jackson
argued successfully before the U.S. Supreme Court, primarily due to their differing methods of
accounting for rearguments.”).
81. Warner Gardner, who served as First Assistant to the Solicitor General during Jackson’s
tenure, remarked, “I have . . . seen none who could so surely and so naturally cut to the heart of a
case.” Gardner, supra note 60, at 441.
82. Felix Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Jackson, 68 HARV. L. REV. 937, 939 (1955).
83. Prettyman, supra note 74, at 76 (“None of his cases involved criminal law; the subject
matter, instead, ranged from antitrust, federal procedure, immigration and tax to bankruptcy and
communications.”).
84. Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Solicitor General’s Changing Role
in Supreme Court Litigation, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1323, 1324 (2010) (“The U.S. Solicitor General, as
the U.S. Supreme Court’s premier advocate, has long exerted significant influence over both the
Court’s case selection decisions and its substantive decisions on the merits.”); Graffeo, supra note
75, at 544 (“[T]he Solicitor’s authority to choose cases for appeal serves a critical gatekeeping
function for the Supreme Court.”).
85. Graffeo, supra note 75, at 544; see JACKSON, THAT MAN, supra note 66, at xvi.
86. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939); United States v. Morgan, 307 U.S. 183, 185
(1939); Shields v. Utah Idaho Cent. R. Co., 305 U.S. 177 (1938); Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United
States, 304 U.S. 55 (1938); Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1 (1938); United States v. Bekins,
304 U.S. 27 (1938).
87. Prettyman, supra note 74, at 75.
88. Pittman v. Home Owners’ Loan Corp., 308 U.S. 21 (1939); H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v.
United States, 307 U.S. 588 (1939); United States v. Rock Royal Coop., Inc., 307 U.S. 533
(1939); Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325 (1939); O’Malley v. Woodrough, 307 U.S. 277 (1939);
Mulford v. Smith, 307 U.S. 38 (1939); Graves v. N.Y. ex rel. O’Keefe, 306 U.S. 466 (1939);
Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1 (1939); Utah Fuel Co. v. Nat’l Bituminous Coal Comm’n, 306 U.S.
56 (1939).
89. Fly v. Heitmeyer, 309 U.S. 146 (1940); F.C.C. v. Pottsville Broad. Co., 309 U.S. 134,
136–37 (1940).
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Court during his time as Solicitor General,90 none of which included a
criminal procedure issue.
After Supreme Court Justice Pierce Butler died on November 16,
1939,91 President Roosevelt on January 4, 1940 submitted the names of
then Attorney General Frank Murphy to fill the Supreme Court vacancy
and of Robert Jackson to become Attorney General.92 Jackson was
subsequently confirmed as Attorney General and took his oath of office
on January 18, 1940.93 He argued only three cases to the Supreme
Court while serving as Attorney General: all of which he won,94 but
none of which involved criminal procedure.95
Consistent with the description of his new position (to only appear
before the Supreme Court in rare circumstances), Jackson’s focus was
not on Supreme Court litigation.96 By the Spring of 1940, Adolf Hitler
had amassed an extraordinary German military force that had already
occupied Denmark, Poland, France, Norway, Holland, and Belgium.97
When the Nazi force turned its attention to Britain, Prime Minister
90. Another commentator suggests that Jackson argued twenty-four times to the Supreme
Court while serving as Solicitor General, but that commentator does not cite cases to support the
higher figure. Prettyman, supra note 74, at 76 (asserting that there were twenty-four arguments in
twenty-one total cases; three were rearguments). A June 1939 issue of Time Magazine also
reports that Jackson made twenty-four arguments, losing two, but does not provide a list.
National Affairs, Judiciary: Jackson’s Term, TIME MAG., June 12, 1939, at 17; cf. CURRENT
BIOGRAPHY, supra note 62, at 428 (indicating that Jackson made twenty-four arguments, without
listing them, and suggesting he lost three). Jackson’s otherwise extraordinarily comprehensive
biography does not provide a list of Jackson’s argued cases, choosing instead to simply note that
they are “matters of record which need not be repeated here.” GERHART, supra note 48, at 191.
91. GERHART, supra note 48, at 182.
92. Id. at 187. Francis Biddle was appointed to replace Jackson as Solicitor General. Id.
93. GERHART, supra note 48, at 190.
94. Prettyman, supra note 74, at 76. Jackson’s predecessor, Frank Murphy, never appeared
before the Supreme Court. Id.
95. United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409 (1941) (addressing decision by the Secretary of
Agriculture to set maximum rates charged by market agencies for services at Kansas City
Stockyards, argued Apr. 10, 1941); Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v Adkins, 310 U.S. 381 (1940)
(resolving action to enjoin the collection of taxes under the Bituminous Coal Act of 1937, argued
Apr. 29, 1940); Okla. ex rel. Williamson v. Woodring, 309 U.S. 623 (1940) (addressing motion
for leave to file a bill of complaint, argued Jan. 29 & 30, 1940).
96. Office of the Attorney General: About the Office, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
http://www.justice.gov/ag/about-oag.html (last visited September 22, 2014) (“In matters of
exceptional gravity or importance the Attorney General appears in person before the Supreme
Court.”).
97. IVOR MATANLE, WORLD WAR II, at 31–42 (1989) (discussing, in separate chapters, the
Nazi invasions of Norway, Holland, and Belgium); SHIRER, supra note 1, at 694–700 (discussing
invasions of Denmark and Norway); C.M.A. McCauliff, Union in Europe: Constitutional
Philosophy and the Schuman Declaration, May 9, 1950, 18 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 441, 446 (2012)
(noting “France fell to the Nazis in June 1940”); Elissa S. Myerowitz, Protecting Cultural
Property During a Time of War: Why Should Russia Return Nazi-Looted Art, 20 FORDHAM INT’L
L.J. 1961, 1987 n.163 (1997) (documenting Hitler’s invasion of Poland in 1939).
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Winston Churchill relayed his first official message to President
Roosevelt requesting “the loan of forty or fifty of your older destroyers
to bridge the gap between what we have now and the large new
construction we put in hand at the beginning of the war.”98 By the
conclusion of two of Jackson’s three arguments as Attorney General to
the Supreme Court that Spring,99 he—and Roosevelt—had shifted their
attention to wartime.100
Roosevelt sought the counsel of his Attorney General about
Churchill’s request. Jackson told Roosevelt that “old World War I 75’s,
machine guns and Lee-Enfield rifles could legally be made available to
the Allies if declared obsolescent by the United States armed
services.”101 That, however, did not sufficiently appease Churchill,
who again requested destroyers from Roosevelt via telegram on July 31,
1940.102 Despite complex legal limitations restricting the legality of the
transaction,103 Jackson helped facilitate the transfer of fifty destroyers to
Britain104—a transaction one commentator later termed “a milestone in
the development of American foreign policy.”105 Labeled the “LendLease Act of March 11, 1941,” the legislation “authorized the president
to implement when necessary immediate transfer—to a value of $1.3
billion—of war supplies . . . to any countries whose defense he
considered critical to the safety of the United States.”106
Even as Jackson focused on complex wartime legal issues as
Attorney General,107 he faced the first (and arguably only) major
criminal procedure issue in his pre-Nuremberg career. Nearly three
thousand complaints arrived daily at the Federal Bureau of Investigation

98. GERHART, supra note 48, at 213.
99. Adkins, 310 U.S. at 381; Woodring, 309 U.S. at 623.
100. See generally DAVID REYNOLDS, THE CREATION OF THE ANGLO-AMERICAN ALLIANCE,
1937–41: A STUDY IN COMPETITIVE CO-OPERATION 119–20 n.7 (1982) (referring to Roosevelt’s
private writings in June 1940 about his long-term fears of the possibilities of the destroyers
falling into German hands); William R. Casto, Advising Presidents: Robert Jackson and the
Destroyers-for-Bases Deal, 52 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 1, 41 (2012) (discussing Jackson’s
involvement in and Roosevelt’s response to Great Britain’s request for destroyers beginning May
15, 1940).
101. GERHART, supra note 48, at 213.
102. Id. at 215.
103. Id. at 219–21.
104. 1 THE AMERICAN ECONOMY: A HISTORICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA 267 (Cynthia Clark
Northrup ed., 2011).
105. GERHART, supra note 48, at 221.
106. THE AMERICAN ECONOMY, supra note 104, at 267.
107. Robert H. Jackson, The Exchange of Destroyers for Atlantic Bases (Dec. 3, 1952)
(unpublished manuscript), in JACKSON, THAT MAN, supra note 66, at 82–110; see Casto, supra
note 100, at 40.
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from Americans concerned about possible spies.108 Consistent with his
now long-standing concern with the rise of Nazi Germany and the
Soviet Union,109 Roosevelt sought to implement a program of domestic
wiretapping.110 His aim, however, was, complicated by Jackson’s
announcement on March 18, 1940—allegedly spurred on by FBI
Director J. Edgar Hoover111—that “[w]ire tapping as a means of
procuring evidence will not be used in the future by the Department of
Justice, nor will it handle the cases of other government departments
when any of the evidence is procured through wire tapping.”112 That
position seemed to correspond directly with two Supreme Court
holdings—one issued in 1937, and the other in 1939—making clear that
the Communications Act of 1934 prohibited domestic wiretapping.113
In May 1940, two months after Jackson’s announcement, Roosevelt
confidentially wrote to Jackson his belief that the Supreme Court’s two
holdings, alongside the Communications Act of 1934, were never
intended “to apply to grave matters involving the defense of the
nation.”114 Accordingly, Roosevelt “authorized and directed” Jackson
to wiretap “persons suspected of subversive activities against the

108. JARROW, supra note 31, at 55.
109. Neal K. Katyal & Richard Caplan, The Surprisingly Stronger Case for the Legality of the
NSA Surveillance Program: The FDR Precedent, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1023, 1037 (2008).
110. See JACKSON, THAT MAN, supra note 66, at 68.
111. Special to The New York Times, Justice Department Bans Wire Tapping; Jackson Acts on
Hoover Recommendation, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 1940, at A1 (noting that Jackson’s
announcement originated “[o]n the recommendation of J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation”). There are numerous documented instances where Hoover sought to
persuade Jackson that wiretaps were “essential” and, moreover, that a failure to wiretap would
expose the Department of Justice to “public indignation” should there occur a “national
catastrophe.” Katyal & Caplan, supra note 109, at 1049.
112. Justice Department Bans Wire Tapping, supra note 111.
113. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 340 (1939) (holding that evidence obtained via
illicit wiretapping may not be used directly or indirectly); Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S.
379, 380 (1937) (construing the Communications Act of 1934 to prohibit the introduction of
“procured by a federal officer’s tapping telephone wires and intercepting messages”). Certain
members of the Justice Department were apparently not persuaded that Nardone I was
particularly far-reaching; as The New York Times reported, “[e]ven in the face of the absolute
barrier against use of wire-tapping evidence in the courts, there was a question in the minds of
some Department of Justice officials whether listening in on telephone conversations was still not
permissible.” Special to The New York Times, High Court Bars Testimony Based on WireTapping, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 1937, at A1. Whatever Nardone I left unclear, though, seemed
clarified by Nardone II—or at least that’s what the media thought. Special to The New York
Times, High Court Widens Wiretapping Ban; Bars Indirect Use, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1939, at
A1 (observing that Nardone II served to “preclude[] the use of wire-tapping evidence, in what
seems every form”).
114. United States v. U.S. Dist. Court, 444 F.2d 651, 669–70 (6th Cir. 1971) (reproducing the
full text of Roosevelt’s confidential May 21, 1940 memorandum to Jackson in Appendix A).
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Government of the United States, including suspected spies.”115
Roosevelt asked that Jackson “limit these investigations so conducted to
a minimum and to limit them insofar as possible to aliens.”116
Roosevelt’s confidential memorandum to Jackson seemingly changed
everything about the remainder of Jackson’s tenure as Attorney
General. From May 1940 until Jackson’s July 1941 confirmation to the
Supreme Court as its eighty-seventh Associate Justice, Jackson was
consumed by evaluating the legality of wiretapping.117 At first, in
response to the President’s directive, Jackson seemed conflicted; despite
(or perhaps because of) his personal position against wiretapping,118
Jackson nevertheless delegated wiretapping responsibility to Hoover in
compliance with Roosevelt’s directive.119
As Hoover, with Jackson’s knowledge,120 implemented the imprecise
boundaries of the President’s confidential wiretapping directive,121
Jackson worked tirelessly toward legislation favorable to wiretapping in
an effort to safeguard what he perceived to be a threat to individual civil
liberties.122 He was particularly concerned with Hoover’s desire to
expand the FBI’s wiretapping efforts beyond criminal investigations,123
115. Id. at 670.
116. Id.
117. Katyal & Caplan, supra note 109, at 1047–52 (examining Jackson’s work on wiretapping
beginning in March 1940 through May 1941).
118. JACKSON, THAT MAN, supra note 66, at 68–69 (noting in part Jackson’s belief that “wire
tapping was a source of real danger if it was not adequately supervised . . . .”).
119. Whether Jackson expressly delegated to Hoover on this issue is less than clear. Rather,
shortly after Roosevelt’s confidential memorandum, Jackson wrote to Hoover that he would not
keep a “detailed record” about “the cases in which wire-tapping would be utilized.” Katyal &
Caplan, supra note 109, at 1051–52 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
Interestingly, Jackson’s personal memoirs suggest the opposite: “But I had regular reports and
was pretty closely in touch with [wiretapping] to make sure that it was not abused.” JACKSON,
THAT MAN, supra note 66, at 69. Two commentators suggest that Jackson’s inclusion of such
language in his memoirs is “historical revisionism.” Katyal & Caplan, supra note 109, at 1052.
120. See Katyal & Caplan, supra note 109, at 1053 (noting that, in his letter to Congress,
“Jackson did not fess up about the fact that the government was already wiretapping”); see Athan
Theoharis, FBI Wiretapping: A Case Study of Bureaucratic Autonomy, 107 POL. SCI. Q. 101,
105–06 (1992) (“In effect, Jackson’s decision not to maintain written records of approved
wiretaps or require a written justification whenever the FBI director sought approval to wiretap
effectively negated the intended restrictions of Roosevelt’s directive: that such uses be
exceptional and limited to aliens and that the attorney general authorize each wiretap after first
assessing each request of the FBI director.”).
121. Katyal & Caplan, supra note 109, at 1058 (noting that Hoover wiretapped organizations
and businesses including the NAACP, Kyffhaeuser Bund, and the Revolutionary Workers
League).
122. See JACKSON, THAT MAN, supra note 66, at 68 (“After the decision in Nardone v. United
States came down in late 1939, I as Attorney General quickly issued an order to discontinue all
use of the interception of wire communications.”).
123. See id. at 69. Jackson’s opposed a House resolution that “sought generally to authorize
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and the prospect that wiretapping could extend into wartime abuses.124
Notwithstanding Jackson’s efforts, Congress responsively declined to
amend the Communications Act of 1934 (or enact other legislation), and
the Supreme Court did not reconsider or otherwise amend its approach
to domestic wiretapping.125 To worsen matters from Jackson’s
standpoint, Roosevelt also later gave his “general approval” to a
broadened FBI wiretapping effort.126
But Jackson’s time as Attorney General was drawing to a close, and
thankfully so he seemed to think. At the time of his nomination to the
Supreme Court on June 12, 1941,127 “Jackson ‘held a certain interest,’
in becoming attorney general,” but the administration’s approach to
domestic spying was taking its toll.128 Apart from his inability to
successfully pursue Congressional action favorable to his view of
wiretapping,129 Jackson had fallen so ill at one point in January 1941
that he was unable to attend ceremonies commemorating Roosevelt’s
third inauguration.130 And, from a substantive law standpoint, Jackson
FBI wiretapping ‘in the interests of national defense.’” Id. Moreover, he “filed a letter with
Congressman Emanuel Celler, who was heading the house investigation, pointing out the need for
specific authorization with safeguards.” Id.
124. Jackson went so far as to note that “wire tapping was a source of real danger if it was not
adequately supervised, and that the secret of the proper use of wire tapping was a highly
responsible use in a limited number of cases, defined by law . . . .” Id. at 68–69. Jackson relives
his exchanges with military leaders regarding espionage in his memoirs. Id. at 72–73.
125. See Katyal & Caplan, supra note 109, at 1059 (“Jackson unsuccessfully sought to
convince Congress to enact legislation that would authorize the Attorney General to do what the
President was already confidentially requiring him to do.”). Congress and the Supreme Court
would of course ultimately amend their respective approaches to wiretapping. Compare Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 356–57 (1967) (holding that the Fourth Amendment applied to the
government’s use of an electronic eavesdropping device, attached to a phone booth, to listen to a
suspect’s phone conversations), with Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18
U.S.C. § 2511(2)(e) (2012) (“Notwithstanding any other provision of this title or section 705 or
706 of the Communications Act of 1934, it shall not be unlawful for an officer, employee, or
agent of the United States in the normal course of his official duty to conduct electronic
surveillance . . . as authorized by [the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978].”).
126. Katyal & Caplan, supra note 109, at 1059–60 (noting that the Secretary of War and the
Secretary of the Navy supported expanding FBI wiretapping).
127. GERHART, supra note 48, at 231. Jackson had actually hoped for nomination to the
position of Chief Justice, id. at 230–31, which Harlan Fiske Stone received. Frank L. Kluckhohn,
Stone Chosen Chief Justice; Jackson and Byrnes Named, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 1941, at A1.
128. HOCKETT, supra note 48, at 236.
129. See Katyal & Caplan, supra note 109, at 1060 (“However, Jackson’s efforts to secure
legislation abruptly failed just as his time as Attorney General came to an end.”); see also David
M. Helfeld, A Study of Justice Department Policies on Wire Tapping, 9 LAW. GUILD REV. 57, 63
(1949) (noting that “Congress rejected all proposed amendments” to the Communications Act and
“after 1942 the Justice Department ceased asking” for them).
130. Associated Press, Jackson Ill, Son Represents Him, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 1941, at 6; John
Q. Barrett, On the Eve of an Unprecedented Inauguration (1941), JACKSON LIST (Jan. 16, 2009),
http://thejacksonlist.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/20090116-Jackson-List-Inauguration.pdf.
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also preferred antitrust matters and specifically “found foreign affairs
less stimulating than domestic governance.”131
Jackson took his official oath of office on July 11, 1941, to become
an Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court.132 He did so
after having completed an extraordinary rise,133 one that—as
discussed—included an impressively deep background in politics,134
tax,135 and antitrust.136 But Jackson, prior to his time on the Supreme
Court, still seemingly had no meaningful opportunity to develop his
approach to domestic criminal procedure issues, at least not in the same
way he did with Roosevelt’s New Deal policies.137
Jackson seemed to inadvertently solidify this conclusion by penning
The Struggle for Judicial Supremacy at the end of his government
attorney career.138 Published in 1941, the book originated from
speeches he gave in favor of Roosevelt’s court-packing plan,139 which
grew into a more polished product following Roosevelt’s suggestion
that Jackson document his administration’s conflict with the Supreme
Court over New Deal legislation.140 The book was141 (and to some
extent still is)142 cited both by the Supreme Court and scholars alike.143
131. HOCKETT, supra note 48, at 236.
132. GERHART, supra note 48, at 233. Jackson was earlier confirmed by voice vote on July 8,
1941. Special to The New York Times, Senate Voice Vote Confirms Jackson, N.Y. TIMES, July 8,
1941, at 15.
133. Jackson, Trusted Roosevelt Aide, Rose Rapidly Under the New Deal, N.Y. TIMES, June
13, 1941, at 3.
134. See GERHART, supra note 48, at 166–202 (discussing generally Jackson’s positions as
Solicitor General, Assistant U.S. Attorney, and U.S. Attorney General); Graffeo, supra note 75, at
540 (noting Jackson’s work with the Democratic Party).
135. Stark, supra note 30, at 173 (characterizing Jackson’s government tax lawyer experience
as “varied and high profile, offering him a brief but intense exposure to the government side of
the practice of tax law”).
136. CURRENT BIOGRAPHY, supra note 62, at 428 (discussing Jackson’s background in
antitrust).
137. Cf. Bruce A. Green, Of Laws and Men: An Essay on Justice Marshall’s View of Criminal
Procedure, 26 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 369, 371 (1994) (noting the opposite for Justice Marshall who,
because of his experiences as Solicitor General, may have acquired “an even greater appreciation
of law enforcement interests in criminal cases”).
138. JACKSON, STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY, supra note 65.
139. DOROTHY BUCKTON JAMES, JUDICIAL PHILOSOPHY AND ACCESSION TO THE COURT:
THE CASES OF JUSTICE JACKSON AND DOUGLAS 77–78 (1966).
140. Graeme A. Barry, “The Gifted Judge”: An Analysis of the Judicial Career of Robert H.
Jackson, 38 ALBERTA L. REV. 880, 889 (2000).
141. See, e.g., Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111, 117 n.10 (1965); Granville-Smith v.
Granville-Smith, 349 U.S. 1, 16 (1955) (Clark, J., dissenting); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin,
328 U.S. 408, 433 n.42 (1946).
142. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 654 (2000); Indus. Union Dep’t, AFLCIO v. API, 448 U.S. 607, 674 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring); Blonder-Tongue Lab. v. Univ.
of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 320 n.6 (1971).

GALLINI PRINT - FINAL 2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

20

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

10/4/2014 2:20 PM

[Vol. 46

The text, in short, provided a window into Jackson’s overarching
judicial philosophy—a philosophy that emphasized judicial
restraint144—and led one commentator to conclude that Jackson’s text
laid the foundation for the scholarly field of constitutional history.145
The point is hopefully clear: after confronting a wide range of
domestic governance issues in the context of an extraordinarily
important time in our nation’s domestic history—the New Deal—
Jackson’s response—to write a book—affected and continues to impact
how we conceptualize judicial philosophies.146 As we shall see, his
transformative service to the law would soon be extended beyond
substantive civil legal issues and repeated in the criminal procedure
context.
But his confrontation with criminal procedure was still to come.
B. Transition to Supreme Court Justice: Jackson’s Criminal
Procedure Work on the Court from 1941–1945
Following his confirmation in July 1941, Jackson served on the
Supreme Court until his death in 1954.147 His time on the Court was
interrupted, however, by an absence from the entire October Term in
1945. During this time, he served as United States Chief Prosecutor for
the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, prosecuting Nazi
leaders for their actions during World War II.148 Before his absence,
the first part of Jackson’s tenure on the Court—from 1941–1945—saw
Jackson remarkably decline to assert himself in the Court’s work on

143. See, e.g., Laura A. Cisneros, Youngstown Sheet to Boumediene: A Story of Judicial Ethos
and the (Un)Fastidious Use of Language, 115 W. VA. L. REV. 577, 599 n.92 (2012); Craig Green,
An Intellectual History of Judicial Activism, 58 EMORY L. J. 1195, 1206 n.34 (2009); Robert L.
Tsai, Reconsidering Gobitis: An Exercise in Presidential Leadership, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 363,
395–96 (2008).
144. E.g., Gregory S. Chernack, The Clash of Two Worlds: Justice Robert H. Jackson,
Institutional Pragmatism, and Brown, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 51, 59 (1999) (noting that Jackson’s
book “expounded a view of judicial restraint within the federalism context”).
145. Mark Tushnet, Justification in Constitutional Adjudication: A Comment on
Constitutional Interpretation, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1707, 1709 (1994).
146. E.g., J. Peter Byrne, Regulatory Takings and “Judicial Supremacy”, 51 ALA. L. REV.
949, 950 (2000) (characterizing Jackson’s book as “[o]ne of the most eloquent critiques of
excessive judicial lawmaking”); Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian
Difficulty, Part Four: Law’s Politics, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 971, 1000 (2000) (discussing the “shift
in attitudes toward judicial review from the Populist/Progressive era to the New Deal era”);
Dwight J. Simpson, Robert H. Jackson and the Doctrine of Judicial Restraint, 3 UCLA L. REV.
325, 326 (1956) (discussing Jackson’s “forthright espousal of the doctrine of judicial restraint”).
147. Wilson Ray Huhn, In Defense of the Roosevelt Court, 2 FLA. A & M U. L. REV. 1, 9
(2007).
148. Bernard D. Meltzer, Robert H. Jackson: Nuremberg’s Architect and Advocate, 68 ALB.
L. REV. 55 (2004).
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search and seizure, confessions, and right to counsel issues.
Accordingly, and consistent with Jackson’s prior legal work, this
Subpart concludes, that he did not develop a meaningful and coherent
philosophy related to criminal procedure issues during his early time on
the Supreme Court. Although intermittent evidence of what would
become his post-Nuremberg approach exists, it is limited; Jackson’s
pre-Nuremberg approach to criminal procedure was therefore
underdeveloped.
To demonstrate these conclusions, this Subpart considers Jackson’s
participation on the Court’s criminal procedure work from 1941–1945
and focuses, consistent with this Article’s thesis, on search and seizure,
confessions, and right to counsel issues. During that four-year span, the
Court heard a total of 639 cases,149 16 of which were focused on
criminal procedure issues,150 though Jackson did not participate in 4 of
them.151 Although Jackson wrote fourteen opinions related to criminal
law issues,152 by comparison, he wrote just one opinion on a case that
149. U.S. Supreme Court Center, JUSTIA, http://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us (last
visited September 22, 2014).
150. By topic, Jackson participated in the following search and seizure, confession, and right
to counsel cases:

Search and Seizure: United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944).

Confessions: Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945); Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322
U.S. 596 (1944); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944); Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S.
547 (1942); Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941).

Right to Counsel: Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786 (1945); White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760
(1945); House v. Mayo, 324 U.S. 42 (1945), overruled by Hohn v. United States, 542
U.S. 236 (1998); Tomkins v. Missouri, 323 U.S. 485 (1945); Williams v. Kaiser, 323
U.S. 471 (1945); Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
Not included in the confession cases are McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943),
superseded by statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3501, as recognized in Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303
(2009), and United States v. Mitchell, 322 U.S. 65 (1944). Although the defendants in both cases
confessed, the Supreme Court in its McNabb and Mitchell opinions focused on federal procedures
required for when an interrogated defendant must appear before a magistrate.
151. Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487 (1944); United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical
Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944); Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942); Goldstein v. United
States, 316 U.S. 114 (1942).
152. In chronological order, Jackson’s criminal law–related opinions from 1941–1945 are as
follows: Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941) (Jackson, J., concurring) (addressing
constitutional challenge to a statute that criminalized bringing an indigent person across state
lines); Duckworth v. Arkansas, 314 U.S. 390 (1941) (Jackson, J., concurring) (addressing
challenge to an Arkansas statute requiring a permit to transport liquor through the state); Skinner
v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (Jackson, J., concurring) (considering challenge by convicted
felon who faced sterilization); Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting) (considering challenge to convictions for bigamy); Pendergast v. United States, 317
U.S. 412 (1943) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (considering whether criminal contempt charge was
barred by the statute of limitations); Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492 (1943) (holding that the
crime of income tax evasion required a “willful” attempt to disregard taxes); United States ex rel.
Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (addressing whether collusive
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sought resolution of a substantive state criminal procedure issue.153
Admittedly, domestic criminal procedure during Jackson’s early
tenure on the Court was, at best, undeveloped. Remember that, for
search and seizure issues, the Supreme Court had not yet held that the
Fourth Amendment applied to the states.154 The same was true for the
Fifth Amendment.155 And, for purposes of the right to counsel, indigent
defendants were still temporally a long way away from the promise of
appointed counsel under Gideon v. Wainwright.156 Accordingly, any
limitation imposed by the Supreme Court on a state’s administration of
criminal procedure would have to come from the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.157 And, given that Jackson joined
the Court after having just published a book on the importance of
judicial restraint,158 it seemed unlikely that he would favor relying on
the Due Process Clause to limit states’ approach to criminal procedure.
Such was the state of the law, and perhaps the state of Jackson’s
thought process, when the Court began the 1941 term—Jackson’s first
on the Court. That year, the Court decided a single, but important,
confession case—Lisenba v. California159—wherein Jackson joined the
majority that concluded an uneducated defendant’s confession was

bidding occurred); Bowles v. United States, 319 U.S. 33 (1943) (Jackson, J., dissenting)
(considering whether convicted defendant should have been able to access a certain file related to
his defense at trial); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting)
(addressing First Amendment implications of a conviction for violating child labor laws); Pollock
v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4 (1944) (addressing defendant’s conviction who was arrested under a
Florida statute that criminalized receiving cash advances for future work); United States v.
Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (considering religious group’s prosecution
for mail fraud); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting)
(addressing legality of Japanese internment); Oriolo v. United States, 324 U.S. 824 (1945)
(Jackson, J., dissenting) (considering interstate prostitution); Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1
(1945) (addressing treason conviction).
153. Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
154. See, e.g., Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) (incorporating the Fourth Amendment
without the exclusionary rule). It was not until later, in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), that
the Court held that the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule applied to the states through
Fourteenth Amendment.
155. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 11 (1964) (holding that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment “incorporate[d]” the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment).
156. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (interpreting the Sixth Amendment to
require that states provide counsel to indigent criminal defendants).
157. Jerold H. Israel, Free-Standing Due Process and Criminal Procedure: The Supreme
Court’s Search for Interpretive Guidelines, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 303, 304 (2001); George C.
Thomas III, When Constitutional Worlds Collide: Resurrecting the Framers’ Bill of Rights and
Criminal Procedure, 100 MICH. L. REV. 145, 150 (2001).
158. JACKSON, supra note 65, at 315 (characterizing the Supreme Court as having a “plain
duty to enforce explicit constitutional provisions even in opposition to the majority”).
159. Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941).
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voluntary despite police interrogation that involved physical contact,
sleep deprivation, prolonged interrogation sessions, and the denial of
counsel.160
Six months later, the Court reached the opposite conclusion in Ward
v. Texas,161 wherein a defendant argued that his confession was
involuntary where he was “arrested without a warrant, taken from his
home town, driven for three days from county to county, placed in a jail
more than 100 miles from his home, questioned continuously, and
beaten, whipped, and burned by the officer to whom the confession was
finally made.”162 Despite the differing result, Jackson joined the
majority, but did not write.163 Jackson would write just one criminal
procedure opinion between 1941 and 1945: a dissent in Ashcraft v.
Tennessee.164
By the time the Court heard arguments on February 28, 1944, in
Ashcraft, the United States had been attacked165 and had gone to war.166
Thinking his work on the Court was comparatively unimportant,
Jackson sought to leave the bench.167 But Roosevelt asked that he
remain on the Court, and he did.168
Jackson’s continued presence on the Court paid dividends. Despite
his absence of traditional legal educational training, and despite his
extraordinary peer group on the bench, Jackson stood out early in his
judicial tenure.169 By the time of the Ashcraft oral arguments, Jackson

160. Id. at 241–42 (Black, J., dissenting).
161. Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547 (1942).
162. Id. at 549.
163. One scholar, in seeking to explain the differing results in Ward and Lisenba, suggests
that the Court was driven by its belief in the defendants’ respective guilt—it thus arguably
believed that the defendant in Lisenba was guilty but was not persuaded of the Ward defendant’s
guilt. Steven Penney, Theories of Confession Admissibility: A Historical View, 25 AM. J. CRIM.
L. 309, 341 n.183 (1998).
164. Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
165. United Press, Tokyo Bombers Strike Hard at Our Main Bases on Oahu, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 8, 1941, at 1.
166. See Chesly Manly, Congress Declares War on Japan in Speedy Session, CHI. DAILY
TRIB., Dec. 9, 1941, at 7 (“[C]ongress today adopted a resolution declaring the existence of a
state of war with Japan.”).
167. JACKSON, THAT MAN, supra note 66, at 107. Indeed, following Japan’s December 7,
1941 attack on Pearl Harbor, Jackson discussed leaving the Court with Roosevelt and specifically
told him that he felt like he “was not doing anything that promoted the war effort and not much
that seemed to be very important in contrast with the great issues at stake in the world.” Id.
Jackson was the Court’s junior member at the time of Pearl Harbor. He had at that point filed
only two opinions: Indianapolis v. Chase National Bank, 314 U.S. 63 (1941) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting) and Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941) (Jackson, J., concurring).
168. JACKSON, THAT MAN, supra note 66, at 107.
169. HOCKETT, supra note 48, at 241.
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had already penned well-received opinions in West Virginia State Board
of Education v. Barnette (writing a majority opinion rejecting a flagsalute requirement in 1943),170 Korematsu v. United States (writing a
dissenting opinion rejecting Japanese American internment camps in
1944),171 and Wickard v. Filburn (writing a majority opinion clarifying
Commerce Clause powers).172 Specifically regarding the Barnette case,
the New York Times went so far as to call Jackson’s opinion “one of the
most notable writings in the [C]ourt’s history.”173 Jackson had
moreover established himself as a “‘moderate liberal’ toward civil
liberty claims, and a ‘moderate conservative’ in business regulation and
labor cases.”174
Consequently, Justice Frankfurter would later
characterize Jackson’s opinions as being “as lively as the liveliness of
his talk.”175
Jackson received tremendous praise for many of his opinions, but that
praise rarely extended to criminal procedure.176 Perhaps that’s why,
170. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); see RICHARD A. POSNER,
CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION 140–41 (1990) (discussing Barnette and noting that
Jackson’s opinion in that case “soared above Cardozo in eloquence”); GLENDON SCHUBERT,
DISPASSIONATE JUSTICE: A SYNTHESIS OF THE JUDICIAL OPINIONS OF ROBERT H. JACKSON 34
(1969) (suggesting that Jackson’s opinion in Barnette “includes passages that rank among the
great paeans to human liberty and freedom of the mind”).
171. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); see John Q. Barrett, A Commander’s
Power, A Civilian’s Reason: Justice Jackson’s Korematsu Dissent, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
57, 59 (2005) (“Justice Jackson’s dissent in Korematsu v. United States merits its very high place
in both the American legal and the human canons.”); Jeff Bleich et al., Dissenting from the Bench
the Origins and Impact of A Modern Trend, 69 OR. ST. B. BULL. 26, 28 (2008) (including
Jackson’s Korematsu dissent among “a veritable greatest-hits list of constitutional law”); David
A. Harris, On the Contemporary Meaning of Korematsu: “Liberty Lies in the Hearts of Men and
Women”, 76 MO. L. REV. 1, 8 (2011) (observing that, according to Lawrence Tribe, “the
dissenting opinion of Justice Jackson, not the majority opinion of Justice Black, has ‘carried the
day in the court of history.’” (quoting 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
237 n.118 (3d ed. 2000))).
172. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); see Jim Chen, Filburn’s Legacy, 52 EMORY
L.J. 1719, 1747 (2003) (“Filburn is regarded today as the high-water mark of the New Deal’s
constitutional revolution.”); Charles Fairman, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, 55 COLUM.
L. REV. 445, 464–65 (1955) (suggesting that, because of his opinion in Wickard, Jackson “takes
his place in history as one who was pre-eminent in his day . . . .”).
173. Arthur Krock, In the Nation: The Supreme Court at its Peak, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 1943,
at 20.
174. JAMES, supra note 139, at 80.
175. Frankfurter, supra note 82, at 938.
176. One source praised Jackson’s work on criminal procedure, focusing exclusively on his
post-Nuremberg opinions. Fairman, supra note 172, at 469. Otherwise, the great weight of
authority focuses on assessing the impact of his opinions in other substantive areas. See generally
LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 94–96 (Oxford
Univ. Press 2d ed. 1996) (stating that Jackson’s concurring opinion in Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer “has become a starting point for constitutional discussion of concurrent powers”);
Barry, supra note 140, at 881 (highlighting “Jackson’s specific jurisprudence relating to
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when Jackson wrote his dissent in Ashcraft, his approach was different.
In Ashcraft, the Court considered the admissibility, pursuant to the
Fourteenth Amendment, of Ashcraft’s confession, given after an
interrogation that remarkably lasted thirty-six hours.177 Suspected of
killing his wife on June 5, 1941, officers took Ashcraft into custody on
June 14, 1941, after talking to him about the circumstances of his wife’s
death on several occasions.178 Law enforcement took Ashcraft to “an
office or room” on the fifth floor of the Shelby County, Tennessee jail
early that evening and “questioned him in relays until the following
Monday morning, June 16, 1941, around nine-thirty or ten o’clock.”179
During that time, Ashcraft never left the room and officers were
forced to question him “in relays” because “they became so tired they
were compelled to rest.”180 For his part, Ashcraft received “a single
five minutes respite.”181 Ashcraft ultimately said he gave officers the
name of another man “who occasionally had ridden with him to
work,”182 although officers recounted that Ashcraft told them that this
other man—petitioner Ware—”overpowered him at his home and
abducted the deceased, and was probably the killer.”183 At the time of
his statement, Ashcraft said he was “blinded by a powerful electric
light, his body became weary, and the strain on his nerves became
unbearable.”184
The investigators collectively contended that Ashcraft was “‘cool,’
‘calm,’ ‘collected,’ ‘normal’”; “his vision was unimpaired and his eyes
not bloodshot”; and, finally, “he showed no outward signs of being tired
or sleepy.”185 Regardless of who was correct,186 law enforcement
economic regulation, procedural due process, civil liberties, and the separation of powers
doctrine”); Paul T. Crane, Did the Court Kill the Treason Charge?: Reassessing Cramer v.
United States and Its Significance, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 635, 652–53 (2009) (discussing the
impact of Jackson’s opinion in Cramer, which focused on a treason issue); Mary L. Dudziak, Law
Power, and “Rumors of War”: Robert Jackson Confronts Law and Security After Nuremberg, 60
BUFF. L. REV. 367 (2012) (reviewing some of Jackson’s more famous post-Nuremberg opinions,
a review that does not include criminal procedure opinions); Laura K. Ray, A Law Clerk and His
Justice: What William Rehnquist Did Not Learn from Robert Jackson, 29 IND. L. REV. 535, 564
(1996) (praising Jackson’s concurring opinion in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, which
focused on Truman’s seizure of the nation’s steel mills).
177. Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 145, 149 (1944).
178. Id. at 147–49 (describing the circumstances of the victim’s death and Ashcraft’s
interactions with officers “on several occasions”).
179. Id. at 149.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 151.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 150.
185. Id. at 151.
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detained Ware, who confessed after a nearly six-hour interrogation and
told officers that Ashcraft hired him to kill his wife.187 Ashcraft
verbally admitted the truth of Ware’s statement, but declined to sign the
transcription of Ware’s confession.188 Premised on their statements,
and apparently their statements alone,189 both Ashcraft and Ware were
convicted of murder in state court and sentenced to ninety-nine years in
prison.190 The Supreme Court of Tennessee affirmed.191
Relying on the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court reversed
Ashcraft’s conviction.192 In an opinion by Justice Black, the majority
held that Ashcraft’s confession was unconstitutionally “compelled.”193
The Court reasoned, “a situation such as that here shown by
uncontradicted evidence is so inherently coercive that its very existence
is irreconcilable with the possession of mental freedom by a lone
suspect against whom its full coercive force is brought to bear.”194 In
stirring language, the majority added the following:
There have been, and are now, certain foreign nations with
governments dedicated to an opposite policy: governments which
convict individuals with testimony obtained by police organizations
possessed of an unrestrained power to seize persons suspected of
crimes against the state, hold them in secret custody, and wring from
them confessions by physical or mental torture. So long as the
Constitution remains the basic law of our Republic, America will not
have that kind of government.195

Black’s highlighting of the interrogation tactics of other nations was
likely no temporal accident. By the time Ashcraft was published on
May 1, 1944, Nazi Gestapo interrogation tactics196—alongside the

186. The opinion’s majority author, Justice Black, characterized factual disputes as the typical
result of third-degree interrogation practices: “As to what happened in the fifth-floor jail room
during this thirty-six hour secret examination the testimony follows the usual pattern and is in
hopeless conflict.” Id. at 149–50.
187. Id. at 151.
188. Id.
189. Id.; see id. at 149 (noting that “none” of law enforcement’s investigative efforts prior to
interrogating Ashcraft “produced tangible evidence pointing to the identity of the murderer”).
190. Id. at 144.
191. Id. at 145.
192. Id. at 155–56.
193. Id. at 153.
194. Id. at 154.
195. Id. at 155 (emphasis added).
196. Threats of being sent to the Gestapo were used frequently in initial Nazi interrogation
sessions. ARTHUR A. DURAND, STALAG LUFT III, at 64 (1999). For example, British and
American airmen were held in solitary confinement while awaiting interrogation, with
temperatures inside their cells hot enough to make the bed scorch bare flesh. Id. Their diets were
also woefully inadequate. Id. at 66. In special cases, the Gestapo also advocated forceful
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Stalin regime’s troubling questioning techniques197—were firmly
established and routinely used in territories under German or Soviet
control.198
But Jackson was not persuaded. In a dissent, joined by Justices
Roberts and Frankfurter, Jackson proffered a distinct federalism
concern, noting that “[w]e have no power to discipline the police or
law-enforcement officers of the State of Tennessee nor to reverse its
convictions in retribution for conduct which we may personally
disapprove.”199
Apart from his concern over states’ rights,200 Jackson seemed to
expressly approve of the techniques used by law enforcement to
interrogate Ashcraft.201 He was unconcerned by the length of the
interrogation, and accused the majority of invalidating the confession
“because of the time taken in getting it.”202 But, if interrogation
duration is a problem, Jackson argued, then “it should be capable of
statement in definite terms. If thirty-six hours is more than is
permissible, what about 24? or 12? or 6? or 1?”203 The duration of
interrogation should be particularly unproblematic, when as Jackson
asserted happened in Ashcraft’s case, a witness is not credible,204
experienced no physical abuse during the interrogation,205 and received

interrogation. GEORGE C. BROWDER, FOUNDATIONS OF THE NAZI POLICE STATE 234 (1990).
Klaus Barbie, known as the “Butcher of Lyon” and S.S. and Gestapo member, tortured women
and children during his interrogations in Lyon, France. 3 Women Testify of Torture at Hands of
Klaus Barbie, PHILA. INQUIRER, May 23, 1987, at A01.
197. See, e.g., ALAN WOOD, STALIN AND STALINISM 40 (2d ed. 2005) (“Sophisticated
interrogation techniques, physical and mental torture, deprivation of sleep, threats to close
relatives and the administration of narcotic drugs were used with deadly finesse to weed out and
destroy the ‘enemies of the people.’”).
198. WOOD, supra note 197, at 40 (referring to Stalinist interrogation tactics used in 1938);
The Triumph of Hitler: The Gestapo is Born, HISTORY PLACE (2001),
http://www.historyplace.com/worldwar2/triumph/tr-gestapo.htm (noting reliance on the Gestapo
as early as February 10, 1936).
199. Ashcraft, 322 U.S. at 158 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
200. Jackson reiterates this concern throughout the opinion. E.g., id. at 160 (“[W]e cannot
read an undiscriminating hostility to mere interrogation into the Constitution without unduly
fettering the States in protecting society from the criminal.”).
201. Jackson’s personal case notes in Ashcraft do not reflect that he was concerned about the
police interrogation techniques. To the contrary, Jackson notes simply “Longer examined greater
suspicion. Finally told them negro did it. Of course proper hold him as [unintelligible] then.”
Robert H. Jackson, Draft Opinion in Ashcraft v. Tennessee, No. 391 (on file with Library of
Congress, Robert H. Jackson Papers, Box 131).
202. Ashcraft, 322 U.S. at 161 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
203. Id. at 162.
204. Id. at 172.
205. Id. at 171–72.

GALLINI PRINT - FINAL 2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

28

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

10/4/2014 2:20 PM

[Vol. 46

regular food and bathroom breaks.206 Rather, as a white, male property
owner, “[t]he real issue is strength of character,” and Ashcraft was not
the “victim of prejudice.”207
Accordingly, said Jackson, “[n]o
conclusion that this confession was actually coerced can be reached on
this record except by reliance upon the utterly uncorroborated
statements of defendant Ashcraft.”208
Jackson’s position is to some extent difficult to understand. By May
1944, the Supreme Court was already well on its way to condemning
state law enforcement’s use of “third degree” interrogation tactics (i.e.,
using physical or mental pain to extract a statement from a suspect).209
In 1940, shortly before Jackson’s arrival, the Supreme Court in
Chambers v. Florida210 invalidated state confessions taken from four
defendants on facts remarkably similar to Ashcraft. Consider that, in
Chambers, officers questioned the four suspects in the presence of
multiple investigators and, at one point, relied on an “all night vigil”
interrogation session.211 Like the interrogation sessions in Ashcraft, the
interrogation sessions in Chambers became so long that the supervising
sheriff was unable to interrogate the suspects at night because he was
too tired.212 Moreover, like the sessions in Ashcraft, the Chambers
suspects were denied sleep, questioned extensively, and could not
confer either with counsel or a friend.213
Justice Black even authored Chambers.214 Relying on the Fourteenth
Amendment, he powerfully warned states that, “[t]o permit human lives
to be forfeited upon confessions thus obtained would make of the
constitutional requirement of due process of law a meaningless
symbol.”215 The Court thereafter relied on Chambers to invalidate two
additional state confessions in 1940,216 and two more in 1941.217

206. Id. at 166–67.
207. Id. at 171, 173.
208. Ashcraft, 322 U.S. at 172 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
209. 1 NAT’L COMM. ON LAW OBSERVANCE & ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON LAWLESSNESS IN
LAW ENFORCEMENT 19 (1931).
210. Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 238–42 (1940).
211. Id. at 230.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 233–35.
214. As is documented extensively elsewhere, Jackson and Black had a well-known feud
while the two served on the Supreme Court together. Associated Press, Jackson Attacks Black for
Judging Ex-Partner’s Case, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 1946, at A1. It is perhaps unsurprising to find
them at opposite ends of an issue. See generally FELDMAN, supra note 52, at 268–74 (discussing
the circumstances that gave rise to their feud); GERHART, supra note 48, at 235–77 (dedicating an
entire chapter to explore in depth the feud between Jackson and Black).
215. Chambers, 309 U.S. at 240.
216. White v. Texas, 310 U.S. 530, 532–33 (1940); Canty v. Alabama, 309 U.S. 629, 629
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Although Jackson was not on the Court for those decisions, he was
likely aware of them. And, although the Court would temporarily
reverse course in October 1941—after Jackson joined the Court—by
admitting a state confession obtained following overnight relay
interrogation sessions,218 Jackson was at least minimally on notice by
Ashcraft of the Court’s general disapproval of even non-physically
abusive interrogation techniques.
Following Ashcraft, but before Jackson’s departure for
Nuremberg,219 Jackson’s voting pattern in confession cases favored
opinions that were deferential to the states.220 But he never explained
why. For example, in June 1944, Jackson joined the majority in
upholding a defendant’s written confession despite the confession
having been obtained, in part, after a ten-hour interrogation where “a
pan of the victims’ bones was placed in [defendant’s] lap by his
interrogators.”221
In March 1945, Jackson joined a partial dissent,222 disagreeing with
the majority’s decision to invalidate a state confession, despite law
enforcement’s reliance on several lengthy interrogations that involved
stripping the defendant and possibly beating him.223 In part, the dissent
wrote that:
The rightful independence of the states in the administration of their
own criminal laws in their own courts requires that in such cases we
scrupulously avoid retrying the facts which have been submitted to the
jury, except on a clear showing of error substantially affecting the
constitutional rights of the accused.224

Although discerning Jackson’s judicial philosophy regarding
confessions is challenging, that challenge is even greater when
examining the Court’s 1941–1945 right to counsel and search and

(1940) (mem.).
217. Vernon v. Alabama, 313 U.S. 547 (1941) (mem.); Lomax v. Texas, 313 U.S. 544 (1941)
(mem.).
218. Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 229–33 (1941).
219. JIM NEWTON, JUSTICE FOR ALL: EARL WARREN AND THE NATION HE MADE 272 (2007).
220. See HOCKETT, supra note 48, at 256 (explaining that Ashcraft reflects “Jackson’s
advocacy of judicial deference”).
221. Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596, 599–600 (1944). The suspect orally confessed
following law enforcement’s reliance on this dramatic interrogation technique, and his confession
was not offered into evidence. Id. at 600. Rather, the issue in Lyons was the admissibility of
suspect’s subsequent written confession. Id.
222. Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 434–39 (1945) (Stone, J., dissenting).
223. Id. at 403–04 (reviewing conflicting factual evidence of whether defendant was beaten,
how long the interrogations lasted, and whether defendant was forcibly disrobed during one of the
sessions).
224. Id. at 438.
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seizure opinions, none of which were authored by Jackson. The Court
decided five search and seizure cases during that period, but Jackson did
not participate in four of them.225 The remaining case, United States v.
White, provides no insight into Jackson’s Fourth Amendment judicial
philosophy.226 Although the respondent in White argued that the Fourth
Amendment’s Search and Seizure Clause provides a constitutional right
for an officer of an unincorporated labor union to refuse to produce
records of the union responsive to a subpoena, the Supreme Court relied
almost exclusively on the Fifth Amendment to reject respondent’s
argument.227
The Court’s six right to counsel cases during Jackson’s preNuremberg tenure are only slightly more revealing. Jackson’s voting
pattern foreshadows his ultimate view that counsel is exceptionally
important, but the right to counsel is not unlimited—a view he would
express post-Nuremberg.228 That view seems rooted in Betts v.
Brady,229 the first right to counsel case Jackson heard, wherein the
Court held that due process requires the state to—in unspecified
“certain circumstances” (although not the circumstances at issue)—
provide indigent defendants with counsel.230 The Court thereafter held
five times in 1945 that certain denials of counsel unconstitutionally
violated Due Process.231
The point is hopefully clear: prior to his departure for Nuremberg,
Jackson, in the limited number of opinions he joined or authored related
to confessions, right to counsel, and/or search and seizure, established

225. Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487 (1944); United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical
Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944); Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942); Goldstein v. United
States, 316 U.S. 114 (1942).
226. United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944).
227. Id. at 698.
228. Compare Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728, 729 (1948) (holding no denial of due process
where defendant “was sentenced as a life offender without counsel or offer of counsel”), with
Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 739–41 (1948) (holding a denial of due process existed where
a defendant was interrogated and pleaded guilty without counsel).
229. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
230. Id. at 462 (declining constitutionally to require the provision of counsel to an indigent
defendant indicted for robbery in state court).
231. Rice v. Olsen, 324 U.S. 786, 788 (1945) (“A defendant who pleads guilty is entitled to
the benefit of counsel, and a request for counsel is not necessary.”); White v. Ragen, 324 U.S.
760, 763–64, 766–67 (1945) (dismissing federal habeas petition but condemning state practice of
declining to appoint counsel for petitioners in state habeas proceedings); House v. Mayo, 324
U.S. 42, 45–46, 48 (1945) (per curiam) (granting motion for leave to file petition for certiorari
where counsel was absent during sentencing proceedings); Tomkins v. Missouri, 323 U.S. 485,
486–88 (1945) (no counsel provided in capital case); Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471, 472
(1945) (no counsel provided during guilty plea and sentencing phases despite indigent
defendant’s request).
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himself—with allowance made for certain circumstances in right to
counsel cases232—as generally deferential to state-based criminal
procedure. But why? Perhaps the pro-judicial restraint philosophy he
advocated in the context of the New Deal guided his voting to some
extent. But the dearth of Jackson-authored criminal procedure opinions
leaves unclear why that rationale should apply to confessions, right to
counsel, and/or search and seizure issues.
II. JACKSON’S TRANSFORMATION AT NUREMBERG
“[T]he hard months at Nuremberg were well spent in the most
important, enduring, and constructive work of my life.”233
This Part describes Jackson’s first meaningful encounter with
criminal procedure. It took place in London, where during the Summer
of 1945, Allied delegates debated the merits of, and procedure for, a war
criminals trial. During those lengthy and sometimes heated post-war
negotiations, Jackson worked to assure that a trial of the Nazis would
occur. During that time, he was forced to think through the merit of
varied and competing international legal systems, each of which
required that he develop a criminal procedure philosophy. The detailed
minutes of the London Negotiations, as discussed in this Part, reflect
that Jackson felt strongly that the accused should receive a fair trial, one
that ensured the accused had due process and evidentiary trial
protections. Accordingly, this Part does not focus on the evidence
against the Nazis and the corresponding applicable law;234 rather, it
232. Jackson’s reserving the right to counsel as a special category of due process concerns—
particularly for indigent defendants—was in hindsight likely foreseeable given his longtime view
of the attorney as exceptionally important. For example, in a speech to the National Conference
of Bar Association Delegates in 1934, Jackson said, “[i]t is a matter of self-preservation, as well
as of social duty, that the bar assumes leadership in overhauling our procedure to put the
processes of the courts in the reach of the people, and to make justice available to disadvantaged
men.” Robert H. Jackson, The Lawyer; Leader or Mouthpiece?, 18 J. AM. JUD. SOC’Y 70, 74
(1934).
233. Robert H. Jackson, Introduction to HARRIS, supra note 11, at xxxvii.
234. See, e.g., M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Nuremberg Legacy, in PERSPECTIVES ON THE
NUREMBERG TRIAL 577, 587–90 (Guenael Mettraux ed., 2008) (discussing the lack of precedent
for the substantive criminal charges against defendants at Nuremberg and the problem of ex post
facto involved in creating new substantive charges); Theodor Meron, Reflections on the
Prosecution of War Crimes by International Tribunals, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 551, 564–65 (2006)
(stating that “[e]ach of the legal grounds set forth in the London Charter was controversial” and
noting the novelty of the concept of substantive law at Nuremberg); Henry T. King, Jr., Lecture at
Chautauqua Institution: Robert Jackson’s Place in History: Nuremberg Revisited (June 13, 2003),
available at http://www.roberthjackson.org/the-man/speeches-articles/speeches/speeches-relatedto-robert-h-jackson/robert-jacksons-place-in-history-nuremberg-revisited/ (noting the three types
of substantive crimes proposed by Jackson in the London Negotiations and the opposition he
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addresses Jackson’s first major encounter with criminal procedure: the
London Negotiations.
Roosevelt condemned the Nazi concept of “total war” as early as
October 25, 1941, when, in response to the Nazi execution of hostages
in France, he said that such acts would “only sow the seeds of hatred
which will one day bring fearful retribution.”235 Roosevelt would not
live to witness the accuracy of his prediction or the punishment of those
adjudged responsible for wartime atrocities.236 While an artist sketched
a portrait of Roosevelt at his vacation home in Warm Springs, Georgia,
on April 12, 1945, the President complained of a “terrific headache.”237
That pain turned out to be a stroke; Roosevelt died at 4:35 P.M. that
day.238
Jackson was stunned.239 That same day, Chief Justice Stone
administered the Presidential oath to Vice President Harry S.
Truman.240 Speaking in Washington, D.C., at Roosevelt’s funeral, an
emotional Jackson said, “[w]e are glad that he lived the high moments
when he could see that his efforts have led our country to the very
threshold of victory both in Europe and the Orient.”241 But this was not
the only speech Jackson gave that day.
Later, in an address to the American Society of International Law,
also in Washington, D.C., Jackson referred, in part, to the prospect of
trying war criminals:
I have no purpose to enter into any controversy as to what shall be
done with war criminals, either high or humble. . . . [But,] I am not so
troubled as some seem to be over problems of jurisdiction of war
criminals or of finding existing and recognized law by which
standards of guilt may be determined. . . . You must put no man on
trial before anything that is called a court, if you are not prepared to
establish his personal guilt. I do not, of course, mean that every step
must be taken in accordance with technical common-law rules of

encountered in implementing his draft of the substantive laws).
235. HARRIS, supra note 11, at 3.
236. Roosevelt died “less than three months into his fourth term.” FELDMAN, supra note 52,
at 265.
237. Associated Press, Last Words: ‘I Have Terrific Headache’, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 1945,
at A1.
238. Arthur Krock, End Comes Suddenly at Warm Springs, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 1945, at A1.
239. JACKSON, THAT MAN, supra note 66, at 165; see FELDMAN, supra note 52, at 265
(noting that Roosevelt’s death “particularly affected” Jackson).
240. C.P. Trussel, Truman is Sworn in the White House, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 1945, at A1.
241. JACKSON, THAT MAN, supra note 66, at 169; see FELDMAN, supra note 52, at 265–66
(recounting Jackson’s speech and noting that, by the end, Jackson had “broken down”).
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proof. The evidence to be received depends upon what the
circumstances make available.242

The speech, which Truman noticed,243 nicely represents a crude but
emerging form of what became Jackson’s post-Nuremberg criminal
procedure judicial philosophy. By the time of Jackson’s April 13
speech, the Allies were already consistently defeating Nazi forces,244
and it seemed clear that the war would end soon.245 The question
would shift to punishment and responsibility,246 a question already
debated internationally.247 President Truman, perhaps having heard or
read Jackson’s speech,248 and impressed by Jackson’s credentials as a
trial lawyer,249 had one of his top advisors, Judge Samuel Rosenman,
contact Jackson on April 26, 1945,250 to ask whether Jackson would
consider leaving the Court to prosecute Nazi war criminals.251

242. Robert H. Jackson, The Rule of Law Among Nations, 19 TEMP. L.Q. 135, 140 (1945)
(emphasis added); see Speeches by Robert H. Jackson, ROBERT H. JACKSON CTR.,
http://www.roberthjackson.org/the-man/speeches-articles/speeches/speeches-by-robert-h-jackson/
(last visited September 22, 2014) (noting the date and location of his address to the American
Society of International Law).
243. See FELDMAN, supra note 52, at 275–76 (“Jackson’s speech was too directly focused on
the war crimes issue to be a coincidence, and it suggested he hoped to position himself to serve in
some capacity on the new tribunal.”); Taylor, supra note 18, at 495 n.37 (“President Truman’s
attention had been called to Jackson’s address . . . .”).
244. MATANLE, supra note 97, at 356–58 (detailing a handful of the Allied conquests in April
1945).
245. Id. at 359 (reproducing a letter from Hitler’s secretary, Martin Bormann, to GrandAdmiral Doenitz, which noted that “on account of the non-appearance of all the divisions, our
position seems hopeless”).
246. President Roosevelt had begun considering in detail how to deal with the trial and
punishment of Nazi War Criminals. In a secret memorandum to the President dated January 22,
1945, Roosevelt’s top advisors proposed who should be punished, where the trials should take
place, and also crudely outlines what crimes the proposed defendants committed. Memorandum
for the President, Jan. 22, 1945, in Diary Kept by Jackson While Preparing for Trial, Confidential
Memorandum for the President, at 5–8 [hereinafter Jackson Nuremberg Diary] (on file with
Library of Congress, Robert H. Jackson Papers, Box 95, Reel 1).
247. See Taylor, supra note 18, at 492 (footnote omitted) (noting that the United Nations War
Crimes Commission, established in 1944, “gave intense and continuing study to such questions as
the tribunals—national or international, military or civilian—by which those accused of war
crimes would be tried and the scope and nature of the international penal law that would be
invoked and applied.”).
248. Id. at 495 n.37.
249. Robert H. Jackson Diary Entry, Apr. 27, 1945, in Jackson Nuremberg Diary, supra note
246, at 22.
250. Taylor, supra note 18, at 495 n.38; see JACKSON, THAT MAN, supra note 66, at 109
(noting that Judge Rosenman was White House counsel at that time).
251. GERHART, supra note 48, at 308. Oddly, Jackson’s biography reports that he received
Truman’s offer through Roseman by phone, id., but Jackson’s own diary says he met with
Rosenman face-to-face. Robert H. Jackson Diary Entry, Apr. 27, 1945, in Jackson Nuremberg
Diary, supra note 246, at 23.
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Although he was “immensely pleased at the offer,” Jackson asked
for, and received, the opportunity to evaluate whether he would
accept.252 At the time, Jackson was concerned about whether
prosecuting the Nazis would be inconsistent with his responsibilities on
the Supreme Court.253 Given that at least two of his colleagues would
later oppose Jackson’s endeavors at Nuremberg,254 his concerns were
hardly unfounded. He closed an April 27, 1945 entry in his diary with
this passage: “Of course if I undertake it and find that the Court is
embarrassed, I shall resign.”255 Jackson ultimately accepted the
President’s offer on April 29.256 Remarkably, despite having no
meaningful substantive background in criminal law or procedure either
as a practitioner or Associate Justice, Jackson was tapped to devise
criminal procedure in the first—and critically important—international
criminal trial.257 Despite his meager background on the topic, a witness
to the trials would say reflectively, “Jackson turned out to be the
principal architect of the entire proceeding.”258 His road to doing so
was hardly an easy one.
From the outset, Jackson knew he had to deal with proposals that the
Nazi war criminals should be “allocated to penal labor”259 or shot in a
series of summary executions—a position particularly advocated by the
British.260 Against the zealousness of the other Allied nations to

252. Robert H. Jackson Diary Entry, Apr. 27, 1945, supra note 251, at 23.
253. Id.
254. Chief Justice Stone was opposed to Jackson’s appointment. Alpheus Thomas Mason,
Extra-Judicial Work for Judges: The Views of Chief Justice Stone, 67 HARV. L. REV. 193, 209
(1953) (noting Chief Justice Stone was “deeply disturbed” by Jackson’s appointment as
Nuremberg prosecutor). So too were Justices Black and Douglas. WILLIAM J. BOSCH,
JUDGMENT ON NUREMBERG 134 (1970) (listing Justice Black as “another justice to whom
personal considerations may well have been important” in Jackson’s decision to take a leave of
absence for Nuremberg); WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS, 1939-1975: THE
AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS 28–29 (1980) (stating that Justice Douglas agreed
with Chief Justice Stone’s objections to Jackson’s leave of absence); GERALD T. DUNNE, HUGO
BLACK AND THE JUDICIAL REVOLUTION 241 (1977) (describing Justice Black as “irate” about
Jackson’s absence and Black’s dissatisfaction with the additional opinions he and the other
justices had to write in Jackson’s absence); GEORGE MARTIN, CCB: THE LIFE AND CENTURY OF
CHARLES C. BURLINGHAM, NEW YORK’S FIRST CITIZEN, 1858-1959, at 501 (2005) (referring to
a later quote by Justice Douglas expressing Douglas’s disagreement with Jackson’s departure).
255. Robert H. Jackson Diary Entry, Apr. 27, 1945, supra note 251, at 23.
256. Id. at 24 (Memorandum from Jackson to the President).
257. See EHRENFREUND, supra note 20, at 10–11 (describing Jackson’s appointment as
“remarkable” for a number of reasons, including his educational background and experience).
258. Id. at xiv.
259. Taylor, supra note 18, at 496.
260. EHRENFREUND, supra note 20, at 7–8. Roosevelt and Churchill had previously even
signed an agreement on September 15, 1944, indicating that the Nazi leaders would, following
capture, be “taken out in the yard and shot by a firing squad.” Id. at 7.
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dispense hastily with the Nazi war criminals, Jackson was alone in his
desire for them to receive a full and fair trial.261 To advance his
principled position, Jackson had to work quickly, even before his
announcement as Chief Prosecutor was made public. Indeed, President
Truman had indicated in his initial offer to Jackson that Judge
Rosenman would leave in just a few days to present a proposal to the
Allies,262 which left little time for Jackson to prepare. Fortunately, as
he considered the President’s offer, he had already been furnished with
a copy of a January 22, 1945 confidential memorandum prepared by
Henry Stimson (Secretary of War), Edward Stettinius (Secretary of
State), and Francis Biddle (Attorney General) to assist Roosevelt when
he attended the Yalta Conference.263 That early memorandum proposed
a trial of the Nazi war criminals by the United Nations War Crimes
Commission, but noted that “[t]he labors of the Commission have not
resulted in any governmental agreement as to the tribunals to try or the
procedures for trying war criminals.”264
In his formal acceptance of Truman’s offer, Jackson noted that the
January 1945 memorandum “need[ed] a good deal of maturing in
details,” but that it “seem[ed] to afford a practicable and sound general
basis for a summary but fair procedure.”265 He suggested that “[w]e . . .
start at once preparation of a short code of procedure, for submission to
and adoption by the Commission.”266 In doing so, Jackson cautioned,
“we must try to outline a flexible but efficient procedure that will be
both summary and in keeping with our traditional fairness towards those
accused of crime.”267 Truman’s response, according to Jackson’s
personal diary, reflects Truman’s confidence in Jackson’s ability to
complete a task that both men acknowledged to be an inordinate
undertaking.268
261. EHRENFREUND, supra note 20, at 12.
262. Robert H. Jackson Diary Entry, Apr. 27, 1945, supra note 251, at 22 (emphasis added).
263. Id. at 2–3; see Memorandum to President Roosevelt from the Secretaries of State and
War and the Attorney General, January 22, 1945, in REPORT OF ROBERT H. JACKSON, UNITED
STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MILITARY TRIALS,
LONDON 1945, at 3 (U.S. Gov’t Printing Office 1949) [hereinafter JACKSON REPORT], available
at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/jackson-rpt-military-trials.pdf.
Yalta is a
Ukrainian city on the Black Sea where, in February 1945, Roosevelt, Stalin, and Churchill met to
discuss how to punish the Nazis. EHRENFREUND, supra note 20, at 9.
264. Memorandum for the President, Jan. 22, 1945, supra note 246, at 3 (emphasis added).
265. Memorandum for the President, Apr. 29, 1945, in Jackson Nuremberg Diary, supra note
246, at 24.
266. Id. at 25.
267. Id.
268. Robert H. Jackson Diary Entry, Apr. 30, 1945, in Jackson Nuremberg Diary, supra note
246, at 29.
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On April 30, the same day that Hitler committed suicide,269 Jackson
was provided with “a draft of the document which it was hoped the
United Nations would sign setting up the tribunal and procedure.”270
The next day, Jackson authored a memorandum indicating that he
thought the proposed trial procedures were “too impassioned,” included
too much legalese, and were too inflexible.271 He therefore hastily
worked with representatives of the State, War, and Justice Departments
to construct a different document that Judge Rosenman took with him to
San Francisco for presentation to the Allies at the United Nations
Conference on International Organization.272
The document, titled “American Draft of Definitive Proposal,”
included considerably more detail than its predecessor. Of particular
interest to this Article are the sections entitled “Due Process For
Defendants” and “Evidence And Procedure.”273 Under the Due Process
heading, the April 1945 Draft included the guarantee that the accused
would receive “reasonable notice” of the charges against them, would
receive a copy of the statement of those charges, and had the right to
“be heard in their defense personally and by counsel.”274 The evidence
heading was thinner and indicated both that the Tribunals should “adopt
and apply . . . expeditious and non-technical procedures” and would
“disallow action by defendants the effect of which will be to cause
unreasonable delay.”275 Procedure, it seemed, was very much on
Jackson’s mind, well before his appointment to Chief Prosecutor

269. IAN KERSHAW, THE END: THE DEFIANCE AND DESTRUCTION OF HITLER’S GERMANY,
1944–1945, at 346 (2011).
270. Robert H. Jackson Diary Entry, Apr. 30, 1945, supra note 268, at 29 (noting that Herbert
Wechsler dropped the document off to Jackson, along with Colonel Bernays and Colonel Cutter).
271. Memorandum Re Document Entitled “Punishment of War Criminals”, dated 26 April,
1945, in Jackson Nuremberg Diary, supra note 246, at 30–31.
272. American Draft of Definitive Proposal, Presented to Foreign Ministers at San Francisco,
April 1945, in JACKSON REPORT, supra note 263, at 22. Although the Draft is labeled “April,”
the discussions in San Francisco took place between May 2–10. Id.
273. Id. at 24–25.
274. Id. at 25.
275. The full “Evidence And Procedure” heading provides as follows:13. Tribunals
established pursuant to this Agreement shall adopt and apply, to the greatest extent
possible expeditious and non-technical procedures.14. Such tribunals shall (a) admit
any evidence which in their opinion has probative value, (b) confine trials strictly to an
expeditious hearing of the issues raised by the charges, (c) disallow action by
defendants the effect of which will be to cause unreasonable delay or the introduction
of irrelevant issues or evidence, and (d) employ with all possible liberality
simplifications of proof, such as but not limited to: requiring defendants to make
proffers of proof; taking judicial notice of facts of common knowledge; and utilizing
reasonable presumptions.
Id.

GALLINI PRINT - FINAL 2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

Nuremburg Lives On

10/4/2014 2:20 PM

37

became public.
On May 2, Jackson was officially designated Chief Prosecutor at
Nuremberg via Executive Order.276 By then, Judge Rosenman had
introduced the American Draft of Definitive Proposal to the Allied
Nations, a process that would extend to May 10.277 Although the four
Allied nations ultimately took no action on the Definitive Proposal,278
they did agree that an international military tribunal would decide the
Nazi leaders’ fate279—despite lingering opposition from Russia and
from many in the United States.280 Amidst the San Francisco
negotiations, Germany surrendered on May 8, 1945.281
Jackson flew to Europe for “his initial survey”282 on May 22 and met
with British representatives on May 29.283 In a top secret file
documenting the meeting, “[t]he British indicated a strong inclination to
go along with the US wherever we should provide an actual clear
lead.”284 By way of illustrative example, the British pointed to
Jackson’s drafted protocol presented to them in San Francisco.285
Shortly after his return, and indicative of Jackson’s success abroad, the
British on June 3 issued a statement indicating that it “now accepted in
principle the United States draft for a discussion by the representatives
appointed by the Allied Governments to prepare for the prosecution of

276. President’s Executive Order, May 2, 1945 in Jackson Nuremberg Diary, supra note 246,
at 35–36 (providing the President’s Executive Order). Jackson remarkably also managed to find
time to wind up his Court business. He delivered his dissenting opinion in Jewell Ridge Coal
Corp. v. United Mine Workers of America, 325 U.S. 161 (1945) on May 7. Robert H. Jackson
Diary Entry, May 7, 1945, in Jackson Nuremberg Diary, supra note 246, at 56. He thereafter
worked for two days straight on opinion-related work. Id. at 59. On May 21, he completed his
work on the Court and left for London the next day, id. at 88, although he would return briefly for
the announcement of opinions on June 4, id. at 136, and a June 9 conference. Id. at 142.
277. American Draft of Definitive Proposal, supra note 272, at 22
278. Id.
279. Robert H. Jackson Diary Entry, May 10, 1945 in Jackson Nuremberg Diary, supra note
246, at 59.
280. See Robert H. Jackson Diary Entry, May 18, 1945 in Jackson Nuremberg Diary, supra
note 246, at 82–83 (describing a range of experiences Jackson had with those who opposed trials
and describing the Russian plan “to take both men and women in very large numbers and to
sterilize the men and to breed the German women to Russians . . . .”); see also Drew Pearson, The
Washington Merry-Go-Round, WASH. POST, May 23, 1945, at 12 (noting, against strong
opposition, Jackson’s position that pretrial compulsory labor for members of the Nazi party was
inappropriate).
281. R.W. Kostal, The Alchemy of Occupation: Karl Loewenstein and the Legal
Reconstruction of Nazi Germany, 1945–1946, 29 LAW & HIST. REV. 1, 2 (2011).
282. GERHART, supra note 48, at 318.
283. Meeting at House of Lords, May 29, 1945, in Jackson Nuremberg Diary, supra note 246,
at 93.
284. Id.
285. Id.
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war criminals.”286
Jackson wrote to Truman with a progress update three days later.287
In it, Jackson outlined his overall plan and in doing so foreshadowed
what became his post-Nuremberg criminal procedure judicial
philosophy. In stirring language, Jackson wrote that “[t]he American
case is being prepared on the assumption that an inescapable
responsibility rests upon this country to conduct an inquiry . . . into the
culpability of those whom there is probable cause to accuse of atrocities
and other crimes.”288 But he also added, “the procedure of these
hearings may properly bar obstructive and dilatory tactics resorted to by
defendants in our ordinary criminal trials.”289 The key, Jackson said,
“is to determine the innocence or guilt of the accused after a hearing as
dispassionate as the times and the horrors we deal with will permit, and
upon a record that will leave our reasons and our motives clear.”290
Jackson outlined his conceptualization of how the trials should look
at negotiations held in London from June 26–August 8, 1945 among the
governments of the United States, France, Britain, and the Soviet
Union.291 In advance of the meetings, Jackson prepared and submitted
a “Revision of American Draft of Proposed Agreement,” dated June 14,
1945.292 The June 14 Draft included only a few changes—in response
to the Soviet Union’s request293—to the “Due Process For Defendants”
(called “fair trial for defendants” in the latter draft) and “Evidence And
Procedure” sections of the April 1945 Draft.294
Of more interest is the planning memorandum that accompanied the
June 1945 Proposed Agreement, which Jackson distributed to all of the

286. 1 DREXEL A. SPRECHER, INSIDE THE NUREMBERG TRIAL: A PROSECUTOR’S
COMPREHENSIVE ACCOUNT 41 (1999).
287. Robert H. Jackson, Justice Jackson’s Report to President Truman on the Legal Basis for
Trial of War Criminals, 19 TEMP. L.Q. 144 (1945).
288. Id. at 147–48.
289. Id. at 148.
290. Id. (emphasis added).
291. SPRECHER, supra note 286, at 43.
292. Revision of American Draft of Proposed Agreement, June 14, 1945, in JACKSON
REPORT, supra note 263, at 55.
293. E.g., Aide-Mëmoire from the Soviet Government, June 14, 1945, in JACKSON REPORT,
supra note 263, at 62 (requesting the deletion of Article 12(c) from the April 1945 Draft, which
required the tribunal to “make written findings and enter written judgment” (quoting Revision of
American Draft of Proposed Agreement, supra note 292, at 59)).
294. Compare American Draft of Definitive Proposal § 12(d), supra note 272, at 25
(including the requirement of written judicial findings post-guilt), with Revision of American
Draft of Proposed Agreement, supra note 292 (omitting the requirement of written judicial
findings post-guilt).
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delegations at the beginning of the London Negotiations.295 That
document was designed both to aid in the understanding of Jackson’s
June 1945 proposal and to outline the possible practical problems with
trying the Nazis.296 It included fairly robust sections outlining, in
relevant part, Jackson’s expectations on (1) the necessary scope of what
to prove, (2) the admissibility of evidence, and (3) outlines of how to
prove guilt.297 Those expectations included requiring the Allies to
prove minimally for each defendant “[t]heir identity,”298 “[t]heir
participation in the criminal plan or enterprise,”299 and “[t]heir
responsibility for the specific atrocities and other crimes charged.”300
The Soviet delegation found the level of procedural detail unnerving,
and, in doing so, quickly established itself as Jackson’s most aggressive
adversary.301 In the course of the coming weeks and months, Jackson
became so frustrated with the Soviets that he threatened to quit,
threatened to walk out, and even recommended that each country try its
own prisoners individually.302 What ultimately unnerved him more
than anything else was the Soviet conception of a trial.303 Although
they had accepted the idea of a trial, they believed that a trial’s purpose
was not to determine guilt, which they believed was already established,
but rather only “to determine the measure of guilt.”304
In addition to the precise purpose of the trial, the U.S. and Soviet
delegations also had substantial differences on how the trial would
operate from a procedural standpoint.305 For its part, the Soviet Union,
along with the French, advocated in favor of the inquisitorial system,
295. Planning Memorandum Distributed to Delegations at Beginning of London Conference,
June 1945, in JACKSON REPORT, supra note 263, at 64.
296. Id.
297. Id. §§ II–IV, at 65–68.
298. Id. § II(2)(f)(1), at 65.
299. Id. § II(2)(f)(2), at 65.
300. Id. § II(2)(f)(3), at 65.
301. Robert H. Jackson, Nuremberg in Retrospect: Legal Answer to International
Lawlessness, 35 A.B.A. J. 813, 814–16 (1949).
302. ROBERT E. CONOT, JUSTICE AT NUREMBERG 88 (1983); John Q. Barrett, The Nuremberg
Roles of Justice Robert H. Jackson, 6 WASH U. GLOB. STUD. L. REV. 511, 520 (2007).
303. Michael J. Bazyler, The Role of the Soviet Union in the International Military Tribunal at
Nuremberg, in THE NUREMBERG TRIALS: INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW SINCE 1945, at 45
(Herbert R. Reginbogin & Christoph J. M. Safferling eds., 2006) (noting that the Soviet vision of
trials likely consisted of “show trials”).
304. EHRENFREUND, supra note 20, at 13 (emphasis added) (quoting the position advocated
by the Soviet delegate, Major General Ion T. Nikitchenko) (internal citation and quotation marks
omitted).
305. See generally Minutes of Conference Session of June 26, 1945, in JACKSON REPORT,
supra note 263, at 71–85 (documenting exchanges between the Soviet Union delegate and
Jackson on a variety of procedural matters).
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whereby the prosecution presents the major points of evidentiary
emphasis to the trial judges who then question the defendants on those
points.306 Further, in this system, the defendants were not permitted to
testify and the prosecution and defense counsel played minor roles.307
In contrast, Jackson and the British pushed for the accusatorial (or
adversary) system, which even then favored receiving evidence during
trial (rather than before as in the inquisitorial system) and providing
defendants with robust trial rights such as the rights to present and
cross-examine witnesses and testify under oath.308 Thus was born the
first—and arguably only—major substantive problem at the London
Negotiations: criminal procedure.309
Consider how Jackson handled some illustrative problems of criminal
procedure during the London Negotiations. At a formal meeting among
the delegations on June 29, 1945, the Soviet Union expressed its
consistent (and persistent) view about the nature of the trial: “[w]e are
dealing here with the chief war criminals who have already been
convicted and whose conviction has [sic] been already announced by
both the Moscow and Crimea declarations by the heads of the
governments . . . .”310 Accordingly, said the Soviets, “the procedure
that we want to work out should be such as to insure the speediest
possible execution of the decisions of the United Nations . . . .”311 That
procedure, thought the Soviets, should include a judge who was aware
of the evidence prior to trial and a prosecutor who should be relegated
to “merely a role of assisting the court in the actual cases.”312 The
Soviet Union believed the best way to proceed required two documents:
one outlining the agreement between nations and another defining the
scope of procedure and the tribunal’s jurisdiction.313
Although Jackson agreed to the idea of two separate documents,314
306. HARRIS, supra note 11, at 15; SPRECHER, supra note 286, at 43.
307. HARRIS, supra note 11, at 15; SPRECHER, supra note 286, at 43.
308. HARRIS, supra note 11, at 15.
309. Id. (“The first problems in negotiating the London Agreement and the Charter of the
Tribunal arose out of basic differences in Anglo-American and Continental criminal procedure.”).
310. Minutes of Conference Session of June 29, 1945, in JACKSON REPORT, supra note 263,
at 104–05 (emphasis added); see 9 Robert H. Jackson, Oral History Memoir 1266–67 (1955)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with Columbia Center for Oral History) [hereinafter Oral
History] (“The Soviet delegation early indicated a belief that the court was merely to apprise the
differences in degree of guilt between various individuals and fix their penalties, but that the
finding of guilt against all and sundry had already been made by Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin
in their statements accusing the Germans.”).
311. Minutes of Conference Session of June 29, 1945, supra note 310, at 105.
312. Id. at 105–06.
313. HARRIS, supra note 11, at 15.
314. Minutes of Conference Session of June 29, 1945, supra note 310, at 117.
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he was otherwise unimpressed and not persuaded by the Soviet position.
By this point, Jackson had already privately noted that the head of the
Soviet Union’s delegation, Major General Ion T. Nikitchenko, “proves
to be an inscrutable person.”315 Perhaps unsurprisingly, Jackson
responded by saying to him at the June 29 meeting that, “in the matter
of procedure we are quite wide apart because of the fact that our legal
traditions are so far apart.”316 To begin with, Jackson did not assume
the Nazis’ guilt and, moreover, emphasized to the delegates that “the
accusation made carries no weight in an American trial
what[so]ever.”317 He added in closing: “[w]e will reconcile these
differences only with difficulty. While they appear to be merely matters
of procedure, they are matters of procedure so deeply ingrained in the
thought of the American people that some of the theories of procedure
mentioned here could not be supported by us.”318 The June 29 meeting
adjourned with Jackson agreeing to edit the American proposal and
submit a revised draft to the delegates.319 The Soviets, meanwhile,
began drafting the overarching agreement between nations.320
Jackson submitted his draft and an accompanying memorandum the
next day.321 On July 2, the Soviet Union submitted a draft agreement
formally establishing the Allies’ agreement to try the Nazi war
criminals.322 Most relevant to this Article is Jackson’s drafting decision
in the June 30 Draft to dilute the provisions restricting the Tribunal’s
ability to receive evidence.323 In that Draft, Jackson did not back down
315. Robert H. Jackson Diary Entry, June 26, 1945, in Jackson Nuremberg Diary, supra note
246, at 159.
316. Minutes of Conference Session of June 29, 1945, supra note 310, at 113.
317. Id. at 115.
318. Id. at 113. At the conclusion of the June 29 meeting, the impact of the Soviet position
was seemingly still on Jackson’s mind. Robert H. Jackson Diary Entry, June 29, 1945, in Jackson
Nuremberg Diary, supra note 246, at 161. At a dinner meeting with John Winant, the U.S.
Ambassador to Great Britain, Jackson discussed with him the “problems of the Russians as posed
by their objections.” Id.
319. Minutes of Conference Session of June 29, 1945, supra note 310, at 118.
320. Matthew Lippman, The History, Development, and Decline of Crimes Against Peace, 36
GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 957, 988–89 (2004).
321. Revised Draft of Agreement and Memorandum Submitted by American Delegation, June
30, 1945, in JACKSON REPORT, supra note 263, at 119.
322. Draft of Agreement Presented by Soviet Delegation, July 2, 1945, in JACKSON REPORT,
supra note 263, at 128.
323. Compared to the June 14 Draft, the June 30 document provides more examples of when
the Tribunal should freely receive evidence. Compare Revised Draft of Agreement and
Memorandum Submitted by American Delegation § 18, supra note 321, at 124 (“It shall employ
with all possible liberality simplifications of proof, such as but not limited to: requiring
defendants to make written proffers of proof; making extensive use of judicial notice; receiving
sworn or unsworn statements of witnesses, depositions, recorded examinations before or findings
of military or other tribunals, copies of official reports, publications and documents or other
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from his provision of counsel to the accused,324 or eliminate either the
defendant’s right to testify in his own defense325 or the requirement of
an indictment published to the accused before trial.326 Finally, in direct
contravention to the Soviet hopes, Jackson expressly clarified that “[n]o
proof shall be lodged with the Court except at the trial.”327
The delegates spent the next three days discussing the American and
Soviet submissions. Predictably, Jackson was at odds with the Soviets
and they with him. The Soviets, for example, sought to obtain a
declaration that certain organizations, like the Gestapo and S.S., were
criminal; thus, the trial would serve only to prove whether the
defendants belonged to a criminal organization.328 The Soviets also
sought “a decision of the court which establishes the criminal
responsibility of the heads or the leaders of any organization of that
kind [that] automatically establishes the criminal responsibility of the
various subordinate members of the organization.”329
Jackson,
however, did not presume the criminal nature of the Nazi organizations;
rather, he believed that the trial was designed to prove that point, in
addition to proving the individual defendants’ involvement.330 Calling
the Soviet plan too “drastic,” Jackson emphasized the importance of
allowing each defendant “to defend what he has done.”331 He tried to
make clear that “you cannot, under our system, attribute guilt to a
person who has not had an opportunity to appear and defend on the
main issues.”332
This was hardly the totality of their procedural disputes. Rather,
Jackson disagreed with the Soviets on the purpose and function of
witnesses,333 the purpose and timing of the indictment,334 and the

evidentiary materials and all such other evidence as is customarily received by international
tribunals.”), with Revision of American Draft of Proposed Agreement § 18(d), supra note 292, at
59 (“[The Tribunal shall] employ with all possible liberality simplifications of proof, such as but
not limited to: requiring defendants to make proffers of proof; taking judicial notice of facts of
common knowledge; and utilizing reasonable presumptions.”).
324. Revised Draft of Agreement and Memorandum Submitted by American Delegation
§ 14(b)(2), supra note 321, at 123.
325. Id.
326. Id. § 11, at 123.
327. Id.
328. Minutes of Conference Session of July 2, 1945, in JACKSON REPORT, supra note 263, at
129.
329. Id. at 135.
330. Id. at 137.
331. Id. at 139. Jackson described the Soviet plan as a “more drastic application of the
principle than we would be familiar with.” Id.
332. Id.
333. Minutes of Conference Session of July 3, 1945, in JACKSON REPORT, supra note 263, at
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timing for collection and presentation of evidence.335 In an effort to
resolve their procedural disagreements, the delegates agreed to name a
separate subcommittee relegated exclusively to drafting.336 Despite the
drafting subcommittee’s diligent work—it submitted a proposed draft
agreement on July 11337—Jackson was starting to get anxious by the
time the delegates conferenced on the draft on July 13.338 Emphasizing
his work on the Supreme Court to the delegates, Jackson said, “I
personally must either abandon this project or get it concluded certainly
by the first of the year.”339
Despite these expediency concerns, Jackson and the Soviets appeared
no closer to resolving their procedural controversies; extending their
previous position, the Soviets again advocated trying “chief criminals
only, and in the course of that trial the court may give a verdict that the
organization to which those criminals were parties is a criminal
organization.”340 From there, the Soviets believed all members of that
organization—even if not present—would contemporaneously be
adjudged guilty.341 Jackson disagreed, noting that such a procedure
“will affect the acceptance of the result of these trials as fair in the
United States.”342 The delegates’ differences also extended into
whether to provide the accused with double jeopardy protections and a
right against self-incrimination during the trial.343
Procedural differences between Jackson and the Soviets persisted
throughout the London Negotiations.
Indeed, conflicts about
344
the role of cross-examination,345 testimony from the
witnesses,
153–54; Minutes of Conference Session of July 4, 1945, in JACKSON REPORT, supra note 263, at
155–56.
334. Minutes of Conference Session of July 3, 1945, supra note 333, at 153–54.
335. Id.
336. Minutes of Conference Session of July 4, 1945, supra note 333, at 155.
337. Draft of Agreement and Charter, Reported by Drafting Subcommittee, July 11, 1945, in
JACKSON REPORT, supra note 263, at 194.
338. Minutes of Conference Session of July 13, 1945, in JACKSON REPORT, supra note 263, at
211–12.
339. Id. at 212.
340. Id. at 236.
341. Id.
342. Id. at 237.
343. See generally Minutes of Conference Session of July 17, 1945, in JACKSON REPORT,
supra note 263, at 262; Minutes of Conference Session of July 16, 1945, in JACKSON REPORT,
supra note 263, at 246.
344. Compare John Q. Barrett, The Nuremberg Roles of Justice Robert H. Jackson, 6 WASH.
U. GLOB. STUD. L. REV. 511, 523 (2007) (indicating Jackson’s preference to build the
prosecution’s case primarily on captured German documents rather than by making deals with
cooperating witnesses), with GEORGE GINSBURGS, MOSCOW’S ROAD TO NUREMBERG: THE
SOVIET BACKGROUND TO THE TRIAL 112 (Martinus Nijhoff Publs. 1996) (depicting Soviet
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accused,346 the role of counsel,347 the role of indictments,348 and the
method of presenting evidence349 carried on throughout the London
conference and, to varying extents, were never perfectly resolved.350
Most frustratingly for Jackson, the Soviets again asserted on July 19,
despite weeks of discussing the issue, that “[t]he fact that the Nazi
leaders are criminals has already been established.”351 That same day,
the Soviets announced, to Jackson’s surprise,352 that they would not be
attending a previously scheduled visit to Nuremberg to assess its
viability as a trial location.353
Although the other delegates successfully visited Nuremberg without
a representative from the Soviet Union,354 Jackson’s frustration boiled
over following his return from the trip. Amidst continuing controversy,
Jackson observed on July 20 that “[f]rom the very beginning it has been
apparent that our greatest problem is how to reconcile two very different
systems of procedure . . . .”355 The inability to reconcile those systems
led Jackson to suggest abandoning the concept of an international war
crimes trial altogether.356 On July 23, having privately characterized
the prior week’s negotiations as “futile” and “sterile,”357 a dejected
Prosecutor Rudenko pushing the Allied prosecution to present more witnesses, including German
witnesses).
345. Oral History, supra note 310, at 1265.
346. See id. at 1270–71 (“We were in a position, however, where it would not be regarded as a
fair trial in the western common law countries if the defendant was denied his right to testify in
his own behalf.”).
347. Id. at 1267–68.
348. Minutes of Conference Session of July 17, 1945, supra note 343, at 266; Oral History,
supra note 310, at 1268–69.
349. See Minutes of Conference Session of July 18, 1945, in JACKSON REPORT, supra note
263, at 289 (noting, per Jackson’s comment, that evidentiary questions existed about “what
should go into the indictment and what should go in at the trial”); Oral History, supra note 310, at
1268–69.
350. HARRIS, supra note 11, at 16.
351. Minutes of Conference Session of July 19, 1945, in JACKSON REPORT, supra note 263, at
303.
352. See Robert H. Jackson Diary Entry, July 20, 1945, in Jackson Nuremberg Diary, supra
note 246, at 169 (noting Jackson’s “surprise” when the Soviets pulled out of the trip).
353. See Minutes of Conference Session of July 18, 1945, supra note 349, at 280 (providing
Jackson’s formal invitation to the delegates and the Soviet Union’s acceptance); see also Minutes
of Conference Session of July 19, 1945, supra note 351, at 309 (noting that the Soviet Union
withdrew from the Nuremberg trip).
354. Robert H. Jackson Diary Entry, July 21, 1945, in Jackson Nuremberg Diary, supra note
246, at 169–70.
355. Minutes of Conference Session of July 20, 1945, in JACKSON REPORT, supra note 263, at
319.
356. TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS: A PERSONAL MEMOIR
72 (Knopf Doubleday Publ’g Grp. 1992).
357. Robert H. Jackson Diary Entry, July 26, 1945, in Jackson Nuremberg Diary, supra note
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Jackson told the delegates, “[i]t seems to me our difference in viewpoint
is too great to work without so much difficulty and delay that it is going
to be impractical to try these people within the length of time I can
commit the United States to this venture.”358 He reiterated a similar
sentiment during their continued negotiations on July 25 before leaving
for Potsdam, Germany.359
During his visit to Potsdam from July 26–29,360 Jackson spoke at
some length with Secretary of State Byrnes about the lack of progress at
the London Negotiations.361 During an evening meeting on July 26,
Jackson expressed his frustrations to Byrnes, who responsively said not
to reach an agreement “at the price of a compromise on fair trial or other
things that we as Americans thought essential.”362 During that same
meeting, the pair seemingly agreed that the best solution would be to
have the Allies agree on a definition of what crimes the Nazis violated
but then have each country “try his own criminals by his own
procedure.”363 But Jackson also reported directly to President Truman,
who himself was at Potsdam discussing a post-war peace settlement
with the heads of state from Britain (Prime Minister Attlee) and the
Soviet Union (Premier Stalin).364
Jackson’s exchange with Truman paid off—eventually. The Potsdam
Conference convened July 17 and continued until August 2.365 On July
26, the Potsdam Conference produced a document titled the “Potsdam
Declaration,” which most famously dictated the terms for Japan’s

246, at 171.
358. Minutes of Conference Session of July 23, 1945, in JACKSON REPORT, supra note 263, at
343.
359. Minutes of Conference Session of July 25, 1945, in JACKSON REPORT, supra note 263, at
379–80.
360. See Robert H. Jackson Diary Entries, July 21–31, 1945, in Jackson Nuremberg Diary,
supra note 246, at 171–74 (detailing Jackson’s visit to Potsdam).
361. HARRIS, supra note 11, at 21.
362. Robert H. Jackson Diary Entry, July 26, 1945, supra note 357, at 172. Fascinatingly,
Jackson visited Berlin the next day and specifically viewed Hitler’s office. Robert H. Jackson
Diary Entry, July 27, 1945, in Jackson Nuremberg Diary, supra note 246, at 172. In the office he
saw “letters addressed to Goering,” “typewritten documents,” and “motion picture films.” Id.
They were “strewn with wreckage,” which prompted Jackson to write, “[i]f the Russians had
done no better job than this in collecting evidence we will not get much from that source.” Id.
Jackson did ultimately uncover an index to Hitler’s files, though he never found the files
themselves. Oral History, supra note 310, at 1287–88.
363. Robert H. Jackson Diary Entry, July 26, 1945, supra note 357, at 172.
364. SPRECHER, supra note 286, at 45.
365. Michael J. O’Neal, Overview, Potsdam Conference Protocols, MILESTONE DOCUMENTS,
http://www.milestonedocuments.com/documents/view/potsdam-conference-protocols (last visited
September 22, 2014).
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surrender.366 However, that was not the only document of importance
produced during the Conference.
During his time in Potsdam, Jackson seemingly sensed the weight of
the procedural impasse that existed back in London. The question of
whether a singular tribunal could try the Nazis loomed larger. Upon his
return to London, he let the next few days pass without pressing for
additional negotiations. Indeed, a July 30 entry in his diary reflects that
he “made no move toward the holding of further conferences.”367 A
memorandum submitted by the United States to the delegates on July 31
reinforced the idea of each country trying its own prisoners pursuant to
its own procedures.368 It is in hindsight remarkable to think how close
the Nuremberg trials came to never happening.
Meanwhile, back in Potsdam, Truman’s work aided in the production
of the “protocol of the proceedings.”369 Released on August 1,370
Truman suggested including371 the following language in Article VI:
The three Governments have taken note of the discussions which have
been proceeding in recent weeks in London between British, United
States, Soviet and French representatives with a view to reaching
agreement on the methods of trial of those major war criminals whose
crimes under the Moscow Declaration of October, 1943, have no
particular geographical localization. The three Governments reaffirm
their intention to bring those criminals to swift and sure justice. They
hope that the negotiations in London will result in speedy agreement
being reached for this purpose, and they regard it as a matter of great
importance that the trial of those major criminals should begin at the
earliest possible date.372

That Protocol language, alongside a change in British leadership,373

366. Potsdam Conference, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/
EBchecked/topic/472799/Potsdam-Conference (last updated May 15, 2014). The official
“Potsdam Declaration” was published July 26, 1945. See Potsdam Declaration, July 26, 1945,
available at http://www.atomicarchive.com/Docs/Hiroshima/Potsdam.shtml (noting date of
publication).
367. Robert H. Jackson Diary Entry, July 30, 1945, in Jackson Nuremberg Diary, supra note
246, at 174.
368. Memorandum on Changes in Subcommittee Draft Desired by American Delegation, July
31, 1945, in JACKSON REPORT, supra note 263, at 396–97.
369. Berlin (Potsdam) Conference, July 17–Aug. 2, 1945: Protocol of the Proceedings, August
l, 1945, available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/decade17.asp.
370. See Potsdam Conference Protocols, supra note 365 (noting the date of the Protocols
issuance).
371. SPRECHER, supra note 286, at 45.
372. The language was included in Article VI. Berlin (Potsdam) Conference, supra note 369.
373. Churchill was voted out of office while Jackson was in Potsdam. HARRIS, supra note 11,
at 22. Churchill’s departure meant a change in representation back in London for the balance of
negotiations. Id.; see Oral History, supra note 310, at 1279 (discussing the importance of the
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dramatically changed the character of the London Negotiations.
Jackson sat down on August 1 with the new British delegate, Lord
Chancellor Sir William Jowitt, to discuss his negotiating difficulties
with the Soviet Union.374 Jackson expressed to him that “if we stood
together, we could get what we wanted.”375
When negotiations resumed on August 2, Jowitt guided the meeting
with a firm hand.376 This remarkably led the Soviet Union not to object
to providing the accused with a right of cross-examination, a right to
testify at trial, and a right to testify at any preliminary examination377—
an examination that did not exist in prior drafts. Soviet representatives
made several procedural concessions favorable to Jackson in other
critical areas too, like the nature and character of the indictment378 and
the organization and timing of evidence presentation.379 Reflecting on
the incredible turn of events, Jackson wrote that the Soviet Union
“swallowed our program ‘hook, line[,] and sinker.’”380 The Nuremberg
trials were now a reality.381
The London Agreement, as it was called, ultimately produced two
documents: first, an agreement reflecting the establishment of an
International Military Tribunal, and second, a Charter that provided “the
constitution, jurisdiction, and functions of the Tribunal.”382 The text of

British change in leadership).
374. HARRIS, supra note 11, at 22 (“For the new Labor government Lord Chancellor Sir
William Jowitt assumed the responsibilities formerly assigned to Sir David Maxwell Fyfe.”);
Robert H. Jackson Diary Entry, Aug. 1, 1945, in Jackson Nuremberg Diary, supra note 246, at
175 (noting also that the pair agreed on all major points except one that is unrelated to this thesis);
Summary Record of Conference Between the Lord Chancellor and Mr. Justice Jackson, August 1,
1945, in JACKSON REPORT, supra note 263, at 398 (same).
375. Robert H. Jackson Diary Entry, Aug. 1, 1945, supra note 374, at 175.
376. Id.
377. Minutes of Conference Session of August 2, 1945, in JACKSON REPORT, supra note 263,
at 403–04.
378. The Soviets wanted the indictment to include a “certain amount of evidence.” Id. at 413.
379. The Soviets asked that:
[I]n the opening statement the prosecution would outline the main charges against
defendants; then . . . the prosecution would state to the Tribunal what new evidence
they had, evidence not lodged with the indictment, or any witnesses; and the Tribunal
would pass judgment on that, whether that evidence was considered necessary and
whether it was relevant to the case.
Id. at 413.
380. Robert H. Jackson Diary Entry, Aug. 2, 1945, in Jackson Nuremberg Diary, supra note
246, at 175.
381. FRANCIS BIDDLE, IN BRIEF AUTHORITY 385 (1962) (“Robert Jackson’s tireless energy
and skill had finally brought the four nations together—a really extraordinary feat.”); HARRIS,
supra note 11, at 24 (“With the signing of the London Agreement the legal basis for the trial was
laid.”).
382. HARRIS, supra note 11, at 22.
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the Charter reflected that Jackson got his way on all procedural matters
previously opposed by the Soviets.383 Of particular note are the rights
provided by the Charter for the accused to: (1) receive a preliminary
hearing;384 (2) have a right to counsel (or to represent themselves);385
(3) present evidence;386 (4) cross-examine any prosecution witnesses;387
and (5) receive a copy of an indictment specifying in detail the charges
against them.388 The delegates met on August 8 to sign the Charter “in
a highly photographed ceremony.”389
The event was widely reported,390 and a trial based on the London
Agreement was scheduled.391 Reflecting on the London Negotiations
nearly eight years later, Jackson said the following: “Notwithstanding
the imperfections of the agreement of London, I think it represents a
very important contribution to international law.”392 The trial of
twenty-two Nazi leaders began on November 20, 1945, and the Tribunal
pronounced its judgment on October 1, 1946.393 Twelve defendants
received a death sentence, seven were sentenced to prison terms of
varying lengths, and three were—remarkably—acquitted.394

383. See SPRECHER, supra note 286, at 48 (noting that the “Fair Trial for Defendants” article
“generally followed the adversarial system of Anglo-American practice”).
384. Agreement and Charter art. 16(b), Aug. 8, 1945, in JACKSON REPORT, supra note 263, at
426
385. Id. art. 16(d), at 426.
386. Id. art. 16(e), at 426.
387. Id.
388. Id. art. 16(a), at 426. It ultimately took one entire trial day for the Tribunal to read the
indictment, which one participant would later say “probably could have been avoided if the
signatories of the London Agreement had foreseen how long the Indictment would be and how
little purpose would be served by its reading.” SPRECHER, supra note 286, at 148.
389. Robert H. Jackson Diary Entry, Aug. 8, 1945, in Jackson Nuremberg Diary, supra note
246, at 178.
390. See, e.g., Allies Accept Code for Trials, MILWAUKEE J., Aug. 9, 1945, at 8; Associated
Press, Allies Agreed On Trial Plan: Tribunal Machinery Set Up in Signed Agreement, TEL.
HERALD, Aug. 8. 1945, at 3; United Press, Court Setup for War Trials, PITTSBURGH PRESS, Aug.
9, 1945, at 4; Mass Trial Planned, WINDSOR DAILY STAR, Aug. 9, 1945, at 23; Canadian Press,
Powers Agree on War Trials, CALGARY HERALD, Aug. 8, 1945, at 3; Associated Press, The Texts
of the War Crimes Committee Report and the Jackson Statement, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 1945, at
10.
391. Order of the Tribunal Regarding Notice to Members of Groups and Organizations,
International Military Tribunal, in INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, THE TRIAL OF MAJOR
WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 97 (1947), available at
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/NT_Vol-I.pdf.
392. 11 Oral History, supra note 310, at 1648.
393. See Taylor, supra note 18, at 503, 510 (providing the first trial date followed by the
Tribunal’s judgment date).
394. Id. at 510; see 2 DREXEL A. SPRECHER, INSIDE THE NUREMBERG TRIAL: A
PROSECUTOR’S COMPREHENSIVE ACCOUNT 1415 (1999) (providing a tabulation of the
Tribunal’s sentencing decisions for each defendant).
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Jackson submitted his final report to President Truman one week
after the Nuremberg verdicts.395 In it, he recounted for Truman some of
the impressive statistics about the trial, including those of procedural
relevance; most notably, he shared that 19 of the defendants utilized
their right to testify in their own defense, 61 witnesses testified on
behalf of the defense, and 143 additional witnesses “gave testimony by
interrogatories for the defense.”396
Characterizing the trial as
“gigantic,”397 Jackson pointed to the London Agreement as the root of
the trial’s success398: “[t]he importance of the trial lies in the principles
to which the Four Powers became committed by the Agreement.”399
That Agreement, Jackson surmised, “set up [a] few simple rules which
assured all of the elements of a fair and full hearing, including counsel
for the defense.”400
With Jackson’s report complete, he resigned his commission as Chief
Prosecutor.401 When all was said and done, the length of Jackson’s
service to the Nuremberg effort far exceeded what he anticipated;
although he believed he would be done in time for the 1945 term,402 he
did not rejoin his Supreme Court colleagues until the start of the
October 1946 Term.403
III. NUREMBERG’S EFFECT ON JACKSON’S CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE JURISPRUDENCE
Jackson described his Nuremberg experience as, “without
qualification, as the most satisfying and gratifying experience of my

395. Taylor, supra note 18, at 510.
396. Robert H. Jackson, Justice Jackson’s Final Report to the President Concerning the
Nurnberg War Crimes Trial, 20 TEMP. L.Q. 337, 338 (1946) [hereinafter Jackson, Final Report].
397. Id. at 340.
398. Not everything about Nuremberg was a success. Jackson struggled mightily with his
cross-examination of Hermann Göring, the second-highest-ranking Nazi official on trial (behind
only Reich President Karl Dönitz). See FELDMAN, supra note 52, at 286–93 (describing
Jackson’s courtroom performance in detail); see also HILLARY GASKIN, EYEWITNESS AT
NUREMBERG 87 (1990) (providing a witness account who noted that Jackson’s cross-examination
was a “flat failure”). In fact, he struggled so mightily with his poor performance during this
cross-examination that, when Truman passed over Jackson for the position of Chief Justice
following Stone’s death, Jackson sent a memorandum to Truman, threatening to—among other
troubling assertions—resign his position as Associate Justice. FELDMAN, supra note 52, at 298.
399. Jackson, Final Report, supra note 396, at 342.
400. Id.
401. Id. at 344.
402. October Term 1945, ROBERT H. JACKSON CTR., http://www.roberthjackson.org/theman/supreme-court/october-term-1945/ (last visited September 22, 2014).
403. John Q. Barrett, Bringing Nuremberg Home: Justice Jackson’s Path Back to Buffalo,
October, 4 1946, 60 BUFF. L. REV. 295, 313 (2012).
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life.”404 This Article is not the first to examine whether, and to what
extent, that experience impacted his post-Nuremberg time on the
Supreme Court.405 But prior efforts have generally focused broadly on
his overall judicial philosophy,406 rather than more narrowly on the
extent to which Nuremberg altered Jackson’s approach to specific
individual criminal procedure rights. Upon his return to the Supreme
Court, Jackson’s opinions in the search and seizure, confessions, and
right to counsel realms place primary importance on the criminal justice
system engaging in a dispassionate search for the truth.407 According to
Jackson’s post-Nuremberg philosophy, it is possible—and
permissible—for a suspect to endure or experience what might be an
undesirable law enforcement tactic, so long as the overall procedural
experience was itself detached, objective, and exposed objectionable
police tactics to neutral judicial review.
The extent of Jackson’s philosophical shift in criminal procedure
issues is subtle, but real, and this Part argues that it has maintained an
important life of its own in the realm of modern domestic criminal
procedure. Subpart A analyzes a handful of Jackson’s post-Nuremberg
opinions and argues that, taken together, Jackson’s opinions and votes
accompanying those decisions best exemplify his altered approach to
select criminal procedure issues. Subpart B then contends that
Jackson’s post-Nuremberg criminal procedure philosophy has shaped
modern criminal procedure doctrines in the specific areas of search and
seizure, confessions, and right to counsel. Subpart B highlights specific
areas where lower courts, in reliance on Jackson’s approach, have
altered or devised key doctrinal areas of criminal procedure for their
jurisdictions.

404. 11 Oral History, supra note 310, at 1648.
405. Louis L. Jaffe, Mr. Justice Jackson, 68 HARV. L. REV. 940, 982 (1955) (“His year in
Nuremberg (on leave from the Court) as chief prosecutor of the German war criminals added a
dimension to his experience which influenced his views on ‘civil liberties.’”).
406. See, e.g., HOCKETT, supra note 48, at 267–80 (examining several substantive areas of
Jackson’s opinions and concluding that “[a] careful examination of Jackson’s opinions . . . reveals
that, apart from influencing him to change the tone of his free speech opinions and to modify his
approach to incorporation and seditious speech, Nuremberg did not serve as a determinant in his
constitutional jurisprudence”); Jaffe, supra note 405, at 977–78 (seeking to harmonize Jackson’s
criminal procedure opinions in their totality).
407. Although not discussed in this Piece, Jackson’s post-Nuremberg emphasis on providing
the accused with an overall dispassionate procedural experience pervades in other areas of the law
too, like immigration. E.g., Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 225
(1953) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“Our law may, and rightly does, place more restrictions on the
alien than on the citizen. But basic fairness in hearing procedures does not vary with the status of
the accused.”).
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A. Returning to the Court
Jackson returned to the Court on October 3, 1946 in time to hear
cases docketed for the October 1946 Term.408 To say the least, he
returned to a combative court. Indeed, in his absence, two of his
colleagues—Justices Douglas and Black—had threatened to resign if
Truman named Jackson as Chief Justice to replace Stone following
Stone’s death.409 Despite facing that considerable adversity, Jackson
rejoined the Court with a renewed sense of purpose—a purpose that
helped him develop a more impactful judicial philosophy related to
criminal procedure issues.410
Termed by this Article his “dispassionate criminal procedure,”
Jackson’s post-Nuremberg approach sought to provide the accused with
a procedurally fair experience without focusing too much on specific
rules or doctrines. As illustrated below, Jackson’s post-Nuremberg
approach reflects his belief in the importance of overall procedure—just
as he believed in the importance of holding a complete war crimes trial
while at Nuremberg. Thus, at Nuremberg, Jackson sought procedure in
the sense that he did not want the Nazis to be summarily executed
without counsel, but he did not seek an equivalent to the Bill of
Rights.411
Consistent with his approach during the London Negotiations, he did
not seek an expanded Bill of Rights once home. But also consistent
with his London positions, Jackson’s “dispassionate” approach sought
to strengthen the accused’s right to counsel and simultaneously impose
some limitations on law enforcement, dictated largely by his perception
of fairness rather than his reliance on precedent.412

408. Barrett, supra note 403, at 313.
409. FELDMAN, supra note 52, at 294–95.
410. Barry, supra note 140, at 885 (arguing that Justice Jackson gained a greater appreciation
of procedural due process after Nuremberg); Alfred S. Konefsky & Tara J. Melish, Justice
Jackson’s 1946 Nuremberg Reflections at Buffalo: An Introduction, 60 BUFF. L. REV. 255, 262
(2012) (noting that, to Jackson, Nuremberg represented the “hope that ‘men of good will’ could
establish ‘fairly workable legal controls’ . . . .” (quoting Robert H. Jackson, Address at the
University of Buffalo Centennial Convocation (October 4, 1946))).
411. Henry T. King, Jr., The Legacy of Nuremberg, 34 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 335, 336
(2002) (noting Jackson’s approach was “totally divergent from the summary execution approach”
but did not include all of the traditional rights guaranteed to defendants in the United States).
412. As part of his formulating that philosophy, it is possible that Jackson incorporated public
perception. Indeed, as his private papers reflect, he kept assorted newspaper clippings assessing
his opinions, both positive and negative, alongside communications received from the public.
Justice Jackson’s Personal Papers, No. 61, U.S. v. Di Re (on file with Library of Congress,
Robert H. Jackson Papers, Box 142, Folder 7) (including five letters from the public and two
relevant newspaper articles submitted by the public in his personal Di Re file); Justice Jackson’s
Personal Papers, No. 391, Ashcraft v. Tennessee (on file with Library of Congress, Robert H.
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To demonstrate these conclusions and showcase Jackson’s postNuremberg criminal procedure philosophy, this Subpart considers his
participation in the Court’s criminal procedure work from 1946 until his
sudden death on October 9, 1954.413 During that eight-year period, the
Court heard a total of 921 cases,414 39 of which focused on criminal
procedure issues pertaining to the focus of this Article.415 Within that
period, in dramatic contrast to the single pre-Nuremberg criminal
procedure opinion he wrote,416 Jackson penned thirteen postNuremberg opinions on search and seizure, confession, and right to
counsel cases.417

Jackson Papers, Box 131, Folder 1) (including two letters from the public in his personal Ashcraft
file).
413. Barry, supra note 140, at 881.
414. U.S. Supreme Court Center, supra note 149 (providing total number of cases for the
1946, 1947, 1948, 1949, 1950, 1951, 1952, and 1953 terms).
415. By topic and in chronological order, Jackson after Nuremberg participated in the
following search and seizure, confession, and right to counsel cases:

Search and Seizure: Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947); McDonald v.
United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948); United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581 (1948);
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948); Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S.
699 (1948); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949); Wolf v. Colorado,
338 U.S. 25 (1949); Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74 (1946); United States v.
Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950); United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951);
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747
(1952); Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199 (1952); Irvine v. California, 347 U.S.
128 (1954).

Confession: Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410 (1948); Haley v. Ohio, 332
U.S. 596 (1948); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949); Turner v. Pennsylvania,
338 U.S. 62 (1949); Harris v. South Carolina, 338 U.S. 68 (1949); Gallegos v.
Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55 (1951); Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181 (1952); Brown
v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953); Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953).

Right to Counsel: Carter v. Illinois, 329 U.S. 173 (1946); De Meerleer v.
Michigan, 329 U.S. 663 (1947); Foster v. Illinois, 332 U.S. 134 (1947); Gayes v.
New York, 332 U.S. 145 (1947); Marino v. Ragen, 332 U.S. 561 (1947); Bute v.
Illinois, 333 U.S. 640 (1948); Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672 (1948); Gryger v.
Burke, 334 U.S. 728 (1948); Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948); Uveges v.
Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437 (1948); Gibbs v. Burke, 337 U.S. 773 (1948);
Quicksall v. Michigan, 339 U.S. 660 (1950); Palmer v. Ashe, 342 U.S. 134
(1951); Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181 (1952); Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3
(1954); Massey v. Moore, 348 U.S. 105 (1954).
416. Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
417. In chronological order, Jackson wrote the following opinions following his Nuremberg
service: Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947) (Jackson, J., dissenting); Gryger v. Burke,
334 U.S. 728 (1948); Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948); McDonald v. United States, 335
U.S. 451 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring); United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581 (1948); Johnson
v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring); Turner v.
Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting); Harris v. South Carolina, 338 U.S. 68
(1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting); Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55 (1951) (Jackson, J.,
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When Jackson rejoined the Court in 1946, domestic criminal
procedure remained—compared to its modern counterpart—
undeveloped.418 And, consistent with his pre-Nuremberg Supreme
Court experience, the Due Process Clause persisted as the primary, if
not exclusive, tool for restricting state action.419 Entering his second
stint with the Court, Jackson’s view of due process remained largely
constrained by his still strongly held view of judicial restraint.420 To
Jackson, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was, as
a general rule, an inappropriate vehicle, both before and after
Nuremberg, to invade states’ rights.421 But even against that backdrop,
there are hints that Jackson’s views post-Nuremberg had changed.
Apart from his views on due process, it is difficult at first blush to
find consistency in Jackson’s post-Nuremberg criminal procedure
opinions. Consider first his two right to counsel opinions, both
originating from consolidated cases argued and decided on the same
day.422 In Townsend v. Burke,423 decided on June 14, 1948, petitioner
Townsend was indicted in Pennsylvania state court for burglary and
armed robbery on June 1, 1945.424 Things thereafter moved quickly:
the petitioner was arrested on the indictment on June 3, confessed on
June 4, pleaded guilty on June 5, and was sentenced that same day.425
Premised in part on incorrect information about the petitioner’s criminal
history,426 the trial court sentenced him to two indeterminate sentences
that were not to exceed ten to twenty years.427 At no point was the
petitioner represented by counsel.428
The petitioner argued to the Supreme Court, in part, that during his
plea hearing, among other procedural phases, “he was not represented
by counsel, offered assignment of counsel, advised of his right to
concurring); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953)
(Jackson, J., concurring); Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953).
418. See supra text accompanying notes 154–56.
419. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
420. See HOCKETT, supra note 48, at 280 (arguing that Jackson was “fundamentally the same
justice” following his return from Nuremberg).
421. See id.
422. Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728 (1948) (argued Apr. 26 & 27, 1948 and decided June 14,
1948); Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948) (argued Apr. 27, 1948 and decided June 14,
1948).
423. Townsend, 334 U.S. 736 (1948).
424. Id. at 737.
425. Id.
426. Id. at 739–40 (noting that the trial court incorrectly relied on charges for which petitioner
was found not guilty as a basis for imposing sentence).
427. Id. at 737.
428. Id. at 739.
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counsel or instructed with particularity as to the nature of the crimes
with which he was charged.”429 Those circumstances, according to the
petitioner, “deprived his conviction and sentence of constitutional
validity by reason of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.”430
Writing for a majority of the Court, Jackson agreed. In doing so, the
Court held that the combination of Pennsylvania’s failure to provide the
petitioner with counsel and the sentencing court’s reliance on incorrect
information about the petitioner’s criminal history violated due
process.431 In his opinion, Jackson reasoned “that this uncounseled
defendant was either overreached by the prosecution’s submission of
misinformation to the court or was prejudiced by the court’s own
misreading of the record.”432 Jackson thought that had counsel been
present, counsel “would have been under a duty to prevent the court
from proceeding on such false assumptions and perhaps under a duty to
seek remedy elsewhere if they persisted.”433
The Court reached seemingly the opposite conclusion in Gryger v.
Burke, decided the same day as Townsend, and also authored by
Jackson.434 Following the receipt of a life sentence as an eight-time
habitual offender in Pennsylvania, petitioner Gryger argued to the
Supreme Court that his sentence violated due process in part because he
was sentenced without counsel and one of his convictions occurred
prior to Pennsylvania’s enactment of its habitual offender statute.435 In
rejecting petitioner’s right to counsel claim, Jackson wrote, “it rather
overstrains our credulity” to believe that petitioner—an eight-time
offender—”did not know of his right to engage counsel.”436 And,
although petitioner argued that the sentencing judge erroneously applied
the Pennsylvania Habitual Criminal Act, Jackson disagreed: “[N]othing
[in the record] indicate[s] that he felt constrained to impose the penalty
except as the facts before him warranted it.”437 Accordingly, a majority
of the Court affirmed the sentence petitioner received, despite the
absence of counsel.
The four-member dissent was baffled. Justice Rutledge, writing for

429.
430.
431.
432.
433.
434.
435.
436.
437.

Id. at 738.
Id. at 738–39.
Id. at 740.
Id.
Id. at 740–41.
Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728 (1948).
Id. at 729.
Id. at 730.
Id. at 731.

GALLINI PRINT - FINAL 2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

Nuremburg Lives On

10/4/2014 2:20 PM

55

the dissent, said pointedly, “I cannot square the decision in this case
with that made in Townsend v. Burke.”438 After citing and quoting from
Townsend throughout the opinion, Rutledge concluded by complaining
that the two cases—Townsend and Gryger—”illustrate how capricious
are the results when the right to counsel is made to depend not upon the
mandate of the Constitution, but upon the vagaries of whether judges,
the same or different, will regard this incident or that in the course of
particular criminal proceedings as prejudicial.”439
Jackson’s apparently inconsistent opinion writing persists in the
confession context. Consider two illustrative cases: Watts v. Indiana
and Stein v. New York. On November 12, 1947, petitioner Watts was
arrested in Indiana and interrogated in relays from 11:30 P.M. until
between 2:30–3:00 A.M. the next morning regarding his suspected role
in a murder.440 Petitioner was thereafter interrogated in relays at
varying points during the days of November 13–18,441 after which he
made a series of incriminating statements.442 During that period, and
among other adversities, Watts endured solitary confinement, did not
receive a “prompt preliminary hearing before a magistrate,” did not
have counsel, and received limited sleep and food.443 A majority of the
Court held that such methods violated the petitioner’s due process
rights.444 Accordingly, it concluded, his incriminating statements were
involuntary.445
Writing separately, Jackson concurred.446 In doing so, Jackson was
not troubled so much by the police’s interrogation methods; to the
contrary, Jackson emphasized that certain aspects of the police behavior
in this case were permissible.447 After all, he said, there was no
438. Id. at 732 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
439. Id. at 736 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
440. Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 52 (1949).
441. Id. at 52–53.
442. Id. at 53.
443. Id.
444. Id. at 54–55.
445. Id. at 55.
446. Id. at 57 (Jackson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The Court in Watts heard
cases involving docket numbers 610 (Watts), 76 (Harris v. South Carolina), and 107 (Turner v.
Pennsylvania). Id. Jackson dissented from the Court’s holding as it applied to Turner and
Harris, but concurred with the majority opinion as it applied specifically to petitioner Watts. Id.
As an aside, Jackson enjoyed concurrences: “It’s more fun to write a dissenting opinion or a
concurring opinion than to write a majority opinion, because you can just go off and express your
own view without regard to anybody else.” Philip B. Kurland, Robert H. Jackson, in 4 THE
JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 1789–1969: THEIR LIVES AND MAJOR
OPINIONS 2563–64 (Leon Friedman & Fred L. Israel eds., 1969).
447. Watts, 338 U.S. at 59–61 (discussing the merits of certain interrogation methods, like
extended durations).
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physical violence, and the confession itself was independently verified
as trustworthy.448 The real difficulty, he wrote, was that “[t]he suspect
neither had nor was advised of his right to get counsel. This presents a
real dilemma in a free society. To subject one without counsel to
questioning which may and is intended to convict him, is a real peril to
individual freedom.”449 Apart from that troubling scenario, though one
that Jackson admitted he did not have an answer for, he indicated that
the Bill of Rights should not provide expanded protection to suspects.450
Compare Jackson’s 1947 interrogation related concerns to his 1952
majority opinion in Stein v. New York.451 Following three petitioners’
arrests for murder in connection with a robbery gone bad, two
petitioners—Stein and Cooper—were interrogated without counsel and
ultimately confessed.452 Premised in some part on their confessions,453
both were convicted of felony murder in New York state court and
sentenced to death.454 Despite both Stein and Cooper enduring lengthy
periods of interrogation that, according to petitioners included physical
violence and threats,455 Jackson upheld the police behavior by noting
first that insufficient evidence existed to corroborate petitioners’ claims
of police brutality.456 Second, Jackson believed that the petitioners’
interrogation was not inherently coercive, even though it involved
multiple officers and lasted for twelve hours over a thirty-two hour
period.457 Jackson’s own opinion never mentions petitioners’ absence
of counsel, despite petitioners lacking counsel during their
interrogations, two dissents mentioning this absence,458 and Jackson’s

448. Id. at 58.
449. Id. at 59.
450. Id. at 61 (Jackson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (counseling against
“unnecessary expansion” of the Bill of Rights).
451. Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953).
452. Id. at 166–70.
453. Stein is a trickier case than the textual discussion would suggest, although the specific
details are excluded from the text as irrelevant to this Article’s thesis. But, in short, New York
procedural law at the time mandated that it was a jury’s decision as to whether a petitioner’s
confessions were voluntary. Id. at 159–60. Given that the jury in Stein issued a general verdict,
one issue in the case was whether it was permissible for a general verdict of guilt to possibly be
premised on a coerced confession. Id. at 170.
454. Id. at 159.
455. E.g., id. at 168 n.10 (describing, in part, petitioners’ contentions about police brutality
during the interrogation sessions).
456. Id. at 183–84.
457. Id. at 185–86.
458. Id. at 197–99 (Black, J., dissenting) (citing cases he wrote noting the trouble with holding
suspects in secret without counsel). See generally id. at 204–06 (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(discussing the right to counsel generally in conjunction with the right to be free from coerced
confessions).
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own concerns expressed in Watts about this very scenario.459
Finally, consider and compare Jackson’s post-Nuremberg work in the
search and seizure context where he was most active. Just following his
Nuremberg service, Jackson, in several late 1940s opinions,460
showcased his skepticism of federal police action unchecked by the
judiciary. First, in the 1947 decision of United States v. Di Re,461 the
Court considered the constitutionality of a warrantless arrest and search
of an automobile passenger following a lawful traffic stop of the
driver.462 In holding that the warrantless police action violated the
Fourth Amendment, Jackson wrote for the majority: “[T]he forefathers,
after consulting the lessons of history, designed our Constitution to
place obstacles in the way of a too permeating police surveillance,
which they seemed to think was a greater danger to a free people than
the escape of some criminals from punishment.”463
One year later, in Johnson v. United States,464 the Court evaluated the
lawfulness of an officer gaining consent to search a room in a residence
by telling the suspect, “I want you to consider yourself under arrest
because we are going to search the room.”465 In holding that the
resulting search violated the Fourth Amendment, Jackson reasoned for
the majority in oft-quoted language,466 “[t]he point of the Fourth
Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that
it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which
reasonable men draw from evidence.”467
By way of final illustrative example, Jackson in 1949 penned a
strongly worded dissent in Brinegar v. United States468 after a majority
of the Court upheld the warrantless search of a vehicle suspected of
transporting liquor across state lines.469 In Brinegar, the petitioner’s
459. Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 59 (1949).
460. In addition to the three examples discussed immediately above, Jackson also wrote
opinions in Harris v. United States and McDonald v. United States. McDonald v. United States,
335 U.S. 451 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947)
(Jackson, J., dissenting). Both are discussed infra.
461. United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581 (1948).
462. Id. at 582.
463. Id. at 595.
464. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
465. Id. at 12.
466. For examples of prominent cases that cite Justice Jackson, see Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S.
213, 275 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 n.24 (1980);
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 449 (1971); United States v. Davis, 657 F. Supp. 2d
630, 653 (D. Md. 2009); State v. Hale, 288 P.3d 1, 7 (Or. Ct. App. 2012).
467. Johnson, 333 U.S. at 13–14.
468. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
469. Id. at 161–62.
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vehicle was “weighted down with something,” the petitioner increased
his speed upon seeing the officers, and one officer knew the vehicle’s
driver had previously hauled whiskey.470 Although the petitioner
contended that such facts did not provide sufficient probable cause for
officers to warrantlessly search his vehicle, a majority of the Court
disagreed and upheld the officers’ actions.471
Jackson, it seemed, was incensed. In his dissent, Jackson asserted
that, “[u]ncontrolled search and seizure is one of the first and most
effective weapons in the arsenal of every arbitrary government.”472
Moreover, he protested, “the right to be secure against searches and
seizures is one of the most difficult to protect. Since the officers are
themselves the chief invaders, there is no enforcement outside of
court.”473 Calling the search of petitioner’s car the search of the car of
“Everyman,”474 Jackson added:
But an illegal search and seizure usually is a single incident,
perpetrated by surprise, conducted in haste, kept purposely beyond the
court’s supervision and limited only by the judgment and moderation
of officers whose own interests and records are often at stake in the
search. There is no opportunity for injunction or appeal to
disinterested intervention.475

But, despite Jackson’s concern about the impact of unchecked law
enforcement conduct on the rights of the accused, his concerns
seemingly did not extend to a remedy. Indeed, he joined the 1949
majority in Wolf v. Colorado that declined to incorporate the Fourth
Amendment’s (then only federal) exclusionary rule.476 Accordingly,
although he apparently believed that the text of the Fourth Amendment
should apply to the states, he did not agree that the judicially created
federal exclusionary rule should be imposed on the states.477
Amidst the apparent chaotic inconsistencies in Jackson’s criminal
procedure writings exists a fluid but consistent judicial philosophy.
During the London Negotiations, Jackson often expressed his belief in
the procedural importance of a trial to determine guilt.478 Indeed, to
Jackson, it was a judicial procedural experience that mattered—a
470.
471.
472.
473.
474.
475.
476.
(1961).
477.
478.

Id. at 162–63.
Id. at 178.
Id. at 180 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
Id. at 181 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. at 182 (emphasis added).
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 33 (1949), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
Id. at 33.
E.g., HARRIS, supra note 11, at 15–18.
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procedural experience accompanied, most importantly, by counsel.479
The more likely the accused received a full, neutral judicial procedure
correspondingly suggested to Jackson that the accused also received a
dispassionate criminal procedural experience overall,480 even if
questionable law enforcement investigative techniques were
involved.481 The key for Jackson, if such techniques were utilized, was
to thereafter ensure that they were subjected—not to a rule
specifically—but to neutral judicial review generally.482
Apply the foregoing to each of the prior seemingly contradictory
examples. Return first to the apparent conflict in the right to counsel
context between Gryger and Townsend. Although the Gryger dissent
could not understand why Townsend did not mandate a different
outcome,483 Jackson was faithful to his criminal procedure judicial
philosophy in both cases. In Townsend, he reversed the conviction of a
petitioner who was held incommunicado for forty hours, did not receive
counsel, and was sentenced less than one week from the time of his
arrest by a judge who misconstrued his criminal history.484 That
petitioner, in short, did not receive a full and fair judicial procedural
experience.
In contrast, however, the petitioner in Gryger—although
unrepresented by counsel—had a substantial criminal history and thus
presumably knew he should request a lawyer.485 And, despite the
petitioner’s sentencing error allegation, Jackson, in language nicely
illustrative of his philosophy, explained, “[n]othing in the record
impeaches the fairness and temperateness with which the trial judge
approached his task.”486 In other words, the petitioner’s substantial
prior experience with the criminal justice system, alongside the neutral
judicial review he received in the instant case, assured him a
dispassionate and full procedural experience. Affirmance was therefore
appropriate for the Gryger petitioner.
Similar logic pervades in Jackson’s approach to confessions through
Watts and Stein. Although, again, the two opinions appear inconsistent,
479. E.g., Revised Draft of Agreement and Memorandum Submitted by American Delegation
§ 14(b)(2), supra note 321, at 123.
480. See Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728, 731 (1948).
481. See Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 192–33 (1953).
482. See generally SCHUBERT, supra note 170, at vii (suggesting that “judicial neutrality”
was, to Jackson, “the norm that ought to govern all judicial decision-making”).
483. Gryger, 334 U.S. at 732–33 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
484. Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 737–38 (1948) (describing forty-hour incommunicado
holding followed by resolution of his case in the space of less than a week).
485. Gryger, 334 U.S. at 730.
486. Id. at 731.
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a closer look suggests the opposite. More specifically, in Watts, the
petitioner was held in solitary confinement for six days without either
seeing a magistrate or being provided with counsel before he
confessed.487 Thus, in Jackson’s eyes, the Watts petitioner did not
receive a dispassionate criminal procedure experience.488 In contrast,
the petitioners in Stein, though exposed to constitutionally questionable
interrogation tactics, received a trial that lasted over seven weeks and
generated a record of more than 3000 pages.489 These petitioners, in
short, received a complete and full procedural experience.490 Thus,
even if some errors occurred, Jackson believed them inconsequential:
In a trial such as this, lasting seven weeks, where objections by three
defense counsel required in excess of three hundred rulings by the trial
court without the long deliberation and debate possible for appellate
court consideration, it would be a miracle if there were not some
questions on which an appellate court would rule otherwise than did
the trial judge.491

Two other points amplify the harmony between Watts and Stein.492
First, Jackson remarkably concurred in Watts–a case with facts nearly
identical to the pre-Nuremberg case, Ashcraft, wherein he vigorously
dissented. But gone is the scathing language Jackson used in Ashcraft
to criticize the petitioner’s failure to request counsel493—replaced
instead post-Nuremberg by language of concern in Watts about the “real
dilemma in a free society”494 when an unrepresented suspect is
487. Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 57 (1949) (Douglas, J., concurring) (noting that Watts was
held in confinement for six days prior to confessing).
488. See id. at 59 (Jackson, J., concurring) (“To subject one without counsel to questioning
which may and is intended to convict him, is a real peril to individual freedom.”).
489. Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 159 (1953).
490. See id. at 182 (citations omitted) (“When the issue has been fairly tried and reviewed,
and there is no indication that constitutional standards of judgment have been disregarded, we
will accord to the state’s own decision great and, in the absence of impeachment by conceded
facts, decisive respect.”).
491. Id. at 193.
492. Jackson’s approach to a 1951 case, Gallegos v. Nebraska, likewise showcases his
consistency. 342 U.S. 55 (1951). In Gallegos, the petitioner confessed to a homicide after four
days of interrogation during which he did not receive counsel. Id. at 57. Following his receipt of
counsel, the petitioner was tried and convicted in state court. Id. at 56. The Supreme Court
affirmed his conviction against the petitioner’s argument that the State’s procedure violated his
federal due process rights. Id. at 66–68. Jackson concurred. Writing separately, he focused
generally on the validity of petitioner’s overall procedural experience, rather than the specific
circumstances of his interrogation. E.g., id. at 71 (Jackson, J., concurring) (“This defendant’s
trial appears to have been scrupulously fair and dispassionate.”).
493. Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 169 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (noting that the
Ashcraft petitioner “did not throw himself at any time on his rights, refuse to answer, and demand
counsel, even according to his own testimony”).
494. Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 59 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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interrogated without counsel. Second, and of equal interest, Jackson
went so far as to rely on the majority opinion in Ashcraft—the very
opinion he rejected pre-Nuremberg—in his Stein majority.495
Similar post-Nuremberg growth pervades in Jackson’s search and
seizure opinions,496 which likewise initially appear inconsistent; how
could Jackson so vigorously condemn certain discretionary police
action but decline to feel as strongly about the remedial consequences
for that action? In Di Re, Johnson, and Brinegar, law enforcement
acted independently and without judicial supervision—thus drawing
Jackson’s ire. Apart from that trio of opinions, Jackson showcased his
concern for the “Everyman’s” Fourth Amendment rights in Harris v.
United States and McDonald v. United States—both also decided
shortly after Jackson’s return to the Supreme Court.497 His authoring
from 1947–1949 of five opinions that were skeptical of unchecked
discretionary police action was likely no temporal accident; Jackson,
remember, returned from Nuremberg in 1946.
His vote in Wolf v. Colorado, declining to incorporate the Fourth
Amendment’s exclusionary rule, is not to the contrary. Given his
newfound concern about subjecting officer conduct to judicial
scrutiny,498 Jackson’s vote in Wolf is noteworthy because it
495. Stein, 346 U.S. at 190 (citing Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 145 (1944)).
496. See HOCKETT, supra note 48, at 280 (“Jackson’s Fourth Amendment opinions (at least
those involving the federal government), like his opinions on procedural justice, also revealed
Nuremberg’s liberalizing effect.”).
497. In addition to the textual examples, Jackson dissented in Harris v. United States and
concurred in McDonald v. United States. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948)
(Jackson, J., concurring); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
In Harris, officers searched a residence without a search warrant following petitioner’s arrest
with an arrest warrant. Harris, 331 U.S. at 148–49. Despite engaging in a five-hour search and
tearing open petitioner’s personal papers, the Court upheld the search as valid incident to
petitioner’s arrest. Id. at 151. Jackson, however, dissented and, in part, indicated his concern that
the Court’s holding provided “no practicable limits.” Id. at 198 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
Jackson’s concern with search and seizure extended beyond the strictly legal realm, as his
handwritten notes in McDonald v. United States reflect. His notes include five revisions of a
hypothetical situation involving the landlady of the home where McDonald was arrested. Drafts
of McDonald v. United States by Robert H. Jackson, No. 36 (on file with Library of Congress,
Robert H. Jackson Papers, Box 151, Folder 5) (including drafts with revisions to the hypothetical
situation from Oct. 29, 1948, Nov. 1, 1948, Nov. 3, 1948, Dec. 9, 1948, and Dec. 13, 1948). In
the prolonged hypothetical, Jackson explored the possibilities of either the landlady shooting the
unidentified officers when they pried open her window or the officers shooting the landlady if she
were to draw her gun on them. Id. Jackson’s carefully constructed hypothetical nicely illustrates
his concern with practical dangers that may arise when officers fail to follow criminal procedure
rules.
498. McDonald, 335 U.S. at 457 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring); Brinegar v. United States,
338 U.S. 160, 180 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948);
United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581 (1948); Harris, 331 U.S. at 195 (1947) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting).
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incorporated the Fourth Amendment’s text—not because it declined to
incorporate the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule.499 Remember,
prior to Wolf, the only constitutional vehicle able to constrain the state
police action in the search and seizure context was the Due Process
Clause. For a Justice so focused on judicial restraint,500 Jackson’s
voting to create an entirely new method of limiting state action was
remarkable.
Thus, by the time of Wolf, judicial restraint as a norm seemingly took
on reduced importance for Jackson when compared to the prospect that,
even at the state level, officer conduct could go on unchecked. Wolf
assured citizens, at a minimum, of the Fourth Amendment’s textual
protection and correspondingly reassured Jackson that officer conduct
would receive judicial scrutiny.501 Thus, a state’s decision on
remedy—that is, whether to adopt the exclusionary rule—was, to
Jackson, a wholly separate matter.502 After all, by the time a remedy
question could procedurally arise in criminal litigation, Jackson’s thirst
for a full, fair, and neutral procedural experience for the accused would
already have been satisfied.
Collectively, Jackson’s post-Nuremberg approach to search and
seizure, confessions, and right to counsel issues showcases what he
learned in London: fairness to the accused is achieved through
meaningful trial procedure and neutral judicial review. Leaving the
Nazis’ guilt in the hands of the Crimea Declaration, rather than at the

499. See generally Sanford E. Pitler, The Origin and Development of Washington’s
Independent Exclusionary Rule: Constitutional Right and Constitutionally Compelled Remedy, 61
WASH. L. REV. 459, 484 (noting the effect of Wolf on the states’ ability to reject the exclusionary
rule in favor of alternative remedies as well as incorporation of the Fourth Amendment); Paul
Simon, The Fourth Amendment’s Exclusionary Rule—Judicial Remedy or Constitutional
Mandate: Is There Room for the “Good Faith” Exception?, 41 S. TEX. L. REV. 1101, 1117
(2000) (discussing the “broad expansion of rights” under Wolf); Scott E. Sundby & Lucy B.
Ricca, The Majestic and the Mundane: The Two Creation Stories of the Exclusionary Rule, 43
TEX. TECH L. REV. 391, 424 (2010) (describing Wolf as “the beginning of a new stage in the
Court’s exclusionary rule analysis”); E. H. Schopler, Annotation, Modern Status of Rule
Governing Admissibility of Evidence Obtained by Unlawful Search and Seizure, 50 A.L.R.2d 531
(1956) (discussing the impact of Wolf on later Fourth Amendment case law).
500. Jaffe, supra note 405, at 969 n.114 (“Jackson is among the Justices who are most
opposed to Supreme Court control of state action under the fourteenth amendment.”).
501. See generally Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 30–34 (1949) (noting that states can
provide remedies besides exclusion of evidence, and that states can “rel[y] upon other methods
which, if consistently enforced, would be equally effective.”), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961).
502. Even in that context there are signs that Jackson’s stance on judicial restrain softened.
Three years after Wolf, Jackson joined a majority of the Court in Rochin v. California, holding
that the Due Process Clause contains a limited exclusionary rule. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S.
165, 172–73 (1952).
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hands of an impartial trial complete with robust individual rights, was
unacceptable to Jackson.503 So too was it unacceptable to him in the
domestic realm to always leave the accused without counsel, tolerate all
law enforcement interrogation methods, and/or always permit
warrantless police investigations. In short, law enforcement conduct by
itself—unchecked and unviewed by the judiciary—was unacceptable to
Jackson. The need for dispassionate and fair judicial review became
critically important to him abroad and that importance stuck with him
upon his return to the Court.
B. Modern Applicability
On April 1, 1954, Jackson suffered a “mild” heart attack.504 He
knew he had inherited a genetically weak heart and,505 although he
improved after the April 1 incident, his health had been fading for the
previous two years.506 Perhaps not surprisingly, Jackson suffered a
seizure on October 9 that same year while driving from his home in
McLean, Virginia, into Washington.507 What seemed treatable when he
drove to his secretary’s nearby home for help quickly became fatal;
Jackson died of a heart attack at 11:45 A.M., shortly after his physician
arrived.508
Media reports following his death, alongside subsequent scholarship,
sought to assess Jackson’s legacy.509 Although those collective efforts
highlighted many of Jackson’s notable life accomplishments,510 most
agreed that his work at Nuremberg comprised his most impactful and
lasting work511—and for good reason. That work, after all, had a
503. See supra note 310 and accompanying text.
504. Special to The New York Times, Justice Jackson Dead at 62 of Heart Attack in Capital,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 1954, at 1 [hereinafter Justice Jackson Dead].
505. JARROW, supra note 31, at 56 (noting that Jackson’s father died at age fifty-two from
heart trouble and that Jackson “knew he might have inherited the Jackson heart”).
506. Justice Jackson Dead, supra note 504, at 86 (“Justice Jackson suffered much from illness
in the last two years of his life.”).
507. Id. at 1.
508. Id.
509. Id. at 86; Some Events That Wrote Headlines in ‘54, DIXON EVENING TEL., Dec. 24,
1954, at 29; see, e.g., Fairman, supra note 172, at 445 (discussing how Jackson left a “shining
mark”); James A. Nielson, Robert H. Jackson: The Middle Ground, 6 LA. L REV. 381, 384 (1945)
(engaging in “a study of Robert Jackson’s political and legal philosophy”).
510. See, e.g., Fairman, supra note 172; Jaffe, supra note 405; Stark, supra note 30; Paul A.
Weidner, Justice Jackson and the Judicial Function, 53 MICH. L. REV. 567 (1955).
511. See, e.g., Gordon Dean, Mr. Justice Jackson: His Contribution at Nuremberg, 41 A.B.A.
J. 912 (1955); Moritz Fuchs, Robert H. Jackson at the Nuremberg Trials, 1945–1946 as
Remembered by his Personal Bodyguard, 68 ALB. L. REV. 13 (2005); Viscount Kilmuir, Justice
Jackson and Nuremberg—A British Tribute, 8 STAN. L. REV. 54 (1955); Meltzer, supra note 148,
at 55–56; Richard W. Sonnenfeldt, For Me, Robert H. Jackson is Alive, 68 ALB. L. REV. 71
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tremendous impact on international law.512 But this Subpart argues that
Jackson’s work at Nuremberg lives on in another important area:
domestic criminal procedure—as demonstrated by the many citations to
Jackson’s post-Nuremberg search and seizure, confessions, and right to
counsel opinions by the Supreme Court and lower courts.
Fascinatingly, although Jackson died fifty-nine years ago, citations to
his post-Nuremberg criminal procedure opinions continue, and the
legacy of his work at Nuremberg thus seemingly persists domestically.
Consider first the significance of Jackson’s right to counsel opinions.
Recall that Townsend and Gryger both considered the extent to which a
state must provide a lawyer to the accused at varying procedural
points.513 Given that both cases’ holdings are premised on the Due
Process Clause,514 the Supreme Court’s 1963 Gideon v. Wainwright
decision largely undermined their value to a defendant as a
constitutional source for obtaining counsel.515 And, given Gideon’s
command that “any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a
lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for
him,”516 it emerged as a far more robust source for the accused to
receive counsel than Gryger/Townsend.517
The rise of Gideon as a replacement for the constitutional prominence
of Gryger/Townsend as right to counsel cases makes more remarkable
the fact that both cases remain modernly relevant. Take Gryger first.
Recall the petitioner’s argument that applying Pennsylvania’s Habitual
Criminal Act to him was inappropriate because one of his predicate

(2004).
512. King, supra note 411, at 337–38; Allan Ryan, Judgments on Nuremberg: The Past Half
Century and Beyond—A Panel Discussion of Nuremberg Prosecutors, 16 B.C. THIRD WORLD
L.J. 193 (1996); Taylor, supra note 18, at 488.
513. See Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728, 729 (1948); Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 739
(1948).
514. Gryger, 334 U.S. at 731; Townsend, 334 U.S. at 738–39.
515. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Note, Procedural Due Process at Judicial
Sentencing for Felony, 81 HARV. L. REV. 821, 826 (1968) (referring to the diluted effect of
Townsend and Gryger after Gideon).
516. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344.
517. Despite Gideon’s prominent role in providing counsel to the accused, the Supreme Court
in 1972 relied in part on Townsend to remand petitioner’s case for resentencing where his
sentence was premised on prior felony convictions obtained without his having received counsel.
United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447 (1972) (citing Townsend, 334 U.S. at 736); see
Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 134 (1967) (noting that Townsend, along with two other right to
counsel cases, “clearly” stands “for the proposition that appointment of counsel for an indigent is
required at every stage of a criminal proceeding where substantial rights of a criminal accused
may be affected.”). Other courts have relied on Townsend as a basis for providing a more
substantive and robust right to counsel. E.g., Gutierrez v. Estelle, 474 F.2d 899, 901 (5th Cir.
1973); United States ex rel. Cleveland v. Casscles, 354 F. Supp. 114, 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
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convictions took place before promulgation of the act.518 According to
Jackson though, it was not “clear” from the record that the sentencing
court misconstrued the habitual offender statute.519 Although the
Gryger Court did not consider the ex post facto implications of the
petitioner’s argument in detail,520 modern courts have nonetheless
heavily relied on that aspect of Jackson’s opinion.521 In perhaps its
most impactful application, lower courts have relied on Gryger to
uphold as constitutional the use of felony three strikes statutes to
defendants whose crimes preceded the statutes’ enactment.522
Recall Townsend next. The Supreme Court in Mempa v. Rhay523
held that indigent defendants have a Sixth Amendment right to counsel
at sentencing.524 Citing Townsend, Justice Marshall emphasized the
importance of a flexible approach. He wrote, “appointment of counsel
for an indigent is required at every stage of a criminal proceeding where
substantial rights of a criminal accused may be affected.”525 He
fascinatingly added, “[i]n particular, Townsend v. Burke, . . . illustrates
the critical nature of sentencing in a criminal case and might well be

518. Gryger, 334 U.S. at 729.
519. Id. at 731.
520. In response to petitioner’s argument, Jackson said, “[n]or do we think the fact that one of
the convictions that entered into the calculations by which petitioner became a fourth offender
occurred before the Act was passed, makes the Act invalidly retroactive or subjects the petitioner
to double jeopardy.” Id. at 732. He added only, “[i]t is a stiffened penalty for the latest crime,
which is considered to be an aggravated offense because a repetitive one.” Id.
521. See, e.g., McCall v. Dretke, 390 F.3d 358, 365–66 (5th Cir. 2004) (relying on Gryger to
uphold the supervisory component of a driving while intoxicated statute a “stiffened” penalty
rather than an “additional” one); United States v. Shepard, 231 F.3d 56, 70 (1st Cir. 2000) (noting
that sentencing enhancements provide for “a stiffened penalty for the latest crime, which is
considered to be an aggravated offense because a repetitive one.” (quoting Gryger v. Burke, 334
U.S. 728, 732 (1948))); United States v. Saenz-Forero, 27 F.3d 1016, 1021 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing
Gryger and holding that an enhancement provision increases the punishment but “does not affect
the punishment that [defendant] received for the crimes committed prior to the effective date of
the Act.”); United States v. Forbes, 16 F.3d 1294, 1302 (1st Cir. 1994) (“Gryger . . . recognized
the legislature’s authority to enact an enhanced penalty for future conduct preceded by a criminal
conviction obtained prior to enactment of the enhanced penalty provision.”); Covington v.
Sullivan, 823 F.2d 37, 39–40 (2d Cir. 1987) (relying on Gryger and indicating “[t]he State could
enhance penalties for future crimes because of all prior convictions or only because of certain
designated prior convictions . . . .”).
522. See, e.g., United States v. Kumar, 617 F.3d 612, 629 (2d Cir. 2010) (“The one-book rule,
when it leads to a higher sentencing range than would be applied to a single offense, operates in a
manner similar to that of the recidivist statutes and ‘three strikes’ laws upheld by the Supreme
Court and our sister circuits in the past.”); Forbes, 16 F.3d at 1302 (“Gryger thus recognized the
legislature’s authority to enact an enhanced penalty for future conduct preceded by a criminal
conviction obtained prior to enactment of the enhanced penalty provision.”).
523. Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 134 (1967).
524. Id. at 134.
525. Id.
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considered to support by itself a holding that the right to counsel applies
at sentencing.”526
The Supreme Court aside, lower courts have cited Townsend 1876
total times (1417 times at the federal level, 458 times at the state level,
and even once at the tribal level).527 Although the cites are too
numerous to list in this context, alongside the specific basis for those
citations, one thing is clear: Townsend is consistently cited by federal
and state courts alike as a basis to raise the minimum due process
protections guaranteed to a defendant at sentencing.528 But more
specifically, recall in Townsend the sentencing court’s erroneous
application of petitioner’s criminal history.529 Jackson said, “on this
record[,] we conclude that, while disadvantaged by lack of counsel, this
prisoner was sentenced on the basis of assumptions concerning his
criminal record which were materially untrue.”530 That aspect of
Jackson’s opinion has impressively matured, around the nation at the
state and federal court level, into a due process right of the accused to
be sentenced based only on materially correct information.531

526. Id. (emphasis added).
527. Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948), Westlaw Citing References (last accessed
Sept. 22, 2014).
528. See, e.g., Bryan v. Brandon, 228 F. App’x 578, 584 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that
Townsend stands “for the proposition that a sentence imposed on the basis of an erroneous prior
conviction is constitutionally invalid” and therefore finding petitioner’s sentence
unconstitutional); Lewis v. Lane, 832 F.2d 1446, 1457 (7th Cir. 1987) (citing Townsend, 334 U.S.
at 741) (vacating death sentence in part based on due process concerns arising from false nature
of defendant’s prior convictions presented during sentencing); Drummer v. United States, No.
3:01cr31-10, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60031, at *3 (W.D.N.C. Apr. 26, 2013) (quoting 28 U.S.C. §
2255(a) (2012)) (holding that Townsend provided petitioner with “a cognizable claim that his
‘sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution’”); D’Ambrosio v. State, 146 P.3d 606,
626 (Haw. Ct. App. 2006) (quoting Townsend, 334 U.S. at 741) (holding that, as a “‘requirement
of fair play,’” a convicted person is constitutionally entitled to be represented at a minimum-term
hearing to ensure that the minimum sentence imposed is not based on misinformation); United
States v. Hamid, 531 A.2d 628, 643–44 (D.C. 1987) (citing Townsend, 334 U.S. at 740–41)
(holding that a sentence based on incomplete information does not comport with due process).
529. Townsend, 344 U.S. at 740.
530. Id. at 740–41.
531. See, e.g., Stewart v. Erwin, 503 F.3d 488, 499 (6th Cir. 2007) (“Townsend establishes the
principle that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is violated when a defendant
is sentenced on the basis of materially false information.”); Torres v. United States, 140 F.3d 392,
404 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing Townsend as providing due process right not to be sentenced based on
materially false information); Gray v. Rowe, No. 01-102-B-S, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15551, at
*30 (D. Me. Sept. 28, 2001) (relying on Townsend to provide “a ‘clearly established’
constitutional right to have a sentence imposed based on factually accurate information”); State v.
Bosworth, 360 So. 2d 173, 175 (La. 1978) (citing Townsend, 334 U.S. at 740–41) (holding that,
where the trial court relies upon materially false information, the defendant must be given an
opportunity to deny or explain substantially significant misinformation); Ford v. State, 437 So. 2d
13, 14 (Miss. 1983) (citing Townsend as controlling in a case involving an unverified statement
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Beyond Jackson’s right to counsel work is the legacy left by two of
his confession opinions: Stein v. New York and Watts v. Indiana.
Although a later Supreme Court case overruled Stein’s upholding of a
particular New York trial procedure,532 Stein has remained modernly
relevant to confession law in two primary ways. First, and quite
generally, Stein remains relevant to the judiciary’s current conception of
the due process voluntariness test.533 Second, keying on the distinction
Jackson drew in Stein between interrogations involving physical
coercions and psychological coercion,534 lower courts have crafted a per
se rule against the admissibility of confessions secured in any part by
police brutality.535
Jackson’s discussion of the role of counsel in his Watts concurrence
resonated with the Supreme Court in Escobedo v. Illinois.536 Premised
on the Sixth Amendment, Escobedo, a controversial opinion when
issued,537 held that petitioner’s conviction was unconstitutionally based
on an unlawful interrogation—one that occurred without petitioner
having received counsel.538 The Court reasoned, after citing to
Jackson’s concurrence, that “[t]he right to counsel would indeed be
hollow if it began at a period when few confessions were obtained.”539
But more modernly, Jackson’s opinion in Watts has influenced lower
courts on issues related to the role of counsel during an interrogation,540

which defendant was not allowed to refute); People v. Barnes, 875 N.Y.S.2d 545, 547 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2009) (quoting Townsend, 334 U.S. at 741) (remanding a case for resentencing where factors
relied on by the sentencing court included “‘materially untrue’” assumptions or
“‘misinformation’” about defendant’s prior convictions).
532. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 391 (1964) (“In our view, the New York procedure falls
short of satisfying these constitutional requirements. Stein v. New York is overruled.”).
533. See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 434 (2000); United States v.
Awadallah, 349 F.3d 42, 56 (2d Cir. 2003); United States v. Alfaro, No. CR 08-0784 JB, 2008
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108887, at *33–34 (D. N.M. Dec. 17, 2008); United States v. Neha, 411 F.
Supp. 2d 1262, 1268 (D. N.M. 2005).
534. Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 183–85 (1953), overruled by Denno, 378 U.S. 368
(comparing the constitutional implications of interrogations that involve police brutality as
opposed to psychological coercion).
535. See, e.g., United States v. Jenkins, 938 F.2d 934, 938 (9th Cir. 1991); Cooper v. Scroggy,
845 F.2d 1385, 1390 (6th Cir. 1988); Cranor v. Gonzales, 226 F.2d 83, 88 (9th Cir. 1955).
536. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 488 (1964).
537. See, e.g., LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 391–92
(2000); Sidney E. Zion, Attorneys Chafe at Crime Rulings: Prosecutors Fear the Guilty Will be
Able to Avoid Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 1965, at 61; Sidney E. Zion, High Court Scored on
Crime Rulings: Bars Against Confessions, Searches and Seizures Attacked by Murphy, N.Y.
TIMES, May 14, 1965, at 39.
538. Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 490–91.
539. Id. at 488.
540. E.g., State v. Stoddard, 537 A.2d 446, 457 (Conn. 1988).
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the treatment suspects should receive during police questioning,541 and
the role of constitutional safeguards more broadly for the accused542—
among other topics.543
Despite the extraordinary heritage of Jackson’s right to counsel and
confession opinions, his work on Fourth Amendment issues has had the
most profound role in shaping modern criminal procedure.544 Like with
his other post-Nuremberg criminal procedure opinions, lower courts
have extensively cited Di Re, Johnson, and Brinegar.545 Thus, similar
to the influence his right to counsel and confession cases have had on
lower courts, Jackson’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has likewise
impacted federal and state courts.546 But, unlike those other two
substantive areas, Jackson’s Fourth Amendment opinions have also
greatly impacted the Supreme Court.
In 1961, the Supreme Court in Chapman v. United States547 relied
heavily on Johnson to invalidate law enforcement’s warrantless search
of a resident’s home.548 Di Re, by contrast, most prominently began
impacting modern Supreme Court Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in
1979,549 when the Court considered the validity of an Illinois statute
authorizing police “to detain and search any person found on [a]
541. E.g., Day v. State, 29 So. 3d 1178, 1180–81 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
542. E.g., State v. Moore, 585 A.2d 864, 898 (N.J. 1991).
543. E.g., State v. Grant, No. CR6481390, 2002 Conn. Super. LEXIS 48, at *17–18 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Jan. 3, 2002); People v. Bender, 551 N.W.2d 71, 83–84 (Mich. 1996), overruled by
People v. Tanner, No. 146211, 2014 WL 2853770, at *24 (Mich. June 23, 2014).
544. See HOCKETT, supra note 48, at 280 (arguing that Jackson’s Fourth Amendment
opinions “disclosed his belief that the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures . . .
is one of the most important procedural safeguards against arbitrary government”); Carol S.
Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 820, 842 (1994) (“Justice
Jackson returned to the Supreme Court a fervent believer in the warrant requirement.”).
545. Brinegar v. U.S., 338 U.S. 160 (1949), Westlaw Citing References (last accessed Sept.
22, 2014) (listing 5394 case citing references); U.S. v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581 (1948), Westlaw
Citing References (last accessed Sept. 22, 2014) (listing 1178 case citing references); Johnson v.
U.S., 333 U.S. 10 (1948), Westlaw Citing References (last accessed Sept. 22, 2014) (listing 2978
case citing references).
546. See, e.g., United States v. Moustrouphis, No. 2:11-cr-141-GZS, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
113490, at *14 (D. Me. May 30, 2012); Lee v. City of Charleston, 668 F. Supp. 2d 763, 774 (S.D.
W. Va. 2009); United States v. Munoz-Villalba, No. 1:05-CR-248, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28974,
at *25 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 15, 2005); United States v. Moderacki, 280 F. Supp. 633, 637 (D. Del.
1968); United States v. Kowal, 197 F. Supp. 401, 406 (D.R.I. 1961); People v. Escollias, 70 Cal.
Rptr. 65, 69 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968) (Kaus, J., concurring); State v. Peery, 303 S.W.3d 150, 153
(Mo. 2010); State v. Davis, No. 18493, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 2457, at *4–5 (Ohio Ct. App.
June 1, 2001).
547. Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961).
548. Id. at 613–17.
549. The Supreme Court cited Di Re earlier, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968), but
Ybarra is seemingly the first instance where Di Re was nearly—if not actually—dispositive of the
issue.
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premises being searched pursuant to a search warrant.”550 Justice
Stewart’s majority opinion in Ybarra v. Illinois relied on Di Re
extensively to invalidate the statute and hold that separate probable
cause must exist to support the search of those on the premises.551 He
reasoned that “the governing principle” in both Ybarra and Di Re—the
requirement of separate probable cause—”is basically the same.”552
The impact of Di Re is collaterally noteworthy also because of Ybarra’s
current doctrinal importance in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.553
Perhaps more interestingly, though, is a more recent debate that
emerged amongst the justices over Di Re’s meaning. It seemingly
began in 1991 when the Supreme Court decided California v.
Acevedo,554 a case of monumental importance to the legality of
warrantless car searches.555 In restructuring decades of prior doctrine
that drew a distinction between whether officers sought to search a car
or a container within that car,556 Justice Blackmun for the majority
550. Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 87 (1979).
551. Id. at 94–96.
552. Id. at 95.
553. George M. Dery III, Improbable Cause: The Court’s Purposeful Evasion of a Traditional
Fourth Amendment Protection in Wyoming v. Houghton, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 547, 595–96
(2000) (arguing that the fundamental logic of Ybarra applies equally to searches of persons or
places and emphasizing the precedential value of Ybarra); Kevin Robert Glandon, Bright Lines
on the Road: The Fourth Amendment, the Automatic Companion Rule, the “Automatic
Container” Rule, and A New Rule for Drug—or Firearm—Related Traffic Stop Companion
Searches Incident to Lawful Arrest, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1267, 1287 (2009) (“Perhaps the
strongest argument against the automatic companion rule can be found in Ybarra v. Illinois.”);
Sara L. Shaeffer, Another Dent in Our Fourth Amendment Rights: The Supreme Court’s
Precarious Extension of the Automobile Exception in Wyoming v. Houghton, 45 S.D. L. REV.
422, 441–42 (2000) (citing Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 91; United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 587
(1948)) (emphasizing that the Court has consistently rejected the idea of guilt by association in
Fourth Amendment cases).
554. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991).
555. Robert Angell, California v. Acevedo and the Shrinking Fourth Amendment, 21 CAP. U.
L. REV. 707, 721 (1992) (noting the importance of Acevedo’s departure from prior decisions
holding that a search of a container is subject to the warrant requirement); Ricardo J. Bascuas,
Property and Probable Cause: The Fourth Amendment’s Principled Protection of Privacy, 60
RUTGERS L. REV. 575, 615 (2008) (describing the two approaches to search and seizure rules in
the majority opinion and dissenting opinion in Acevedo); Cynthia Lee, Package Bombs,
Footlockers, and Laptops: What the Disappearing Container Doctrine Can Tell Us About the
Fourth Amendment, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1403, 1438–41 (2010) (discussing the
importance of Acevedo on searches of containers in cars).
556. Leading up to Acevedo, the Supreme Court treated warrantless car searches differently
depending on whether officers sought to search the car itself or a container specifically located
inside the car. Compare California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985), and Carroll v. United States,
267 U.S. 132 (1925), with Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979), abrogated by California v.
Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991), and United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977), abrogated by
California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991). Acevedo largely eliminated that distinction by
simply requiring probable cause to search the car or containers within the car. Acevedo, 500 U.S.
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wrote: “[W]e now hold that the Fourth Amendment does not compel
separate treatment for an automobile search that extends only to a
container within the vehicle.”557 Accordingly, he concluded, “the
police may search without a warrant if their search is supported by
probable cause.”558
Although Justice Blackmun’s majority opinion in Acevedo did not
rely on Di Re, Justice Stevens in dissent relied both on Di Re and
Johnson. In arguing that Acevedo unconstitutionally undermined the
role a warrant should play in car searches, Stevens cited both cases
when highlighting the historical importance of warrants:
Over the years—particularly in the period immediately after World
War II and particularly in opinions authored by Justice Jackson after
his service as a special prosecutor at the Nuremburg trials—the Court
has recognized the importance of this restraint as a bulwark against
police practices that prevail in totalitarian regimes.559

Justice Stevens added, again relying on Johnson, “[t]he [warrant]
requirement also reflects the sound policy judgment that, absent
exceptional circumstances, the decision to invade the privacy of an
individual’s personal effects should be made by a neutral magistrate
rather than an agent of the Executive.”560
The proper role—at least according to Scalia and Stevens—of
Jackson’s jurisprudence more pointedly arose when the pair squared off
in Wyoming v. Houghton.561 Decided in 1999, in a case of tremendous
significance to everyday Americans, Houghton held that when probable
cause exists to search a vehicle for contraband, officers may
warrantlessly search even a passenger’s belongings.562 Writing for the
majority, Justice Scalia reasoned that, compared to a full search of a
passenger, “the degree of intrusiveness upon personal privacy and
indeed even personal dignity” is lower “when the police examine an
item of personal property found in a car.”563 In doing so, he sought to
distinguish Di Re—relied upon heavily both by the state court below
and by Justice Stevens in dissent—by asserting the following:

at 579.
557. Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 576.
558. Id. at 579.
559. Id. at 586 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (citing as an example United States
v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 17 (1948)).
560. Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 586 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Johnson, 333 U.S. at 13–14).
561. Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999).
562. Id. at 302.
563. Id. at 303.

GALLINI PRINT - FINAL 2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

10/4/2014 2:20 PM

Nuremburg Lives On

71

[The dissent attributes the holding in Di Re] to “the settled distinction
between drivers and passengers,” rather than to a distinction between
search of the person and search of property. . . .
In its peroration, however, the dissent quotes extensively from
Justice Jackson’s opinion in Di Re, which makes it very clear that it is
precisely this distinction between search of the person and search of
property that the case relied upon:
“The Government says it would not contend that, armed with a
search warrant for a residence only, it could search all persons found
in it. But an occupant of a house could be used to conceal this
contraband on his person quite as readily as can an occupant of a
car.”564
Does the dissent really believe that Justice Jackson was saying that
a house-search could not inspect property belonging to persons found
in the house—say a large standing safe or violin case belonging to the
owner’s visiting godfather? Of course that is not what Justice Jackson
meant. He was referring precisely to that “distinction between
property contained in clothing worn by a passenger and property
contained in a passenger’s briefcase or purse” that the dissent
disparages.565

Joined by Justices Souter and Ginsburg, Justice Stevens dissented,
and in doing so, found Di Re directly on point as “the only automobile
case confronting the search of a passenger defendant.”566 Di Re,
according to Stevens, established a “settled distinction between drivers
and passengers” that made it “quite plain” that the search of a
passenger’s belongings involves a serious intrusion.567 Quoting from
Di Re, Stevens finished by observing “[w]hat Justice Jackson wrote for
the Court 50 years ago is just as sound today: . . . ‘We are not
convinced that a person, by mere presence in a suspected car, loses
immunities from search of his person to which he would otherwise be
entitled.’”568
Most recently, in Virginia v. Moore,569 the Supreme Court in 2008
considered “whether a police officer violates the Fourth Amendment by

564. Di Re, 332 U.S. at 587.
565. Houghton, 526 U.S. at 303 n.1. Incidentally, there is nothing in Justice Jackson’s private
papers to support Justice Scalia’s blanket assertion that Jackson’s opinion in Di Re focused on
distinguishing a search of person versus property, as opposed to distinguishing between a search
of a driver rather than passenger. If anything, the limited exchange between Jackson and his clerk
suggests the opposite; indeed, the pair spoke in terms of searching “occupants of the car” rather
than in terms of “people” or “property” more generally.
566. Houghton, 526 U.S. at 309 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
567. Id. at 309–10 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
568. Id. at 312 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (quoting Di Re, 332 U.S. at 587).
569. Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164 (2008).
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making an arrest based on probable cause but prohibited by state
law.”570 In concluding that no violation occurs, the Court held “that
while States are free to regulate such arrests however they desire, state
restrictions do not alter the Fourth Amendment’s protections.”571 The
Court reasoned, in part, that cases like Di Re and Johnson confirmed the
propriety of its resolution.572 Moore, like the other Supreme Court
cases influenced by Jackson’s post-Nuremberg work, quickly assumed
an important role in Americans’ daily lives.573
Collectively, Jackson’s post-Nuremberg Fourth Amendment work
has influenced the Supreme Court’s modern direction on automobile
searches,574 searches of a car passenger’s property,575 searches of
persons present during warrant-based property searches,576 and the role
of state law in Fourth Amendment seizures of a person.577 But apart
from the precise importance of Jackson’s search and seizure opinions to
the doctrinal development of the Fourth Amendment is the overall
impact of what Jackson wrote in those opinions. Like a broad
contingent of lower courts,578 the modern Supreme Court has indeed
often relied on Jackson’s choice of words to support its decisions.579
570. Id. at 166.
571. Id. at 176.
572. Id. at 173 (“Neither Di Re nor the cases following it held that violations of state arrest
law are also violations of the Fourth Amendment.”).
573. See J. Thomas Sullivan, Danforth, Retroactivity, and Federalism, 61 OKLA. L. REV. 425,
436 (2008) (construing Moore as an “important decision having federalism consequences”).
Perhaps most importantly, Moore sought to ensure consistency in Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence by untangling it from state law standards—at least in the context of arrest. See
Moore, 553 U.S. at 176 (cautioning that “linking Fourth Amendment protections to state law
would cause them to ‘vary from place to place and from time to time’ . . . .” (quoting Whren v.
United States, 517 U.S. 806, 815 (1996))).
574. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 564, 586 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
575. Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 303 n.1 (1999).
576. Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 94–96 (1979).
577. Moore, 553 U.S. at 170.
578. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 862 F.2d 1135, 1151 (5th Cir. 1988) (Goldberg, J.,
dissenting); United States v. Alvarez-Gonzalez, 561 F.2d 620, 629–30 (5th Cir. 1977) (Goldberg,
J., dissenting); United States v. Fern, 484 F.2d 666, 670 (7th Cir. 1973) (Gordon, J., dissenting);
United States v. Stewart, 468 F. Supp. 2d 261, 282 (D. Mass. 2007), overruled by United States v.
Stewart, 532 F.3d 32 (1st Cir. 2008); Polk v. District of Columbia, 121 F. Supp. 2d 56, 66–67
(D.D.C. 2000); Ramirez v. Webb, 599 F. Supp. 1278, 1282 (W.D. Mich. 1984); United States v.
Thomas, 314 A.2d 464, 473 (D.C. 1974) (Pair, J., dissenting); State v. Barnaby, 142 P.3d 809,
849–50 (Mont. 2006) (Nelson, J., dissenting); State v. Deskins, 799 P.2d 1070, 1074 (Mont.
1990) (McDonough, J., dissenting); State v. Crom, 383 N.W.2d 461, 469–70 (Neb. 1986)
(Krivosha, C.J., concurring); State v. Irving, 555 A.2d 575, 592–93 (N.J. 1989) (O’Hern, J.,
dissenting); Commonwealth v. Rosenfelt, 662 A.2d 1131, 1145–46 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993).
579. See, e.g., Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 436 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“As
Justice Jackson observed shortly after his return from Nuremberg, cases of this kind present ‘a
real dilemma in a free society . . . for the defendant is shielded by such safeguards as no system of
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Without further belaboring the point, it seems safe to conclude that
Jackson’s post-Nuremberg opinions remain profoundly influential on
how criminal procedure issues are decided today.
CONCLUSION
Robert Jackson was a monstrously important legal figure, but not for
the reasons we might traditionally think. Although his varied positions
in the government alongside his work as an Associate Justice on the
Supreme Court impacted the direction of tax law, antitrust law, and
bankruptcy law—to name but a few examples—he never received credit
for influencing an additional important doctrinal area: criminal
procedure.
Prior to Jackson accepting an assignment from President Truman to
become the Chief Prosecutor at Nuremberg, Jackson simply had no
occasion to construct a coherent judicial philosophy on issues like
search and seizure, police interrogation methods, and the importance of
the accused receiving the assistance of a lawyer. But after struggling
for months in London during the Summer of 1945, everything changed.
That Summer, he came to understand the procedural importance of
providing the accused with certain rights—those rights, he realized, are
what set the American legal system apart.
Following his return to the bench after Nuremberg, Jackson
commented, “I regard [the Nuremberg trials] as infinitely more
important than my work on the Supreme Court.”580 He therefore
unsurprisingly approached his work on criminal procedure issues with a
renewed vigor and focus that produced several important opinions.
Those opinions remain highly influential today on both lower courts and
the Supreme Court. Nuremberg therefore did more than impact
international criminal law; its influence on Justice Jackson’s thinking
reflects, through his opinions, that it touched the lives of Americans—
both then and now. The influence of those opinions on modern
courts—both at the lower court and Supreme Court levels—likewise
remains pervasive.
law except the Anglo-American concedes to him.’” (quoting Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 59
(1949) (Jackson, J., concurring in result))); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 973 (1984)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Justice Jackson’s reference to his experience at Nuremberg should
remind us of the importance of considering the consequences of today’s decision for
‘Everyman.’”); United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 609–10 (1983) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (relying on language from Jackson to emphasize “an unprecedented invasion of
constitutionally guaranteed liberties”); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 273–74
(1973) (holding warrantless roving border search unconstitutional and noting in doing so “[i]t is
well to recall the words of Mr. Justice Jackson, soon after his return from the Nuremberg trials”).
580. Kurland, supra note 446, at 2565.

